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This thesis establishes an analytical framework for identifying and discussing 
strategic factors considered important when implementing NCW as a new warfighting 
concept for the information age. Although the findings have a broad application, focus 
has been on a Norwegian NCW implementation. A key question is if the emerging NCW 
concept is a feasible defense alternative for smaller nations.  
Central to the study are factors found in the strategic environment, such as 
Norway’s strategic freedom of maneuver, affiliation with NATO, the impact of national 
interests, economic and technological assumptions, and the cultural premises that 
underlie the power of information. The changing features in the nature of conflict and in 
future potential opponents will also influence NCW mission challenges, opportunities 
and constraints. A particularly important mission challenge is the neglected military view 
of low-intensity conflicts as “worthy” military missions as well as the sociological impact 
on networked actors and opponents, as conditioned by new trends in the information age.  
A key finding is that NCW, which also takes into consideration the impact of 
other strategic factors discussed in this thesis, has the potential to rise to the many 
challenges and achieve many of the objectives currently “floating” in existing military 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis identifies and discusses several strategic factors considered important 
when implementing NCW as a new warfighting concept for the information age. 
Although the findings have a broad application, my focus has been on NCW 
implementation in the NATO Alliance’s small countries, and in Norway in particular. Of 
particular interest are factors found in the strategic environment. For Norway’s case, as a 
non-EU member state, strategic freedom of maneuver is determined by the power triangle 
between the U.S., the EU and Russia. The impact of this power triangle, and in particular 
the proximity of Russia, suggests that Norway must develop a broader range of NCW 
capabilities compared to other small nations. Furthermore, Norway’s economic strength 
and technological environment imply a sound foundation for an NCW implementation if 
there is a willingness to prioritize the required strategic, doctrinal and organizational 
elements in an implementation strategy. As a small, high-tech oriented and transparent 
nation, Norway could particularly benefit from a broad interagency approach to the NCW 
concept. Other factors such as a cultural resistance to embracing the significance of soft 
power such as IO and public diplomacy as tools in information-age conflicts must be 
overcome in order to fully exploit the anticipated benefits of NCW.  
Characteristics of the ongoing changes in the nature of conflict will also influence 
a NCW implementation strategy. New doctrinal and organizational principles such as 
swarming and the increased significance of trust in modern societies, should be further 
investigated to enhance future command and control arrangements and other NCW 
capabilities. In addition, the development of comprehensive mission capabilities must be 
ensured. Other mission challenges and constraints that need to be considered are the risk 
of shortcutting strategies and an underestimation of nontraditional missions found in low-
intensity conflicts, caused by an exaggerated belief in Western militaries current 
supremacy, new warfighting capabilities and in the concept of information superiority.  
Another important mission challenge discussed is the neglected military view of 
low-intensity conflicts as less “worthy” military missions. Obviously there is reluctance 
in the military to embrace these new and changing missions such as peace support- and 
 xv
humanitarian operations even if they have political, economic and social significance. 
Noticeably, there is a need to transform both our understanding of low-intensity conflicts 
and our war fighting capabilities to meet the information revolution. Applying the 
revolution in military affairs only to the conventional, mid- and high intensity levels of 
war will not contribute to solving the difficult and complex problems connected with 
low-intensity conflicts. The scale of conflict is not a continuous line with just a higher 
intensity of the same problem. High-and low-intensity conflicts are in fact inverse 
problems with vastly different origins and threat assessments. They require different 
strategies, tactics and form of organization in order to be solved. Recognizing this 
diversity in future NCW development implies that both capabilities are needed, and that 
the types of forces employed in each case are not necessarily compatible or 
interchangeable. 
The sociological impact of new trends in the information age, such as the 
emergence of smart mobs, should be further researched and exploited in future doctrines 
for conducting low-intensity conflict. Although, smart-mob behavior is based on 
developments in information technology, particularly in wireless networks and wearable 
mobile devices, it is the anticipated changes in social behavior and its impact on future 
networked actors and opponents that are significant. The benefits of smart-mob behavior 
for these actors can be substantial, but at the same time severe constraints apply. The 
NCW implications of smart-mob behavior are many, but two stand out. First and 
foremost are the requirements of network centric forces to understand and predict the 
consequences of this type of behavior by opponents or other actors in low-intensity 
conflicts. Second is the opportunity to develop new doctrinal concepts for homeland 
defense structures as well. In Norway’s case, an example could be to introduce NCW 
capabilities in the home guard. The deterrent and operational impact of such a force could 
be considerable if the force truly were able to operate autonomously with the advantages 
of new information technology, combined with detailed local knowledge in the cities and 
in rural territories. 
Finally, NCW has the potential to substantiate and unite the many challenges and 
objectives currently “floating” in existing transformation strategies. The continuous 
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process of a transformation strategy needs direction. The developments of Norwegian 
NCW, which also take into consideration the impact of strategic factors as discussed in 
this thesis, offers the prospect of shaping the transformation process and creating a 
comparative strategic advantage. In its present form, NCW might not be the proper 
concept or even the right term to use for how Norway should contribute militarily in 
future conflicts. But current theory, experiences and related experimental doctrines have 
come far enough for us to outline a more tangible and comprehensive concept. In this 
regard, the Norwegian adapted term Network-Based Defense or perhaps Net-centric 
Defense may be more appropriate than the term Network Centric Warfare, because it 
encompasses all levels of conflict and meets the requirements of net-centric activities: 
cooperation or integration across services; joint units; and inter-agency and multinational 
entities. Thus, NCW may be just the warfighting concept used during times of crisis or 
conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over specific adversaries. 
Consequently, if net-centric operations are seen as the cornerstone of  future warfighting 
concepts, it should indeed be pursued on a broader level in a comprehensive Norwegian 
transformation strategy. By doing so, Network Centric Defense has the potential to 
become a feasible and “holistic” defense alternative. To get there, we must rethink and 
broaden the whole business of military affairs, take some calculated risks towards an 
uncertain future, and emphasize the development of unconventional doctrinal and 



























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DEFINING THE CONTEXT OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
Network centric warfare (NCW) is emerging as a future warfighting concept in 
the U.S., NATO and many other Western countries. NCW may be defined as “an 
information-superiority enabled concept of operations that generates increased combat 
power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared 
awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality, 
increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.”1  
NCW arose out of the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 
Arguably, this revolution represents a major discontinuity in military affairs due to the 
effects and prospects of new technology and in particular developments in information 
technology.2 The United States is in front of doctrinal and technological developments, 
while its allies are adapting and developing their own NCW concepts based on their 
countries’ individual premises and the Alliance’s demands.  This process is not simple 
and there are frictions and numerous problems associated with it based on the cultural, 
doctrinal, technological, and economic diversity within the Alliance.  
At one end of the scale we find U.S. forces’ long-term goals as they are 
envisioned in Joint Vision 2020: to form a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance 
on the battlefield.3 Full spectrum dominance is an ambitious national goal in any type and 
level of conflict, and it is certainly not within reach of most other countries. For the new 
and less resource-rich NATO members in the Baltic and in Eastern Europe, who 
represent the other end of the scale, the goal is basically to develop an armed force that 
can fulfill fundamental national security needs and at the same time fit in with the 
Alliance’s basic interoperability requirements. Other more established NATO members 
in Europe are also struggling to keep up with developments.  
                                                 
1 David Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and 
Leveraging Information Superiority,  (CCRP Publication Series, 1999), 2. 
2 Several scholars dispute the assertion that a contemporary revolution in military affairs is taking 
place. However, most would agree that the current technological, doctrinal and organizational development 
has at least a potential to be called revolutionary by definition.  
1 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020  (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), 
3. 
It is within the context of the Information Age, the discontinuation of the Cold 
War’s effect on the strategic environment and on the nature of war, and the subsequent 
military transformation process that NATO and most other Western countries have 
deemed necessary, that the NCW concept is evolving. How the latter is conducted is of 
particular importance since it is a direct and interrelated link between the two.  According 
to Admiral E. P. Giambastiani, the current Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, 
transformation applies to the military by: 
…bringing changes to doctrine, organization, capabilities, training, 
education and logistics. It is not just about new weapon systems and 
improving capabilities. It is understood that Transformation is a process 
and a mind-set. It is an iterative, ongoing process that seeks to adapt and 
master unexpected challenges in a very dynamic environment. It is about 
managing the future in a joint and combined way.4  
In this view, transformation is an optimized strategy that continuously tries to fit 
the defense structure to current and future security challenges. Thus, transformation 
differs from modernization because it aims not only at improving existing defense 
concepts, doctrines, organizations, logistics and tactics, but to change them in accordance 
with a dynamic environment. It is not only about doing things right anymore, but rather 
about doing the right things.5 Critics, however, argue that the transformation process 
itself is on the wrong track or that it overshadows the strategic context in which NCW 
must be regarded.6 Some of the allegations are that military transformation has a too 
narrow focus and that NCW is seen mainly as a technological and information superiority 
enabled concept at the operational and tactical level. It does not sufficiently take into 
                                                 
4 Edmund P. Giambastiani. “What is Transformation?” Allied Command Transformation Web Page. 
Not dated.  http://www.act.nato.int/transformation/transformation.html   (Accessed 12 May 2004). 
5 Jørgen Berggrav, ”Militær Transformasjon, en nødvendighet for å møte fremtiden?” The Norwegian 
Atlantic Committee, Kortinfo – 3 2003, August 2003 [journal online];    
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/kortinfo/2003/3-2003.htm . (Accessed 26 January 
2004). 
6 For critics of the military transformation process, see; Senior Analyst Marcus Corbin in Rumsfeld's 
War Leaves Iraq in Pieces Center for Defense Information  April 14, 2004.  
http://www.cdi.org/mrp/corbin-newsday-041403-pr.cfm . Military historian Fredrick Kagan in The Art of 
War  http://host45.ipowerweb.com/~newcrite/cgi-bin/printpage.php , and in War and Aftermath available at  
http://www.policyreview.org/aug03/kagan.html  ,  and an early critique of the process by  Professor 
Thomas Barnett, U.S. Naval War College with Henry H. Gaffney in A Critique of the National Defense 
Panel Report . The CNA Corporation, April 1998.  
http://www.geocities.com/ResearchTriangle/Thinktank/6926/ndpzero.htm (Accessed April 14 2004) 
2 
account the transformation of war, including the emergence of low-intensity conflicts and 
new problems in the third world.   
Simplified, current descriptions of the NCW concept are not fully taking into 
account the strategic or political factors that directly or indirectly will influence 
conceptual, doctrinal and organizational development. Moreover, although many of these 
strategic factors will be common for most NATO countries, some will be dependent on 
specific conditions applicable to the individual countries in the Alliance. Hence, these 
conditions need to be studied independently by each nation before the concept is 
implemented.   
This thesis will investigate some of the strategic factors that will influence the 
NCW concept in Norway, one of the smaller countries in the Alliance. A U.S.-led NCW 
bandwagon might not be appropriate for Norway in all its facets, considering the 
differences in resources, political objectives, threats, social structure, culture and other 
strategic preconditions. Consequently, and even if many of the forthcoming challenges 
imposed by the information age will apply to both, Norway is perhaps better off choosing 
a somewhat different track for its NCW train. 
A thesis question pertinent to the above is therefore: How will factors such as 
the strategic environment, changes in the nature of war and characteristics of our 
potential adversaries imposed by the information age, affect the development of a 
Norwegian NCW concept? Will the emerging NCW concept be characterized as 
fractioned chaos or is it a feasible, holistic defense alternative also for smaller nations. 
 
B. THE NORWEGIAN APPROACH TO NCW 
The process of developing a Norwegian NWC concept was officially initiated in 
2000 as a result of a Norwegian Chief of Defense annual defense study.  So far efforts 
have been concentrated on exploring the tenets of NCW, and the concept is identified as a 
long-term goal. However, transformation initiatives to make the force more net-centric 
are currently being undertaken. A few publications have been issued by the Norwegian 
Chief of Defense and the Norwegian Defense College. These documents give an 
introduction to NCW based on the U.S. developed theory and conceptual framework. 
3 
They are focused on theoretical command and control issues and the conceptual use of 
network centric warfare in military theory in general. In addition, Norway has established 
an innovative unit called the Norwegian Battlelab Experiment (NOBLE), whose main 
focus is to find operational solutions that may direct the Norwegian Armed Forces in a 
network centric and precision guided engagement direction.  
Although the Norwegian efforts have had a fairly good start since 2000, military 
transformation in a NCW direction is extremely challenging. Assuming it will be as 
costly as some have predicted, a fully mature network centric force seems almost 
unattainable for a small country with less than 4.6 million inhabitants, even if Norwegian 
defense spending within the Alliance is exceeded only by the U.S. when counted per 
capita. For 2004, the Norwegian defense budget represents 1.87% of GNP and 4.87% of 
the state budget.7  A Norwegian NCW concept is anticipated to demand immense 
investments within both the command and control structure and the force structure 
because of a profound gap in requirements between the old and the new warfighting 
concept.8 The costs are related virtually to the entire military organization: the info-
structure, sensor components, decision components, effect components, data fusion 
systems, systems to create necessary situation awareness and systems for self-
organization.9 Consequently Norway, like other countries in the Alliance, is facing huge 
investments in the implementation process. Much of the older material designed to stop 
an enemy within a static defense concept is in process of being phased out to free the 
necessary resources, but it is stated that Norway will have to live with its military 
heritage for years to come.10  
Furthermore, politically important values such as the conscript system, the home 
guard concept, and widespread military support for civilian society are at risk. It is 
questionable if Norway has the need for, or is able to develop and purchase the necessary 
                                                 
7 Norwegian MoD, “Defence budget.” Alliance comparison derived from NATO statistics for the 
fiscal year 2003. http://www.dep.no/fd/norsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120053/index-dok000-b-n-a.html . 
(accessed 19 Feb 2004). 
8 Norwegian Chief of Defence. ”Konsept for nettverksbasert anvendelse av militærmakt” 
Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003. Oslo: 2003, 50. 
9 Ibid. , 46 - 50. 
10 Ibid. , 7. 
4 
technology and information structure to maintain these values. As a consequence, and 
without alternative implementation strategies, NCW may transform the Norwegian 
Armed Forced to a defense with certain “niche capacities.” These capacities may be well 
fitted within NATO where they indeed are needed; but, there are serious domestic 
concerns that these forces will have a lesser deterrent effect compared to the force 
structure possessed during the Cold War, and that they will not be sufficient for 
Norway’s need to sustain independent operations for homeland defense and crisis 
management on its own territory and adjacent waters.  
Consequently, there is a need for Norway to have a closer look at its 
implementation strategy for NCW. So far the NCW approach has been evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary. One reason is the earlier mentioned heritage and lack of 
demonstrated NCW efficiency. The underlying NCW theory, necessary simulations, and 
real life battle experiences are so far too ambiguous and based on primarily U.S. 
experiences that may not be consistent with a smaller country’s premises or security 
needs. From this perspective an evolutionary development might be the right approach. 
However, Norway should at least investigate different NCW approaches based on other 
historical examples and strategic factors that may be more suitable to Norwegian 
conditions. In light of rapid military technological, doctrinal and organizational 
developments, which constitute the three main areas of the emerging RMA, it is 
important to create a sense of urgency for the political and military leaders to make some 
consistent decisions for the way ahead. Nevertheless, possible consequences at all levels 
based on Norway’s particular conditions should be analyzed before an implementation 
strategy is mapped out. This thesis aims to identify and evaluate some of the strategic 
factors that can contribute to developing an advantageous NCW implementation strategy 
in a Norwegian context. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To establish a framework that may help to identify the strategic factors needed to 
create a comparative strategic advantage when implementing NCW, Michael Handel’s 
5 
model for strategic planning have been adapted.11 The model builds on the strategic 
thoughts of Carl von Clausewitz. Two of his analytical concepts are central. The first is 
about knowing the kind of war (s) that is forthcoming and the second is the well known 
trinity between the people, the military, and the government. If we add the material and 
technological environment that have characterized military innovation and developments 
the last century, and to which Clausewitz paid less attention , 12 the model could function 
as a starting point to identify factors that have strategic implications. These factors can in 




Figure 1.   Identifying Strategic Factors (After Handel, 2001). 
 
The analysis will begin in Chapter II by describing the NCW concept as it is 
presented by NCW proponents. Since NCW is part of a U.S. led RMA, U.S. literature has 
                                                 
11 Michael Handel, Masters of War (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 101. 
12 Ibid. , 109. 
6 
been heavily relied on. What are the advantages of changing the military in a network 
centric direction? NCW’s advent was in the first Gulf War where superior U.S 
technology and combat power clearly showed the impact of information technology on 
the conventional battlefield. Since then, the developments within military innovations, 
technology and organization have accelerated towards even more information dependent 
war fighting concepts based on precision guided munitions, real-time information 
dissemination, and on demand delivered logistics. The development has necessitated a 
shift from a platform-centric to a network-centric way of conducting warfare. Thus, 
Network Centric Warfare has been coined as the new term that describes how the military 
organize and fight in the Information Age. Chapter II presents a description of the NCW 
concept up to its present form. This background is necessary to understand the influence 
on the concept by the other factors depicted in Figure 1. It is assumed that Norway 
intends to follow the NCW path even if there exists, at least in theory,  alternative 
security and defense policies that can lead to other warfighting concepts. This assumption 
also implies a limit to the scope of the thesis when addressing security and defense 
policies in the subsequent chapters.   
The understanding of contemporary conflict is, among other things, determined 
by changes in the strategic environment and will be the theme for Chapter III. This 
chapter will discuss specific strategic factors that are believed should have a particularly 
important impact on the development of a Norwegian NCW concept. Some of the key 
issues are Norway’s strategic freedom of maneuver, obligations and contributions within 
the Alliance; technological premises and other particulars of Norwegian social structure 
or culture that may or may not be well adapted to a NCW context. The latter premises 
have particular interest with respect to NCW, as an information superiority enabled 
concept because, as  will be shown, Norway does not have a particularly well developed 
tradition of exploiting the soft power side of information. By soft power is meant the 
state’s use of information as a recognized and important part of its power base, exercised 
through means such as public diplomacy, information operations or information warfare.     
7 
Chapter IV will discuss the impact of characteristics in the information age and 
the emerging RMA, in order to reach a deeper understanding of contemporary changes in 
the nature of war. This factor is central in Handel’s model and an issue believed to have  
been underestimated in the discussions of NCW so far. Perhaps the nature of conflict is a 
better term that also encompasses the new threats at the lowest end of the conflict scale. 
Although many of these changes have a universal application for most militaries 
emphasis will be on the consequences for Norway where deemed fit. Consequently, the 
implications these changes in the nature of conflict should have for future mission 
challenges, constraints and opportunities will be highlight. Particular attention will be 
paid to the features of low-intensity conflicts and the changing characteristics of  
potential adversaries imposed by the information age and the contemporary RMA.  
In Chapter V there will be further exploration of certain aspects of low-intensity 
conflicts in light of the newest trends that are emerging in the information age. 
Recognizing that there is a need to combine both the understanding of low-intensity 
conflicts and the information revolution’s impact on modern forms of war should direct 
the NCW concept to encompass not only conventional, mid- and high intensity level of 
conflicts, but also the often more complex problems that are connected with low-intensity 
conflicts. Thus, this chapter will look at some of the sociological aspects of the 
information revolution and its impact on key actors in low-intensity conflicts such as 
those with extremists, terrorists and insurgents.  
The final chapter will summarize key findings in the previous chapters in a 
Norwegian military transformation context. The assumption is that an NCW analysis seen 
through these strategic lenses, should affect both the direction of the transformation 
process itself as well as the technological, doctrinal and organizational development of a 
Norwegian NCW concept.  
8 
II. UNDERSTANDING NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Network Centric Warfare emerged in the nineties as a new war fighting concept. 
It was envisioned as a way to achieve U.S. forces’ long-term goals as depicted in Joint 
Vision 2020: to form a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance on the battlefield. 
Full spectrum dominance should be achieved by the application of four key operational 
concepts13: 
− Dominant maneuver 
− Precision engagement  
− Focused logistics  
− Full dimensional protection 
 
Furthermore, Joint Vision set the goal for “DoD to pursue information superiority 
in order that joint forces may possess superior knowledge and attain decision superiority 














































Figure 2.   Full Spectrum Dominance Enabled (From Joint Vision 2020) 
 
                                                 
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 , 3  
14 DoD, “Network Centric Warfare”, Department of Defense Report to Congress (DoD 27 July 2001), 
1-1.  www.c3i.osd.mil/NCW/  (accessed 14 April 2004). 
9 
DoD envisions NCW to be a warfighting concept to achieve Joint Vision 2020 
operational capabilities.15 NCW allows “ …the force access to a previously unreachable 
region of the information domain – the network region – that is broadly characterized by 
both increased information richness and information reach.”16 The information advantage 
is characterized as Information Superiority (IS).  The significance of IS as an enabling 
factor is shown in Figure 2 as an enabling band across the operational capabilities. It is 
also inherent in DoD’s definition of NCW, stated earlier in the Introduction. The correct 
interpretation of any given situation in an NWC concept is interdependent on three other 
essential capabilities as described by the Command and Control Research Program 
(CCRP).17 In sum, the four minimum capabilities are:18 
1. The ability to make sense of the situation; 
2. The ability to work in a coalition environment including nonmilitary 
(interagency, international organizations and private industry, as well as 
contractor personnel) partners; 
3. Possession of the appropriate means to respond; and 
4. The ability to orchestrate the means to respond in a timely manner. 
  
Throughout this thesis CCRP’s conceptual framework and understanding of NCW 
will be used as a basis for discussions. The concept is depicted in the following figure 
which also encompasses the above mentioned capabilities. Furthermore, the model 
identifies the characteristics and attributes needed by NCW forces and their relationship 
to other entities.19  
                                                 
15 DoD 27 July 2001, 2-4 
16 DoD 27 July 2001, 2-4 
17 CCRP is the driving force within the DoD and the U.S. Armed Forces for developing the NCW 
concept and has the mission of “…improving DoD’s understanding of the national security implications of 
the Information Age” 
18 David Alberts and Richard Hayes, Power to the Edge (CCRP Publication Series, June 2003), 98. 
19 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge,  99. 
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Figure 3.   NCW Framework (From Albert and Hayes, 2003) 
 
Alberts and Hayes explain the increased value of the NCW concept as follows: 20  
The logic of the NCW value chain begins with the characteristics of force 
entities. These include effectors (all those able to create effects, not just 
weapons), information sources, value added services, and of course, 
command and control entities. Individual entities have access to organic 
capabilities including organic information sources. The degree to which 
force entities are networked will determine the quality of information that 
is available to various force entities and their ability to interact in the 
information domain. The level of interoperability achieved and the 
characteristics of command and control processes will determine the 
extent that information is shared, as well as the nature and quality of the 
interactions that occur between and among force entities. Taken together, 
these capabilities and organizational characteristics will determine the 
effectiveness of the force, its agility, and the degree to which decisions, 
plans, actions, and entities are synchronized.  
In the following, the key elements in NCW, the concept of information superiority 
and the benefits of networking the force will be presented. 
                                                 
20 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 101. 
11 
 B. THE CONCEPT OF INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
Information is power and information superiority is a key factor in NCW. IS 
affects all areas of modern warfare in the physical, information, cognitive and social 
domain. NCW impact on the four domains is depicted in shades of grey in Figure 3. The 
physical domain is where strike, protect and maneuver takes place, preferably in a joint 
perspective. The focus is primarily tactical, emphasizing hardware and battle space 
technology. This is also the area where NCW effects are easiest to predict and measure. 
Challenging military innovations within technology sectors such as sensors, stealth, 
speed, navigation (precision), and weapons systems are forthcoming, which in turn will 
contribute to establish IS. Nevertheless, most of the problematic aspects with the IS 
concept occur in the other domains that to a larger extent involve cultural and 
organizational changes. Changing people’s mindset in the way they practice their 
business is inherently more difficult. Consequently, focusing on these domains will be 
important to achieve IS on a broad scale as envisioned in Joint Vision 2020.  
Seeking out an information advantage to outperform an adversary is nothing new 
in military affairs. The principles of collecting information, processing it for intelligence 
and planning purposes and distributing it through the chain of command has been valued 
since the days of Sun Tzu. Furthermore, Clauswitz’ term “the fog of war,” and his notion 
about “friction” during the conduct of war, are closely connected to commanders’ 
uncovered information needs. Presumably, commanders want to have all the relevant 
information they can get to analyze it, before they put men at risk. In addition, 
commanders must evaluate the validity of the provided information. Adversaries will 
most likely try to hide, disrupt or falsify information to conceal their own intentions.  
All these activities take place in the informational, cognitive and social domain. 
The information domain is where information is collected, posted, pulled, displayed, 
processed and stored.21 It is also the domain where command and control are 
communicated. The single most important information element traveling through this 
domain is perhaps the commander’s intent, which also is based on the enemy’s 
ption and understanding of the information takes place in anticipated actions.  The perce                                                 
21  Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 15. 
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the cognitive domain. Interpretation of the information is influenced by the values, frame 
of mind, presumptions and biases of the commander or the interpreter,22 or, in other 
words, by the mindset of the warfighter and his aides. The response, or action, is reflected 
in the output of the interpretation, including the style and contents of such things as 
leadership, intent, doctrine, tactics and techniques. Lastly, but equally important to 
achieve an information advantage are the organizational aspects, the C2 processes and 
interactions between entities and individuals that take place in the social domain.  
The difference in this notion of the term information advantage compared to the 
earlier one is that innovations in technology, and in particular information technology, 
have created possibilities for both quantitative and qualitative improvements in 
information processing. They have also created the conditions for network centric 
computing, which the explosive growth of the Internet and intranets has shown in the last 
decades. Some claim that these improvements are revolutionary in character because they 
will radically change how wars will be fought in the future. Hence, we are in the midst of 
a RMA.  
The prospects of gathering and processing information to be able to lift 
Clausewitz’s ”fog of war,” enabling commanders at all levels to have a transparent view 
of the battlefield, are alluring. Transparency of the battlefield will of course not be a 
constant or 100% condition but it will vary in time and space. Hence, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff’s definition of information superiority is, “The capability to collect, process, and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an 
adversary’s ability to do the same,”23 must be interpreted accordingly. Information 
superiority is a condition only achieved when a force is able to exploit a superior 
information position compared to its adversary. The relationship is shown in the 
following figure. 
                                                 
22 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 15. 
23 Joint Publication 3-13. “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations” (Headquarters Department of the 

















Figure 4.   Information Advantage (From Alberts, Garstka and Stein, 1999) 
 
According to J. Garstka at the Joint Staff Directorate for C4 Systems, some 
characteristics of this relative information advantage is that it can: 
− Be persistent or it can be transitory. 
− Exist in some areas of the battlespace but not others. 
− Be measured in the context of a task or set of tasks. 
− Be created by taking actions to reduce our information needs and/or 
increase the information needs of an adversary. 
− Be achieved through the synergistic conduct of information operations, 
information assurance and information gain and exploitation”.24  
 
As Garstka suggests, Information Operations (IO) play a significant part in 
achieving IS. IO are “actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”25 The desired 
effect of IO in the context of information superiority is “to drive one or more components 
of the competitor’s information “volume” towards the origin. The desired effect of 
defensive information operations is to keep our information ‘volume’ from being 
                                                 
24 John Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory”, PHALANX Online, 
December 2000 Volume 33 Number 4,  http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm 
(accessed 3 March 2003). 
25 As defined in Joint Pub 3-13, GL-7. 
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compressed.”26 Consequently, IO may be conducted both offensively and defensively. 
Offensive IO includes activities like “operations security (OPSEC), military deception, 
psychological operations (PSYOPS), electronic warfare (EW), physical attack and special 
information operations (SIO) and may include computer network attack.”27 Although 
offensive IO are conducted primarily through the physical and information domain, their 
prime target are in the cognitive domain - namely the human decision maker. 
Commanders will employ offensive IO influencing their adversary’s observation, 
orientation and perception in order to cause responses that will be advantageous to their 
own military objectives.28 On the defensive side of IO the objectives are two-sided. One 
is to minimize friendly IO system vulnerabilities to adversarial efforts and the other is to 
minimize friendly mutual interference during the operational employment of IO elements 
and capabilities.29 Defensive IO includes activities such as “information assurance (IA), 
OPSEC, physical security, counterdeception, counterpropaganda, counterintelligence, 












Figure 5.   Elements of Information Superiority (From Alberts and Garstka, Dec 1999) 
                                                 
26 Alberts, Garstka, Stein, Network Centric Warfare, 55.  
27 Joint Publication 3-13, viii. 
28 Dan Kuehl, “Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power.” Joint Forces Staff College  
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jciws/iw/io_textbook.pdf   (not dated), 62 (accessed 18 May 
2004) 
29 Kuehl, 41. 
30 Joint Publication 3-13, viii. 
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 Figure 5 illustrates how IO is a basic element to achieve IS. Some of the 
fundamentals of IO are that it capitalizes on the current advances in information 
technology in addition to adapted doctrines and new forms of organizations. Increasingly 
more sophisticated computers, multiple and high speed connectivity and advanced 
networks enable IO to target information and information systems more efficiently. The 
goal is to affect human or automated based information processes.   
The increased access to information takes place in three information 
infrastructures simultaneously: the global information infrastructure (GII), the National 
information infrastructure NII and the Defense information infrastructure DII. The GII is 
the “worldwide interconnection of communications networks, computers, data bases, and 
consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users.”31  NII is 
similar to GII but related to a national information environment, while DII is deeply 
integrated in NII.32 DII is the means, people and organizations that connect and support 
the armed forces’ missions at all levels. However, it is not the volume of information 
itself that creates an advantage. Information overload constitutes a problem in itself and 
information can still be poorly used by decision makers. Consequently, changes in the 
information structure must be followed by doctrinal and organizational changes as well. 
Furthermore, understanding the nature, complexity and dependencies between the 
information structures are crucial to exploit the opportunities the structures entail. 
Information Operations has a promising future to influence this relationship because it 
functions as an enabler that can shape the operational environment. Viewed as a process, 
IO can synchronize, synergize and deconflict activities in the information structure that 
ultimately will support the strategic, operational and tactical use of military forces.33 
 It is equally important to understand the vulnerability that comes with 
sophisticated computer systems, networks and the dependencies between the information 
structures. Studies of recent conflicts show that cyber attacks are becoming frequently 
                                                 
31 Joint Publication 3-13, I-13. 
32 Ibid.,  I-14. 
33 Kuehl, 6. 
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more used as a part of the contending parties’ arsenal in both conventional and 
unconventional conflicts. Countries like Libya, China, North Korea, Cuba and Russia, 
amongst others, are in the process of developing cyber warfare capabilities.34 In addition, 
terrorist organizations, sympathizers, and different hacker groups, more or less with the 
consent of hosting nations, are also developing cyber capacities that have the potential of 
inflicting substantial damage to Western information systems, communications and 
infrastructure in future conflicts. These issues will be considered later, but to counter 
these threats and to defend our own information and information systems IO plays an 
important part through activities such as Computer Network Defence (CND) and IA. 
Two other contributors available to commanders, in order to achieve information 
superiority, are Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and Information 
Management (IM). ISR and IM will not be discussed in detail here, but together these 
contributors enable and complement full spectrum dominance operations35. 
  
C. NETWORKING AND SYNCHRONIZING THE FORCE 
As mentioned before, developments in IT, combined with organizational 
networking a force, is expected to provide access to a new, previously unreachable region 
of the information domain characterized by both increased information richness and 
information reach. However, there is no precise definition or ideal model within the 
NCW theory of what this network might look like. Webster’s Online Dictionary defines a 
network as an interconnected or interrelated chain, group, or system. Within the 
organizational theory in general, network has often been seen as a level of analysis above 
the organizational level where some of the topics of interest are: how tight or loose 
coupled are the links; strength of ties; regulatory functions; scope and diversity of 
organizations in network; network persistence; and power centers.36 In terms of networks 
as an organizational design Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe a network as “…dispersed 
“nodes” who share a set of ideas and interests and who are arrayed to act in a fully 
                                                 
34 Trustees of Dartmouth College. “Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A Predictive 
Analysis.” (Dartmouth College: Institute for Security Technology Studies, 22 September 2001), 12. 
35 Field Manual No 3-0 (FM 3-0), “Operations,” (Headquarters Department of the Army, 14 June 
2001), 11-11.  
36 Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. (New York: McCraw-Hill, 1993), 195. 
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internetted ‘all channel” manner.’37  Furthermore, Arquilla and Ronfeldt refer to basically 
three types of networks: the chain, the hub and the all channel network. Although not 
stated in NCW literature, the type of network a NCW concept is reaching for is as 
complex as the latter, and it is “also the most difficult to organize and sustain, partly 
because it may require dense communication”38   
An emerging approach for command and control in the information age and 
networked organizational structures is the so called power to the edge concept. Within  
NCW, power to the edge is considered a necessary condition for the networked force to 
reach a self-synchronizing capability. In Alberts’ and Hayes’ words, power to the edge is 
about: 
 …changing the way individuals, organizations, and systems relate to one 
another and work. Power to the edge involves the empowerment of 
individuals at the edge of an organization (where the organization interacts 
with its operating environment to have an impact or effect on that 
environment) or, in the case of systems, edge devices. Empowerment 
involves expanding access to information and the elimination of 
unnecessary constraints. For example, empowerment involves providing 
access to available information and expertise and the elimination of 
procedural constraints previously needed to deconflict elements of the 
force in the absence of quality information. Moving power to the edge 
implies adoption of an edge organization, with greatly enhanced peer-to-
peer interactions. Edge organizations also move senior personnel into roles 
that place them at the edge. They often reduce the need for middle 
managers whose role is to manage constraints and control measures. 
Command and control become unbundled. Commanders become 
responsible for creating initial conditions that make success more likely 
and exercise control by: 
- Creating congruent command intent across the enterprise; 
 - Allocating resources dynamically; and 
 - Establishing rules of engagement and other control mechanisms that the    
   fighting forces implement themselves. 39 
Thus, a network-centric force consist of empowered, interoperable, self- 
rovides commanders with the capability to dynamically synchronizing entities that p                                                 
37 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 7.  
38 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars, 9. 
39 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 5. 
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network (connect, share, and collaborate) the three main sets of battlefield components: 
sensors (regardless of platform), decision-makers (regardless of location) and shooters 
(regardless of service). Each component in the net may consist of an individual, an 
entity/organization or a type of technology or materiel.  
The sensor component has sensing as its main function and contributes to 
knowledge of the battle space. It encompasses all components, from satellites to an 
individual’s sight, which contribute to awareness and understanding. The decision 
component typically decides the allocation of resources, sets the priorities, and 
reconfigures the organizational structure based on the current situation awareness 
established by interpretations from the sensing process. The shooter, or transaction, 
component’s main function is to affect the situation or target by some type of action by 
lethal or non-lethal means.  
According to Alberts and Hayes, the basic tenets of NCW begin with the 
existence of a robustly networked force, and interoperability among the different 
networked entities are substantial.40 This applies to all levels or layers in the structure. 
 
Figure 6.   The Tenets of NCW (From Alberts and Hayes, June 2003)  
 
Interoperability must be present within all four domains: physical, information, 
cognitive and social. The degree of interoperability within these domains determines an 
                                                 
40 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 107. 
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entity’s ability to perform NCW operations. With reference to the four domains, entities 
in a network need to… 
1. be connected to the net 
2. be able to provide information to those on the net 
3. be able to find, retrieve, and understand the information available on the net 
4. participate in one or more virtual collaboration  environments or processes 
…to increase the value of information in the net. 41 The profit of a network centric 
concept, as compared to platform centric, is the increased value and availability of 
information about the battle space provided by the sensors combined with the 
connections, or multiple links between the different components within all four domains. 
This increased situational awareness at all levels gives an opportunity to rapidly respond, 
reallocate or shift focus as the situation changes. Moreover, the idea is that ownership of 
each component (e.g. weapons and sensors) should no longer be integrated or organically 
belong to one particular decision maker or a single platform. Instead, the components 
work together sharing information and exploiting changes in the situation according to 
the commander’s intent. The result is a dynamic organization reacting to the changing 
situation by a continuous reconfiguration of available forces made to fit to the highest 
prioritized missions.42   
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The highest degree of maturity in a NCW force is when all the entities in the net 
have a fully shared awareness and are able to truly self-synchronize their operations. At 
the bottom lies a fully developed doctrine for warfare in the information age together 
with new types of organizational structures. Ultimately, the side that possesses the best 
information and manages to transform it to shared awareness and subsequent 
synchronized and timely actions achieves a major advantage versus its opponent. That is, 
concisely, the prospect of a NCW concept. 
                                                 
41 Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 107. 
42 Norwegian Chief of Defense, ”Konsept for nettverksbasert anvendelse av militærmakt.” 
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III. NORWAY’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
Seen from a power-based theory, small nations have many constraints shaping 
their security and defense policies compared to larger and more resource-rich countries. 
Although it is aimed at an individual or an organization, Charles Perrow’s definition of 
power as “the ability of persons or groups to extract for themselves valued outputs from a 
system in which other persons or groups either seek the same outputs for themselves or 
would prefer to expend their effort toward other outputs,”43 is useful also to explain state-
to-state relationships. The key is that power based on diplomatic, economic, military or 
psychological resources always has been used to secure, alter or distribute a nation’s 
various outputs. This could be substantial outputs such as sea or land territories, natural 
resources or other trade products, or more abstract outputs in the form of ideological, 
philosophical and political ideas.  
Arguably, and due to its smaller power base, a small nation’s strategic 
environment is to a larger extent determined by world events and larger nations’ leniency 
more than its own influence. Hence, historically for Norway, a constrained approach to 
the use of statecraft, particularly the use of psychological (informational) and military 
means, have been deemed more fit than a proactive and offensive strategy using all 
means available. The exception was perhaps the Viking era (750-1100) where the 
Vikings’ culture and military power strongly influenced the British Isles as well as 
continental Europe as far south as Constantinople.  In modern time, Norwegian activities 
and interests are even more global, especially within the maritime cluster in sectors such 
as shipping and ship building, oil and gas exploitation, the cruise liner business and in the 
whaling and fish industry. However, these activities have developed more or less 
independent of Norway’s state power as such. The outputs of these activities have never 
been linked to an overall national strategy, which also integrates political and military 
elements. The need for such a strategy that also encompasses Norway’s military doctrine, 
has been raised by many scholars.44 In this view, developing a NCW concept in the 
                                                 
43 Charles Perrow, 259. 
44 Amongst others by Iver Neumann in ”Norges handlingsrom og behovet for en overgripende 
sikkerhetspolitisk strategi”. http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/sp/2002/3.htm (accessed 24 
March 2004). 
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Norwegian military cannot and should not be initiated without the appropriate strategic 
context in which it is supposed to support and defend Norway’s interests. Furthermore, 
these interests may be different from the common interests of NATO, the single most 
important cornerstone in Norwegian security since the Organization’s origin. In addition, 
other important strategic features of Norwegian society play an important part. This 
chapter will explore these features in the strategic environment and the implications for 
military transformation in a NCW direction.  
 
A. STRATEGIC FREEDOM OF MANEUVER  
Norway’s security is, in an as yet incalculable future, linked to the power triangle 
between the United States, the European Union and Russia. This dependency was also 
recognized in 2000 when the Norwegian MoD proposed the most extensive reorganizing 
of the armed forces since WW II:45 
− Norway’s security is highly dependent on the member states’ continued 
commitment to NATO.   
− Norway should contribute to preserve and strengthen NATO both politically 
and militarily and thereby also secure continued transatlantic cooperation. 
−  Norway should actively participate in the development of the crisis 
management mechanisms in the EU.  
− Norway should actively ensure that Russia is included further in the European 
and broader international security and defense environment.  
Summarized in Figure 7 is the influence of the larger powers and Norway’s 
freedom of maneuver in security affairs. The latter is limited and dependent on the 
triangle’s three centers of gravity. A gradually stronger Russia that seeks influence may 
entail a potential increased pressure against Norway; in particular for those cases where 
Norway and Russia have conflicting interests, such as in the maritime limits between the 
two countries in the Barents Sea and also Russia's challenge of Norwegian jurisdiction 
beyond Svalbard's territorial limits within the Svalbard Treaty. Increased pressure from 
Russia will reinforce the dependency on NATO/EU, or alternatively, it will require a 
greater capability for independent crisis management 
                                                 
45 Norwegian MoD, St.prp nr. 45 (2000-2001), ”Omlegging av Forsvaret i perioden 2002-2005”, 19 
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Figure 7.   Power Triangle and Strategic freedom of Maneuver  
 
Another challenge for Norway’s security policy is the marginalization that takes 
place on at least three levels.46 First, is the Nordic region where the focus has shifted 
from the Norwegian Sea/North Sea to the Baltic region. Secondly, on the European level, 
where Norway as a non-member state never can be integrated into the EU’s common 
security and defense policies. On the contrary, without full partnership Norway will be 
regarded as a competitor to the EU, particularly in the trade and economic sectors. Lastly, 
it is marginalization at the transatlantic level where the development of NATO 
increasingly takes place through a U.S.-EU dialog. Practically, Norway tries to balance 
its policy between the three powers’ main goals as depicted in Figure 7. This is often a 
delicate balance where Norway avoids making obvious choices between the EU and 
                                                 
46 Bjørn Knutsen et al.  ”Europeisk sikkerhet i en foranderlig tid: En analyse av Norges utenriks- og 
sikkerhetspolitiske handlingsrom”,  The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek 
nr 4 – 2000,  http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/sp/2000/4-2000.htm  (accessed 26 March 
2004).   
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NATO.47 Apparently, this has not become an easier task recently in the wake of the Iraqi 
war. According to a new comprehensive study of transatlantic trends,48 there is growing 
European criticism of the alleged U.S unilateralism and global leadership, the preferred 
means and institutions (e.g. the UN) to deal with international crisis, and the willingness 
to spend resources on the military. Americans share European concerns about U.S. 
unilateralism, but have a larger willingness to bypass the UN if required by national 
interests. In addition, the U.S. wants the EU to be a stronger partner with which it can 
share common and global responsibilities. 
 In light of this increasing rift in transatlantic relations it is perhaps an even more 
important security issue for Norway to contribute to transatlantic cooperation. However, 
the situation also calls for a re-evaluation of what many used to take for granted; an 
automated transatlantic or allied reinforcement if a conflict should emerge. In a less 
cohesive alliance there might not be a larger network to plug into during a limited 
conflict between, for instance Norway and Russia. Consequently, Norway must also 
secure a certain capability to act alone in case of a crisis where neither of the two security 
institutions is willing or able to support distinctive Norwegian interests. In addition, since 
both institutions seek a tighter integration of Russia in the security policy arena, such a 
conflict in the northern region may be too small for the larger powers compared to the 
political strain of getting involved.49 This problem could partly be solved by increasing 
Norway’s power base, both militarily and economically through EU membership. 
However, Norway has turned down this question in two referendums (1972 and 1994) 
and is obviously still not ready to make that commitment partly because it implies the 
submission of some of its sovereignty to the Union, in addition to a greater sharing of the 
natural strategic resources Norway so strongly depends upon. As a consequence, and to a 
much larger extent compared to other similar sized countries within NATO and the EU, 
                                                 
47 Iver Neumann, ”Norges handlingsrom og behovet for en overgripende sikkerhetspolitisk strategi” 
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Kort-info fra DNAK 1-2001,  
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/kortinfo/2001/1-2001.htm (accessed 26 March 
2004).  
48 Findings from Transatlantic Trends 2003. After a public opinion survey undertaken by the German 
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Washington D.C., USA, the Compagnia di San Paolo in 
Turin, Italy and the Luso-American Foundation in Lisboa, Portugal.  http://www.transatlantictrends.org/ 
(accessed  3 Mars 2004).  
49 Neuman, 4. 
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Norway’s development towards a NCW concept has to ensure a certain capacity for 
independent crisis management. This does not imply that Norway should aim to match a 
future Russian threat by itself; however, it does imply a requirement for gaining a 
political/military initiative and leadership in the northern region as well as having a 
continuous military presence in the area. Thus, national needs must be reflected in a 
NCW implementation strategy as well as fulfillment of the NATO/EU requirements for 
military transformation. 
 Moreover, homeland-defense proponents would reasonably argue that a 
development of tailored NCW capacities for domestic purposes should have precedence 
over the new and “exported” security requirements. This discussion, which is both 
politically and military relevant in the ongoing transformation process, most likely can 
only find its solution based on a comprehensive national security strategy. Until such a 
strategy is in place, regional and local political interests, and inter-service rivalry will 
continue to disrupt a purposeful transformation of the military forces towards better ends 
in the information age. Besides, by not thinking nationally and independently, Norway 
misses the opportunity to develop a NCW concept that fits the distinctiveness of its 
smaller power base. This approach to Norway’s power base might focus on other 
valuables of NCW such as doctrinal and organizational issues rather than costly 
technology which, some think have had a too prominent place in the Norwegian NCW 
debate until now. 
 
B. THE NATO UMBRELLA 
Emphasized in NATO’s new strategic concept is the new and uncertain security 
environment. However, the uncertainty is based on a less existential threat than that 
endured in the Cold War. With the disappearance of the communist threat, the U.S. and 
NATO directed their political and military attention and resources to other problems, 
symptoms of violence, or conflicts throughout the world. Earlier, minor and mostly 
intrastate conflicts functioned as surrogate wars between the two military blocks where 
ideological views determined the political agenda and the invested resources. The new 
security environment, however, has led to an expansion of the NATO military task list, 
including peace support operations and the fight against terrorism, crime, for human 
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rights and environmental issues.50 Not only have these problems been defined as security 
threats directly linked to Norwegian security interests, but the political will to use 
military power to resolve them has increased significantly. In 1999, Norway terminated a 
21 year long commitment in Lebanon under the U.N. flag where more than 34, 000 
Norwegian soldiers have participated. In addition, since 1990 Norway has participated in 
most major conflicts from the first Gulf War, to the conflicts in the Balkans, then in 
Afghanistan as part of the U.S. led operation Enduring Freedom and also in the  
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) troops. Most recently is the small but 
politically disputed engagement in Iraq where Norwegian forces are contributing to 
provide security and humanitarian assistance in the post-conflict phase.  
In addition to an increased will to use its military power, NATO’s security 
boundaries are now theoretically unlimited. This is in sharp contrast to the Cold War 
period where the military power of NATO never was to exceed NATO’s well defined 
boundaries by going “out of area.” The discussions of out of area operations within 
NATO are now long gone, as described  in the 2002 Prague Summit declaration:  
We are determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attacks 
on us, in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the 
United Nations. In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO 
must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are 
needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations 
over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be 
faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their 
objectives.51  
 Consequently, since Norwegian security is tightly linked to NATO, the 
Norwegian security focus has shifted from NATO and homeland defense to include more 
peripheral security requirements abroad. This strategic shift in the use of military power 
has caused a widespread political and military debate contrary to the across party lines 
agreements in defense policies experienced in Norway since WW II until the early 
nineties. One of the main issues is the quantity and relevance of the armed forces for 
                                                 
50 NATO, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept.  North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. 
on 23rd and 24th April 1999. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>  (accessed 17 September 
2003). 
51 NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, paragraph 4. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm  
(accessed 25 Feb 2004). 
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homeland defense purposes in a transformation process that apparently is focused to 
fulfill NATO needs and requirements. Hence, the Norwegian Minister of Defense, Kristin 
Krohn Devold, continuously must reassure the Norwegian parliament that the usability of 
a transformed structure fits both needs. Her argument to prioritize allied requirements is 
most valid; “If Norway ever needs support from NATO, our forces have to be 
interoperable with our supporters. And, if any other NATO countries need support from 
Norway, our forces must be interoperable with the supported forces.”52 However, doubts 
about the reduction of mass and absence of forces in areas that earlier was considered 
vital for Norway’s security interests is still a concern; but it seems that the MoD’s view 
are becoming more and more prevalent.  
How valid is the perception of the opposition that a shift of focus from territorial 
defense to an exported security policy is a dismal decision? It appears that the 
disagreements go along three lines of strategic argument. First is the likelihood of an 
invasion or larger military dispute on the Northern Flank. In today’s security 
environment, most security analysts and politicians in Norway see this likelihood as very 
low. On the other hand there is also uncertainty connected to Russia’s development: 
Russia remains, in terms of both its short- and long-term fate, a fascinating 
and somewhat terrifying puzzle to the West. Declines in personal income, 
personal safety, and life expectancy have created political volatility and 
ripe opportunities for extremists of every sort. Moreover, for the 
foreseeable future, Russia could at any time become again the decisive 
factor in determining American engagement in European and even global 
security matters.53 
Since 1996, when the above citation was written, Russia has had clearly positive 
domestic developments and has also returned as a stronger security policy actor both 
globally and in Europe. The problem, however, is that it is not clear in which direction 
Russia wants to use its influence. It could either seek  European integration or remain a 
                                                 
52 Kristin Krohn Devold,: Usability through transformation Speech at the Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee’s “Leangkollen” conference. 2 February, 2004.  
http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/aktuelt/taler/statsraad_a/010001-990096/index-dok000-b-n-a.html (accessed 
25 Feb 2004). 
53 Richard Leone in Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: The Twentieth 
Century Fund Press, 1996), viii. 
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transatlantic actor.54 Russia has also become more authoritarian under Putin’s regime but 
this may be considered as a stabilizing factor so far. Nevertheless, it could be wise to still 
factor in some uncertainty with regard to Russia’s development.  
Linked to the likelihood of military confrontation is the probability of receiving 
allied support. Clearly, in an Article Five scenario, NATO support can be expected. 
Hence, it is support in a minor crisis that can be disputed, however, it may look minor in 
the eyes of NATO or the U.S. but it can be relatively consequential for Norway as a small 
nation.  
Secondly, there is a question of predictability and timeframe for the defense 
planning in NATO. Will a NCW concept meet Norway’s short and long-term security 
requirements? Implicit in the ongoing transformation process is a shift from a long-term 
planning perspective of 20 – 30 years55 towards dynamic incremental improvements in a 
NCW direction where the planning horizon is in terms of years rather than decades. In the 
U.S. DoD’s Office of Force Transformation the reduced planning horizon, based on a 
uncertain future in the information age, is called rapid spiral transformation. This 
approach is focused on “…rapid, incremental changes to exploit improvements in 
technology, processes and organizations that contribute to larger jumps in concept and 
capabilities. Taking a large number of small-to-medium exploratory jumps, risks are low, 
but the payoffs quickly accumulate.”56 The question is whether the risk of reducing 
Norway’s military presence and capabilities in its northernmost areas can be considered a 
low-risk venture, considering the still unpredictable developments of its mighty neighbor 
Russia. 
The third concern is if the planned NCW concept will provide the proper type of 
forces and a sufficiently large force structure to secure and manage Norway’s enormous 
wealth of natural resources. Most of these resources are marine resources such as oil, gas 
                                                 
54 Iver Neumann and Kristine Offerdal, Russia is Back.  The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Internett 
tekst nr 18, November 2003. http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/i-tekster/18.htm  
(accessed 24 March 2004). 
55 This planning timeframe typically coincides with the development, procurement and 
implementation of major military material such as submarines, NATO frigates, etc. 
56 John Hanley, Rapid Spiral Transformation. DoD Office of Force Transformation, Transformation 
Trends – 3 February issue 2003.http://www.cdi.org/mrp/transformation-trends.cfm (accessed 26 Feb 2004).  
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and fish in an area that is seven times the land territory, covering the North Sea, the 
Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea and the adjacent waters surrounding Svalbard. The latter 
is a Norwegian protectorate in accordance with the Svalbard treaty of 9 Feb 1920. The 
fact that the marine resources represent nearly 50% of the Norwegian GDP57 underlines 
the dependency and importance for Norway to manage and protect them accordingly.   
Arguably, being under the U.S. and NATO security umbrella for almost 40 years 
has in many ways spoiled the Norwegian population’s view of what the demands really 
are for protecting these offshore resources and state investments against, for instance,  
rogue states and terrorism. In this sense the Norwegians are not alone, or as expressed by 
Robert Kagan:58 
Europeans have generally believed, whether or not they admit it to 
themselves, that whenever Iraq or some other rogue nation emerged as a 
real and present danger, as opposed to merely a potential danger, then the 
United States would do something about it. If during the Cold War Europe 
by necessity made a major contribution to its own defense, since the end 
of the Cold War Europeans have enjoyed an unparalleled measure of “free 
security” because most of the likely threats emanate outside Europe, 
where only the United States can project effective force.” 
Kagan’s statement may be nuanced in light of the many instances where European 
countries indeed have taken care of their own security far beyond their borders,59 and 
must be seen in relation to the transatlantic rift that emerged in wake of the Iraqi 
intervention. Nevertheless, in a larger perspective, the Norwegian welfare state and 
prosperity was allowed to expand almost unaffected by Russia’s or other nations’ 
influence or intervention during the Cold War period. Certainly there were disputes, 
particularly with Russia, and many of them are still unresolved,60 but it can be speculated 
that there were considerable restraints from the negotiating parties in order not to 
exacerbate any situation that could involve interference in a bipolar context. Moreover, 
o create reasons for skirmishes of any type. This situation disputes were never allowed t                                                 
57 Figures derived from 2001 numbers. Statistics Norway Gross domestic product, by kind of activity  
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/minifakta_en/en/ (accessed 26 Feb 2004). 
58 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 33. 
59 For instance, the British during the Falklands War, Germany’s counterterrorism operations in 
Mogadishu, and the many preemptive operations by the Israelis to defend their immediate security 
interests.  
60 For instance, the Norwegian-Russian dispute on maritime borders. 
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was not only positive with regard to Norwegian claims because, as a small country, 
Norway felt an immense responsibility not to evoke a situation between the superpowers 
based on its sole economic interests. Thus, the Norwegian freedom of maneuver in these 
questions was also very limited. Today, they are still limited but the strategic choices rest 
more independently on Norway’s own power base. As a result Norway must develop 
strategies to look after its own interests based on individual means of statecraft. This 
includes diplomatic, economic, informational and military strength. For these reasons it 
could be argued that Norway’s requirements for self-sustaining security measures have 
increased and not decreased since the discontinuation of the Cold War. The larger 
question for the military is, however, how to efficiently support such a policy in the 
ongoing transformation process. Part of this answer can perhaps be found by exploring 
the specific interests that are at stake.  
 
C. THE IMPACT OF INTERESTS  
Central in the strategic environment are the particulars of the interests related to a 
country’s security, values, legitimacy, welfare and economic basis. To optimize a NCW 
implementation, the national interests should be analyzed and balanced against Norway’s 
strategic freedom of maneuver previously discussed. The conclusions of such an analysis 
can function as guidance regarding what to prioritize in the military transformation 
process. Questions that ought to be answered are for instance, what interests are 
threatened and how important are they? What interests will influence the dimensional 
factors of the military structure? In what environment do the most important interests 
occur? Are they sea or territorial based, regional or global? What type of technology can 
best meet the challenges in these environments? What type of strategic and operational 
concepts will be suitable? How should the services be prioritized to meet the 
requirements?  
For Norway’s part, without an overall national security policy strategy it is 
difficult to get a comprehensive understanding of the strategic interests, their prioritized 
order and their impact on military affairs. It is symptomatic for the situation that the 
greatest successes for Norwegian foreign policy in the last decades has been as a peace 
arbitrator based on the perception that Norway has few interests and a negligible 
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capability to influence the comparative strength between two adversaries.61 The abstract 
interest of preserving a reputation as a peace arbitrator is honorable and valuable in order 
to preserve global peace, but it may also contribute to suppress Norway’s more 
substantial interests. These interests are not always obvious to the public because they are 
found in multiple departmental strategies and initiatives. The span of interests is not 
always reflected or easily found in the defense policy.  
Typically, the Norwegian Chief of Defense receives political guidance from the 
MoD, and it includes a thorough analysis and description of changes and threats in the 
overall security environment. However, the conclusive assessments are superficial and 
generate very broad tasks for the armed forces. An overview of the total set of current 
security and defense policy objectives and the subsequent tasks is depicted in the 
following table.62 They are also repeated in the Chief of Defense’s latest study with the 











                                                 
61 Tore Nyhamar, ”Norske Nasjonale Interesser I Nord-Atlantaren” The Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee Internet text nr. 11- 2003.  http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/andre/i-
tekster/11.htm (accessed 16 March 2004). 
62 MoD, Norwegian Defence 2004. Online fact book on the Norwegian defense. 
http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/publ/veiledninger/010011-120064/index-dok000-b-n-a.html  (accesses 5 
March 2004).  
63 Chief of Defence Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003 (Oslo: 2003). 
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Security Policy Objectives  Defense Policy Objectives  
− To prevent war and to contribute 
towards stability and peaceful 
development, including the prevention 
and combating of terrorism  
− To safeguard Norwegian rights and 
interests, and to protect Norway’s 
freedom of action in the face of military 
or political pressure  
− To uphold Norwegian sovereignty  
− To protect Norwegian land, sea and air 
territory against incursion and attack  
− The maintenance of military presence and visibility  
− The ability to produce and exchange risk assessments 
and early warnings  
− The ability to deal with incidents and crises  
− The ability to defend Norwegian land, sea and air 
territory against military attack  
− The ability to operate jointly with allies and to take 
part in international force structures and operations  
− Participation in defense-related cooperation with other 
countries and within international organizations 
Defense Concept Military Defense Tasks 
− A balanced and flexible national 
defense  
− Operating jointly with allies and 
participating in international defense 
cooperation  
− Total defense and other civil-military 
cooperation  
− Compulsory military service  
 
 
− Maintaining a military presence in priority areas  
− Upholding national sovereignty and the exercise of 
national authority  
− Crisis management in areas under Norwegian control  
− Defending Norwegian territory and preparing, 
together with allies, to meet any challenge to 
Norwegian security  
− Securing facilities and activities that are vital to 
Norwegian society  
− International involvement  
− Being of use and assistance to society at large 
 
Table 1. Norwegian Security and Defense Policy 
 
As shown in the Table the political and military goals, objectives and tasks are 
very general in nature. Although, they are elaborated further in the original documents, 
and particularly measured against the recent developments in security and defense policy 
such as the new global security situation, asymmetric threats, cyber threats, terrorism, and 
advances in information technology, they are not interest specific and it is problematic to 
sort out where the important challenges are.  
Perhaps this uncertainty is one of the most characteristic features of security 
policies in the new century. Nobody seems to know what the future will bring, but there 
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are many good but conflicting assessments64 in addition to a lot of guessing. However, 
even if interests may change rapidly in the new world order, many of Norway’s interests 
are, in fact, very stable due to Norway’s geopolitical situation. Especially in an uncertain 
environment, it would be wise to actively focus more on these interests. Both politically 
and militarily there has been little tradition to do so. Less use of public diplomacy and a 
careful appearance within international institutions have been the preferred course of 
action. Arguably, that makes sense for a small country because many of the interests in 
question depend on international law and cooperation. On the other hand, the interests 
remain relatively unknown to the public, not only internationally but also domestically. 
This general political guidance is problematic for several reasons: 
− The security policy analysis does not always create the logical link between 
current and future threats to the specific interests that needs to be secured or 
defended. 
− Except for the existential and allied interests, an inconclusive and general 
security policy does not give a clear signal to the military, or an adversary, 
about which interest there is a political will to defend, and as a consequence… 
− It becomes difficult to develop a comprehensive military strategy that has a 
deterrent effect.  
− It becomes difficult to orderly prioritize or develop the necessary capabilities 
to meet the political demands when the need to protect the interests arises.  
In sum, the direction of important military affairs, such as the ongoing military 
transformation, becomes unclear. There is too much room for interpretation of the 
political ends which ultimately also leads to a subsequent, more difficult, debate on the 
means and ways to reach them.  
As an example of how a further specification of interests might be useful in the 
transformation process is a systematic analysis of the Norwegian national interests in the 
North Atlantic region made by Tore Nyhamar at the Norwegian Defense Research 
Institute. National interests, in this assessment, are determined by the dynamics and 
consistency between four conditions:65 
                                                 
64 For instance, see Martin van Creveld in the Transformation of War ( Free Press, 1991) versus Harry 
G. Summers in The New World Strategy (Touchstone, 1995) for different views on the nature of future 
conflicts and use of military forces; and Michael O’Hanlon in Technological Change and the Future of 
Warfare ( (Brookings, 2000) versus Admiral Bill Owens in Lifting the Fog of War ( FSG, 2000) with 
regard to diverging views on RMA hypothesis and the impact of technological change.    
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65 Tore Nyhamar, Norske Nasjonale Interesser I Nord-Atlanteren. 
− a set of core interests 
− a set of derived interests 
− a set of derived strategies or policies 
− a set of facts or relevant background theory 
   Based on this dynamic interaction of identified core and derived interests, 
theoretical or practiced strategies and policies, Nyhamar lists the Norwegian national 
interests in the North Atlantic as follows:  
Vital interests (secure and increase the welfare of the people in a free and secure state) 
− Protect Norway against a foreign will brought upon the country by force  
− Maintain and develop a security policy alliance based on common interest in such a way that we will 
not stand alone in a conflict with Russia 
− Maintain a trustworthy ability for exercising an authority that entails international acceptance 
(includes physical capabilities and the perception of others that the exercise of authority is objective 
and legitimate) 
Very important interests 
− Promote Norwegian economic interests, including: 
o beneficial use of fishery resources in the North Atlantic 
o beneficial use of the petroleum resources in the North Atlantic 
o Safe passages in the  Norwegian adjacent waters  
− Maintain and develop international institutions (e.g. maritime law) in order to avoid a bilateralization 
of the situation with Russia 
− Promote the understanding that the oceans under Norwegian jurisdiction are an important interest and 
that Norway’s management of these areas is a common good  
− Preserve the environment in Norwegian adjacent waters, including: 
o avoidance of oil pollution from oil industry and oil tankers  
o avoid radioactive pollution from radioactive waste and reactors 
− Maintain and develop strong regional organizations for crisis management 
− Maintain and develop a strong and relevant UN 
Important interests 
− Stability in Russia 
− Promote democracy and a civilized society in Russia 
 
Table 2. Norwegian Interests in the North Atlantic 
 
The impact of the above identified interests can be important in a NCW 
implementation context for several reasons. 
First, since the basis for Norwegian defense is no longer tied to an existential 
threat from the East, but rather to defend a broader range of national and allied interests, 
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it is imperative that these interests are well identified and specified in order to develop 
matching NCW capabilities. U.S or NATO NCW blueprints might not fit the Norwegian 
needs very well.  
Secondly, although Russia no longer represents an existential threat, it stands out 
as a great concern in most of the described interests. Hence, Norway’s NCW capabilities 
should be organized to ensure a proper development of bilateral military and civilian 
cooperation, and in case of a crisis, also to meet potential means of coercion from 
Russian authorities or organizations. 
Third, since the reach of NATO has turned global, and to a larger extent is 
following a U.S or EU interest base, it would be naïve to believe that the use of 
Norwegian military power in an allied or coalition context will always be concurrent with 
Norwegian interests. Despite the growing transatlantic rift and the political turbulence 
that followed the Iraqi intervention, the greater powers’ foreign policies have been in 
Norway’s interest so far, but what about the future?66 Allied cohesion is extremely 
important for Norway and it is also fair that its foreign policy, to a certain extent, 
supports the U.S. and larger nations’ national security interests, especially since the 
former are contributing proportionally larger resources in the Alliance. However, 
reasonable arguments must be raised in an institutional manner when conflicting interests 
arise. In a globalized but interest-based world, Norway’s particular interests will be more 
respected as long as they are visible, well-founded and balanced toward the common 
good.  In short, Norway must, to a much larger extent than before, take care of its own 
interests both independently and within the Alliance. That might require different 
approaches to the NCW concept and connected capabilities. 
Fourth, specifying the interests gives direction and prioritization of the needed 
capabilities in a NCW implementation. For instance, Nyhamar’s analysis would suggest 
that Norway should: 
− Continue to develop allied relations and relevant NATO NCW  capabilities 
                                                 
66 As an example Kagan (31) points to the different perception between the U.S. and Europe with 
regard to tolerance of repressive or threatening regimes. While the former refers to these regimes in terms 
of “axis of evil” and “rogue states” the latter tend to use terms as “failed states”, which not only determines 
the threat they pose but also what instruments of statecraft, if any, should be used against them. 
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− Emphasize NCW capabilities that are maritime because a regional or local 
conflict in the future will probably be related to Norway’s economic centre of 
gravity that currently is found in fishery and the offshore oil and gas industry  
− Emphasize the development of an interagency network within the same 
maritime cluster that would enhance the government’s ability to conduct crisis 
management in the northern region 
− Prepare units in the armed forces for operations under the UN flag where 
standardization, interoperability, conceptual and procedural requirements may  
differ somewhat from those that are developed in a NATO context. In addition 
to allied NCW “plug in” capabilities, perhaps these forces should be prepared 
to build networks and enable non-allied countries to function under a 
Norwegian led “net” as well 
The main point here is not to focus on Nyhamar’s example but rather the necessity to 
taylor the development of NCW capabilities to Norway’s long term interests accordingly. 
In this sense, Norway’s security environment and long-term interests should be 
functioning as a driver for the NCW implementation. 
 
D. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PREMISES 
So far in this thesis it has almost been an underlying condition that the 
development of NCW capabilities will demand radically higher defense spending in the 
future. With a continued emphasis on the technological side of RMA and the increased 
R&D costs for new military material, this assumption might be true. For instance, the 
concept of Information Superiority is anticipated to bring about a tremendous effort in 
the future to develop and implement new information technology on a broad scale to U.S. 
forces. Figures suggest that the U.S.  “spends more on its information technology than all 
but a couple of great powers spend on their entire militaries.”67 Thus, there are serious 
concerns whether Norway or other allied forces will be able to communicate adequately 
and share information with the U.S. military in future conflicts. These concerns have 
already been addressed in NATO, first by the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and 
most recently in the Prague Capability Commitment (PCC). In these initiatives, the 
member states have agreed to pursue common efforts within certain areas to reduce the 
                                                 
67, Thomas P.M. Barnett. “The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare.” Proceedings, U.S. 
Naval Institute, January 1999.       
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gap between the U.S. and the European pillar in order to improve the Alliance’s 
capability for modern warfare in a high threat environment.  
Taking its share of DCI, PCC and similar initiatives68 is important to Norway’s 
credibility and usefulness in NATO. “Norway must contribute actively to the 
modernization of NATO. This means continuing to contribute relevant capabilities to 
NATO’s structures and operations and making Norway’s unique training facilities 
available to the Alliance.”69 Consequently, as NATO goes along in a NCW direction 
Norway is committed to follow. The problem is if NATO becomes less relevant as a 
defense alliance, due to increased politicization or increased gaps in doctrine or 
technology, it may no longer function as a defense alliance in minor crises or under non-
existential threats.  
To many, and despite the rapid article five declarations in NATO after the 11 Sep 
2001 attacks, the U.S. decision to intervene in Afghanistan, within a coalition framework 
rather an allied one, serves as an example for this danger. This decision was made for 
several reasons.70 First, the Americans wanted a broader coalition but the requirements 
for troops on the ground were low. Second, they wanted a higher level of 
political/military control and speed in the decision-making process than experienced in 
Kosovo. Third, the technical requirements of the intervention and the nature of forces and 
weapons employed limited meaningful allied contributions. In short, U.S. officials 
viewed allied support as politically useful but militarily insignificant. If this development 
continues, where diverging politics or the dependency on new technology enables only 
U.S. forces, or a few of its allies, to operate on the battlefield, it may critically damage 
the efficiency and cohesion of the Alliance. It will also limit a coalition of the willing. 
Alternatively, as experienced in Iraq, U.S. forces will be used as an enabling force 
conducting the “war-fighting” such as strategic bombing and the initial ground battles. 
Other forces will perhaps be sent in to secure the peace when the fighting is over or 
                                                 
68 Other initiatives are managed through organizations within NATO such as the Multinational 
Interoperability Council (MIC), Combined Communications Electronic Board (CCEB), and the NATO C3 
Board.  
69 Norwegian MoD, Proposition to Parliament No. 42 (2003 – 2004) English short version, 8.  
70 Tom Lansford, All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States.(Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), 
110. 
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otherwise contribute to the operations; for instance with logistical resources or taking 
over responsibilities in other theatres where the situation is more secure. However, in the 
long run, such a policy will be damaging. Attention and debate regarding the legitimacy 
of a conflict will always peak when the conflict is most intense. An impression can be 
made of the U.S. as a unilateral and aggressive nation, pursuing its own interests, if it 
stands out singularly on the battlefield in the initial phase. In these cases NCW 
capabilities might help U.S. forces to win the battles, but if the U.S. becomes the 
scapegoat the peace might be lost. In addition, if the imbalance in military power 
continues, it is likely that the rift in the transatlantic link will continue to grow. It is 
therefore imperative to ensure that most allies have a role to play in future conflicts even 
if it plays out within a NCW concept. 
Likewise, in case of a more existential conflict, such as a more tangible Article 
Five situation within NATO, cooperation and interoperability will be crucial from the 
outset.  Without interoperability and a common situational awareness, the efficiency on 
the battlefields might actually decrease. The benefits of IS may diminish because the 
commanders intent cannot be distributed sufficiently down the chain of command. Also, 
the fear of “blue on blue situations”71 may delay the decision making process and the 
shooters efficiency. Consequently, measures have to be taken when new IT is 
implemented within NATO to assure that the forces are able to operate on the same 
battlefields simultaneously. Inevitably, in an allied context IS has to be a shared 
superiority to be advantageous. 
Nevertheless, there are alternative approaches to fund the ongoing RMA in a 
NCW direction. In an American transformation context, Michael O’ Hanlon suggests 
four guidelines to further promote defense innovation within the current budget levels.72 
The first is to “emphasize relatively economical and high-payoff improvements in 
munitions, communications, information systems, and sensors that are possible today due 
to trends in electronics and computers.”73 In Norway, this aspect of economization is 
                                                 
71 Expression used when inadvertently firing on friendly forces. 
72 O’Hanlon refers to the year 2000 budget. Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future 
of Warfare. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).  
73 O’Hanlon, 172. 
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attended to by, amongst others, the experimental organization NOBLE. Truly there are 
profits to be made by a more extended use of COTS, NATO off the Shelf (NOTS), 
Military off the Shelf (MOTS), Government off the Shelf (GOTS) and by improving  
older platforms, sensors, weapons and information systems instead of developing new 
ones. In addition, new asymmetric threats may also put different and even less costly 
demands on military materiel than on the old conventional battlefield. One of the cost 
driving factors in military innovation is the particular specification of the equipment 
related to endurance, hardship and redundancy. Although the prospect of such a 
battlefield is not entirely gone, much can be done with less advanced or less hardened 
equipment in, for instance, the war against terrorism or fighting insurgencies in an urban 
environment.  
Another cost reducing idea is to exploit organizational networked experiences and 
technology from the private sector, or as Arquilla frames it: “We look to the business 
community for inspiration. Networked organizational forms are highly efficient, and we 
like to emulate that.”74 By tapping into the same hardware, software and expertise, R&D 
costs may be less and valuable time for experimentation saved. For instance, “In many 
cases, the same servers, satellites and fiber-optic networks, as well as software that major 
corporations routinely use, can be pressed into service to link images from Global Hawk 
unmanned aircraft with commanders and shooters on the ground.” 75 Another example is 
the FBCB276 computer network technology that most recently has shown its usefulness 
in the Iraqi desert. Originally developed as a simple tool to keep track of truckers on 
America’s highways, this satellite and radio-based tracking system has evolved into a 
highly advanced database and digital battle command system that identifies own users’ 
location, friendly forces and other threats and obstacles. 77 
                                                 
74 John Arquilla in John Carey et.al, “Point, Click…Fire,” BusinessWeek online, 7 April 2003. 
http://www.businessweek.com/index.html ((accesses 6 March 2004). 
75 John Carey et.al, “Point, Click…Fire”, BusinessWeek online, 7 April 2003. 
http://www.businessweek.com/index.html (accesses 6 March 2004). 
76 Acronym for Force XXI Battle Command Brigade or Below 
77 William New, “Army Relying on New Battlefield Network Technology.” Government Executive 
Magazine, Daily Briefing, 8 April 2003.  
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Similar approaches are possible in Norway if extensive cultivation of civilian – 
military cooperation takes place. In fact, in a small transparent country that also is 
dependent on high-tech industry, the opportunity to form a network of civilian businesses 
and the military to promote NCW innovations and procurements should be very good. 
Such cooperation has already started. A study of the initial Norwegian NCW system  
concept, including an ambition level, was worked out with three larger actors in 
Norwegian industry.78 Furthermore, this group reviewed how the present organization, 
materiel, technology and competence could be exploited in an implementation phase and 
made several recommendations on necessary actions and how to proceed in the future. 
Parts of these conclusions are referred to in this thesis,79 but the point here is to 
emphasize the importance of having the industry on board from the outset when new 
NCW technology and concepts are developed. This industrial cooperation should follow 
two converse principles. One the one hand, the military should seek strategic partnership 
with certain industrial corporations, particularly in areas where military demands require 
pure research and development of new ideas and innovations. On the other hand, the 
military should also economically exploit the diversity and competition in civilian 
industry and to a large extent, use COTS whenever possible to reduce unnecessary R&D 
costs.  
O’Hanlon’s second guideline is to “Redress existing military weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities. Doing so requires attention to a wide spectrum of subjects ranging from 
homeland defenses against missile attack and the terrorist threat to further improvements 
in U.S airlift and sealift.” 80 These considerations are very much political questions and 
for Norway’s part have been addressed when security policy and the importance of 
interests are discussed. In the next chapter, changes in the nature of war will be discussed 
as well, and together these changes should also influence future NCW capabilities. The 
main point is, nonetheless, that the funding needed to develop an adequate NCW 
capability in the future may only be found by narrowing the tasks of the Armed Forces to 
the essentials. At present, it may seem that the tasks are ill defined, not particularly 
                                                 
78 The three industrial actors were: Teleplan, Ericsson and Thales. See Norwegian Chief of Defence. 
”Konsept for nettverksbasert anvendelse av militærmakt” Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003.  
79 See amongst others chapter 1  The Norwegian Approach to NCW. 
80 O’Hanlon, 172. 
40 
coordinated with other means of statecraft, and ranging over a general and far too large 
interest base.  
Third is to “Sustain robust research, development, testing and evaluation 
(RDT&E) efforts, particularly in areas of basic research and development (R&D), as well 
as a joint-service simulation and experimentation.” 81 These efforts apply to Norway as 
well, but as a small nation with a limited research environment, alliance and 
multinational cooperation will play an important part. Consequently, the Norwegian 
military transformation should be closely coordinated with NATO’s transformation 
efforts and the NATO Council’s Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC).  
A Norwegian contribution to these PCC initiatives is focused on establishing 
desired niche capacities within the Alliance. Focus on these capacities entails an 
increased role specialization and division of labor within the Alliance that will reduce the 
costs and need for resources. Moreover, identifying appropriate niche areas of 
specialization is considered a key to NATO’s transformation.82 The Norwegian approach 
to this demand is to focus on capabilities where the military already occupy high level 
competence and where these capabilities already meet national demands. Some of these 
capabilities are general in nature and inherent in most of the elements of the Norwegian 
force structure: for instance specialization in arctic warfare, expertise in littoral 
operations and mastering of demanding topography.  Others nice capabilities are 
specially developed, amongst others through multinational operations, such as transport 
control, mine clearance, EOD elements, multinational logistic, special operations and 
intelligence. In an NCW perspective, Norway’s approach makes sense. If the nations or 
their services are considered as nodes in a larger system, they cannot all develop and 
maintain the same capabilities. Networking the niche capacities will ensure that a 
multinational and joint task force can perform a larger range of tasks. In essence, this way 
of organization creates a larger result than the sum of connected entities. The prerequisite 
for the connection is interoperability and familiarity with the main body’s (U.S.) 
operational concept.     
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Another initiative sees an increased need for multinational cooperation within the 
Alliance for development of technology, materiel, force capabilities, concepts and 
operations. Again, Norway sees the need to balance the transatlantic link against Europe. 
Instead of a spread focus, Norway tries to gather a few strategic partners concentrated 
around the North Sea basin in a North Sea strategy for multinational military 
collaboration. In addition to a shared geography, the five countries, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Holland and Denmark also have a shared historical and cultural background 
that is anticipated to create less friction in a tighter military community. Examples of this 
strategy are the Norwegian-Danish-Dutch air force cooperation recently deployed in 
Kyrgyzstan, the Norwegian army’s cooperation with the German-Dutch corps and the 
Navy and Special Forces’ long standing relationship with the British. The strategy makes 
sense also in a strategic NCW perspective since it is almost impossible for a small node 
(Norway) to have the same strength of ties to all the nations or nodes in a large system 
such as NATO. By limiting the numbers of partners the hope is to build qualitatively 
better relationships and competence within this North Sea network that will give valuable 
and economic synergy effects. Furthermore, the strategy does not exclude other allies or 
partners in selective areas where such cooperation is necessary or mutually beneficial. In 
this regard Norway seeks to uphold the strong transatlantic link towards the U.S. with 
military cooperation on a broad scale. 
O’Hanlons’s last guideline is not to “pursue full-scale modernization with 
expensive next generation weapons platforms. Rather focus on making sure existing 
platforms remain safe and reliable. In addition, existing weaponry may be coupled with 
new information systems. In many cases, weaponry that that is already in the force today 
will be good enough for coming decades.”83 According to O’Hanlon, this point is the real 
bill payer for future innovations and procurement in the transformation process. Two 
historical examples that have provided a surprising superiority on the battlefield support 
his point.84 The first is Germany’s development in the interwar period where only a small 
number of transformed troops (10%), among a larger number of legacy forces (90%), 
                                                 
83 O’Hanlon, 172 
84 Williamson  Murray and Thomas O’Leary, “Military Transformation and Legacy Forces.” Joint 
Forces Quarterly, Spring 2002. 
42 
created the necessary synergy to make a superior warfighting doctrine of combined arms 
– the Blitzkrieg. Similar were the U.S. experiences from the Gulf War, where a small and 
creative “think-tank” within General Schwarzkopf’s staff was allowed to plan and 
execute a new and “unconventional” strategy utilizing an available, but very small 
portion of the force with stealth and precision guided munitions, to create confusion and 
disruption rather than the proposed systematic destruction of a roll-back strategy. Thus, 
the air defense system was neutralized, complete surprise was achieved, and the Iraqis 
never recovered from the initial psychological defeat. The key point is that a relatively 
small number of transformed forces can greatly improve the entire force. In this respect, 
innovative concepts, doctrinal and organizational development are more important than 
implementing new technology and weapons systems in the whole force structure. 
However, the latter is important as an enabler. Consequently, a radical transformation in 
the whole force may not be necessary, but the force still has to be receptive and adaptive 
to new concepts. Thus, the requirements for a cultural and mental change are crucial and 
perhaps the greatest challenge in the transformation process. Unlike the Germans in the 
interwar period, the same existential urgency to transform. is not felt in Norway. 
The above is true for Norway’s Armed Forces as well but there are limitations to 
this policy. In some key areas new procurements have already been deemed necessary. 
New frigates in the Navy are to be introduced in 2005. They will be supported by the 
NH90 helicopter package, which also includes new transport helicopters for the Army. 
Furthermore, both the Army and the Air Force are retaining a lot of their old platforms 
that need upgrading or replacements.  Hence, expensive platforms such as new fighters, 
air transport and a new generation of mechanized vehicles are due in the not too distant 
future. Together these needs for basic investments put an enormous pressure on the 
expenses required to run daily activities and operations.  
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As a consequence, redirecting resources to fill the identified NCW gaps in the 
“info-structure,” sensor components, decision components, effect components, data 
fusion systems, systems to create necessary situation awareness and systems for self-
organizing, seems very difficult. In reality, Norway risks the danger that the number of  
entities in a network will be so small or fragmented that they will have little combat 
effect except when hooked up to a larger net, for example in NATO or a coalition of 
forces. This problem was recognized in the earlier mentioned NCW study and one 
suggested solution is to replace volume for speed. Truly, superior speed has contributed 
to surprising victories throughout military history, as it did in the earlier mentioned 
Blitzkrieg concept against a larger number of allied troops actually prepared for a 
German attack. However, the advantage lasted only a while against an adaptive enemy 
that soon copied and obtained similar capabilities and reengaged in the battle with greater 
resources. The point is that sustainability and a wider range of capabilities to ensure 
flexibility will be needed in most conflicts or crises of certain duration. The lack thereof 
can easily be exploited by an adversary and mass speed will shortly outlive itself. 
Consequently, a NCW implementation must find the right balance between the range of 
capabilities, quantity and quality. Understanding and sensing the enemy is of less use if 
the means to touch him are not available.      
The Norwegian NCW study also recognizes that calculation of any economic 
benefits of a NCW concept in its development or implementation phase should not be 
made.85 Hence, it is difficult to see that investments in defense will not increase during 
this transformation process. Asking for money seems like an easy fix when a task within 
the given resources cannot be solved. In fact, at the beginning of the transformation 
process in the late nineties, a Norwegian general said he welcomed these economic 
restraints because it enforced necessary reductions in an obsolete organizational structure. 
Publicly, the armed force’s have also been criticized for not delivering more fighting 
power for its 27 billion NOK annual allocation compared to, for instance, Sweden and 
Denmark that are similar sized countries. The general’s statement and the critique might 
have been in order early in the transformation process when the goal of transforming the 
force in a NCW direction was less clear. Moreover, part of the critique stems from 
difficulties such as political friction, bureaucratic inertia, and cultural resistance of 
getting rid of a legacy that lasted almost 40 years. Many of these problems are now 
reduced and the bureaucratic mindset and military culture is more adjusted to a future 
reality of constant change.   
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However, the military is unlikely to conduct the transformation at the same 
economic thresholds that were maintained in the last decades of the Cold War. An 
analogy can be made to the business world. Few larger businesses and corporations 
believe that they can make more profit during the transformation process itself. On the 
contrary, the expected dividends come after, often a long time after, the investments. One 
example is the huge investments made in the development of the Norwegian oil and gas 
industry during the seventies. Perhaps this industry could serve as an example of how to 
enter the information age for the military. In the early seventies, the oil and gas venture 
was a national economic and industrial venture of large proportion for a small nation 
without prior off-shore drilling and production experience. Luckily the resources, 
competence or technology were not outsourced, but developed domestically and 
incrementally to the benefit of the people and the main land industry. Finally, after 20 
years, large surpluses began to show in the state budgets and Norway is now one of the 
wealthiest nations in the world. 
 Norway became a full-fledged oil nation in the mid-’70s. One of the main 
reasons for our success was that our shipping and related maritime 
businesses provided us with an administrative network and the technical 
and management skills needed to build up our oil industry. Through gains 
in efficiency, rationalisation, continuous adaptation to technological 
development and changed marketing, operating, as well as competition 
conditions on the continental shelf, Norwegian maritime industries not 
only managed to maintain, but also consolidate their positions.” 86 
Now, there is a need to make an all-out effort for innovation and investment for 
society’s and the military’s entrance in the information age. For the military part, and 
contrary to the oil industry experience, the expenses will of course never create a surplus 
in the state budget but, both directly and indirectly, innovation could thrive, domestic 
civilian high tech industry could benefit and an overall enhanced security environment 
would also spill over to other sectors and society in general. In short, because the NCW 
implementation is so widespread in its doctrinal, organizational and technological scope, 
looking at red figures only in the defense budget, could be a very narrow-minded view of 
the whole society’s benefit of implementing NCW.  
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Arguably, this line of strategic thinking has been absent in Norway since the 
dependency on the NATO in 1947 and it goes along with not having an official national 
strategy that also encompass a military doctrine. This shift in attitude toward the 
military’s role in society and defense spending will require immense political persuasion 
and a significant cultural change, but it could mean a rapid spiral transformation in a 
Norwegian context. Despite its size, Norway possesses both the resources and 
competence to implement NCW on a broad scale. It is first and foremost a matter of 
networking existing governmental agencies and private industry. The alternative of not 
choosing this path is incremental and evolutionary steps in the wake of the U.S.’s. and 
other larger strategic partners’ NCW initiatives. Surely, the domestic competence and 
economic off spring from these initiatives will be less than if they were self-initiated. 
 
E. THE CULTURAL RESISTANCE OF EXPLOITING “SOFT POWER” 
Previously, it has been argued that a new mindset is required for thinking about 
security policies, national interests, technology, and perhaps also the economic 
approaches when implementing NCW. Furthermore, that a tighter integration between the 
military and civilian society is necessary to reach the ambitious goals depicted in the 
tenets of NCW, and that tighter interagency networking will require a significant cultural 
change amongst Norway’s political and military establishments. This cultural change is 
necessary in other areas as well if the NCW implementation is to be successful. First and 
foremost is the way of approaching the tenets of IS as a foundation for NCW. In Chapter 
Two the importance of IS to achieve full spectrum dominance was emphasized. Implied 
in this is that information must be consciously exploited at all levels of warfare and that 
there is a network that timely connects and communicates vital pieces of information 
between  the intelligence community, key actors and decision makers. “Information is the 
lifeblood of Information Age organizations. Information-related policies and 
architectures define the topology and determine the capabilities of an organization to 
distribute this vital resource.”87  
Unfortunately, in the Norwegian military, or in the government or bureaucracy in 
ition to purposefully exploit the soft power of information. general, there is very little trad                                                 
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Organizational structures for the conduct of IO have only partially been developed and 
then mostly at the operational and tactical level with emphasis on EW, OPSEC and 
Physical Destruction. The non-technical capabilities of IO such as deception and 
PSYOPS are given very little attention and are practically not developed at all. Nor have 
IO related activities such as public affairs and civil affairs had any prominent place in the 
planning or conduct of military operations. The absence of IO efforts is also reflected in 
the emerging Norwegian NCW literature. In the first published introduction to NCW, the 
reader is in fact cautioned not to make a tight link between IO and NCW even if a direct 
relationship were indeed recognized. The primary point of intersection between the two 
was seen within IA and OPSEC.88 In the new NCW concept, IO as an enabling concept is 
mentioned directly only once, and then in a general context on how to achieve IS.89 
Furthermore, the proposed IO ambition in the next planning period is limited to enhance 
the PSYOPS and EW capabilities and to establish a CNO capability. In addition, the 
command structure at the strategic and operational level should have the ability to lead 
and coordinate military information operations, but the organizational consequences of 
such a capability is not mentioned.90 The IO relationship to the political level is not 
mentioned in the study, which additionally support the impression that it is mainly 
tactically focused. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that IO is not yet functioning as a 
strategic instrument nor yet seen as an enabler shaping the operational environment and 
creating the foundation for IS in the Norwegian Armed Forces. In a larger perspective 
this confirms the impression, also shared by Alberts and Hayes, that “… most military 
organizations continue to see Information Operations as a separate function that is 
managed outside the traditional operations organization”.91 It could be argued that the 
situation in the Norwegian military is even worse, because there are no dedicated entities 
outside the traditional organization that have the resources, competence or skills needed 
to conduct strategic or operational IO on a broader basis. Emphasis continues to be made 
on information management and the technical information structure within the 
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conventional establishment. Overemphasizing the tactical and technical side of IO will be 
at the expense of more important issues in the cognitive domain such as how to influence 
a larger part of a population or an adversary’s key decision makers.   
It is difficult to explain this lack of interest in information as power or a tool of 
influence, but the phenomena is also reflected in other areas of Norwegian governance. 
One explanation can be that IO is seen as an unfair method using non-desirable political 
and military means. Obviously IO is surrounded by myths especially created through the 
PSYOPS and Deception elements where secrecy, lies and indirect methods are some of 
the main ingredients for success. Perhaps aspects of IO contradict the Western perception 
of the warrior ethos where honor, bravery and fairness on the battlefield have been 
admired since ancient times. We complement the Viking duels on the beaches; the 
Knights conduct of honor during the Middle Ages; the organized and civil battles of the 
American Civil War; the daring commando raids against superior defenders during WW 
II; and lastly, modern Special Forces’ remarkable successes in difficult takedowns of 
embassies, airliners and other objects. We tend to forget that the Vikings’ successes also 
were information dependent on their reputation created by merciless atrocities; that 
mayhem and treachery also were the trademark of royals, knights and the priesthood 
during the crusades; that Sherman purposely created fear through his campaign against 
the civil population in the South; that the commando raids often were heavily dependent 
on supporting deception plans; and that recent Special Forces’ successes have often 
depended on a deliberate breakdown in the established trust that is achieved through 
negotiations. Hence, throughout history Western nations have relied more on elements of 
IO for successes in warfare than not.  
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Also part of the problem to fully recognize IO as a legitimate tool of warfare is 
the fear from our own population that they themselves may be exploited or deceived. In 
fact, when describing the proposed IO efforts in the defense study, the Norwegian Chief 
of Defense carefully reassures that IO is not directed against its own or allied 
populations. No other warfare concept or weapon system needs such an introduction. 
This visualizes the more troublesome aspects of IO and the political skepticism to 
embrace it. Certain elements of IO are not easily seen as viable and legitimate means of 
pursuing political objectives. Terms, such as political warfare and propaganda remind us 
of totalitarian regimes’ efficient use of these means to suppress their own populations and 
influence their opponents. The Third Reich’s propaganda machinery and the Soviet 
Union’s excessive use of psychological operations stand out as examples in this regard.  
Nevertheless, IO is recognized as an instrument that can reduce the costs of 
warfare in more than an economic sense. In addition, other countries and future potential 
adversaries to the Western Alliance are acknowledging IO as an increasingly more 
important tool of modern warfare. Today’s Russia continues to develop its IO capabilities 
based on in-depth expertise from the communist era. Amongst others is an active IO 
R&D program, attempts to create computer viruses as weapons, and institutionalized 
efforts of IO such as the creation of the Federal Agency for Government 
Communications and Information.92 Correspondingly is the Chinese emphasis on IO 
efforts as a prominent feature of future wars. Major General Wang Pufeng, former 
director of the strategy department states that: “In the near future, information warfare 
will control the form and future of war. We recognize this developmental trend of 
information warfare and see it as a driving force in the modernization of China’s military 
and combat readiness.”93 These contrasting views of IO are striking and an inferred 
conclusion may be that the Norwegian perception of the legitimacy and political and 
military usefulness of IO is indeed limited.  
The aversion to fully exploit the psychological means of statecraft is also present 
in the U.S., perhaps the Western country, apart from Great Britain, that has gone the 
furthest to develop and exploit the soft power of information, including public diplomacy 
and IO. According to Dan Kuehl, professor at the National Defense University in 
Virginia, one indicator of IO’s reduced significance in the Bush administration is that the 
new U.S. national strategy has only one reference to IO, which, “is a step backwards 
from its predecessor.”94 Furthermore, Kuehl states: “What you are seeing there is perhaps 
the reaction to September 11. What’s missing, in my opinion, is a sense of the power and 
synergy of information as an element of national power, and I hope this omission is 
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rectified in the next such National Security Strategy.” One impact of loosening this 
important notion of the “war of ideas” through IO can perhaps be seen in Iraq. While the 
conventional battles were convincingly won, the U.S. has so far not been particularly 
successful in winning the war of ideas in the Iraqi population or elsewhere in the Middle 
East. 
 The war of ideas is undoubtedly important but it must also be supported by a 
country’s own population, at least in a democracy, to be viewed as legitimate. “A 
democratic people – or the influential portion that cares what the nation does in 
international politics – associates itself morally and emotionally with national policies 
and actions, and demands that the government reflect its sentiments.”95 Thus, IO at the 
strategic level can be conflicting because there is a perception that it is about diverging 
ideas and opinions. Arguably, the “power of the people” has also increased in the 
information age. New technology and forms of communication have made it easier to 
participate in political debates. As a consequence, “The new social forms of the early 
twenty-first century will greatly enhance the power of social networks.”96 This may have 
an important impact for IO in the future. In addition, because of the variety of means 
available for expression and communication it can also be difficult to get a grasp of what 
the “people’s opinion really is.”  
On the other hand, Carnes Lord warns us about the tendency to focus on strategic 
IO only as a conflict of ideas, ideologies and opinions. In fact, under many circumstances 
this perception could be seriously misleading. “Psychological and political warfare is also 
about cultural and political symbols, about perceptions and emotions, about the behavior 
of individuals and groups under stress, about the cohesion of organizations and 
alliances.”97 This point is extremely important to stress for the GWOT and in the current 
post-conflict phase in Iraq. Obviously there is an ongoing war of ideas in these matters 
that requires attention; but, it might be more important to emphasize the elements of 
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strategic IO that Lord refers to rather than the stigmatizing larger ideological and 
religious differences between Western and Islamic countries.  
Additionally, there is a misconception that psychological-political operations 
should be entirely directed against an opponent. It is equally important to bolster a 
countrys’ policies and military operations through information operations. Thus, highly 
important target audiences for this influence could also be neutral, allied or semi-allied 
nations, depending on the adversary’s objectives.98 The manner in which this can be done 
is a matter of ethics and institutionalized rules of conduct and need not be contradicting 
to democratic values. On the contrary, openness and promoting the truth from a Western 
perspective should be the key issue, but one need amongst others the psychological skills 
and the tools of propaganda to influence the target audience efficiently.  
In this view, the Norwegian approach to achieve IS seems incomplete without 
properly emphasizing the cognitive domain in a NCW implementation. Moreover, the 
development of the necessary psychological means and IO capabilities will have to reach 
far outside the military. It must be recognized as a legitimate part of future warfare by the 
political establishment and interagency effort and cooperation is necessary to succeed. 
Without these efforts in the cognitive domain, the anticipated benefits and efficiency of 
NCW will only be partly fulfilled. David Potts speaks of this necessary shift in culture of 
viewing psychological operations in the following:99 
Deploying decision against other such forces in a defined battlespace, is 
giving way to deploying forces to create the conditions in which a decision 
might be achieved outside the military domain. The military line of 
operation in a campaign is therefore not just one of a number of lines of 
operation, it is subordinate to and constrained by others: diplomatic, 
political and economic and increasingly by Information Operations, 
directed from the highest political level, and legal considerations.  
As a consequence, a Norwegian NCW concept should give IO far more attention 
in an implementation phase. Emphasis on this side of the information structure could also 
be a cost reducing factor as IO efforts will contribute to identify and prioritize the 
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technical side of the structure. According to Kuehl, IO must be seen as a process and an 
enabler to synchronize, synergize and deconflict activities across the interagency 
spectrum. IO is a “source multiplier,” and not a separate weapon capability. It is a 
“strategy, a campaign, and a process that is supported by traditionally military forces.”100 
 
F. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
A key aspect of soft power can be found in the area of public diplomacy. Much of 
the same resistance and attitudes as described in an IO context can be observed within 
this tool of statecraft as well; but, first public diplomacy needs to be clarified. Starting 
with some definitions, public diplomacy is:101  
 Public diplomacy differs from traditional diplomacy in that it involves 
interaction not only with governments but primarily with 
nongovernmental individuals and organisations. Furthermore public 
diplomacy activities often present many differing views represented by 
private American individuals and organizations in addition to official 
government views. (Edward Murrow, 1963, speaking as director of USIA) 
Public Diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest of the United 
States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign 
audiences. (Planning group integrating USIA into the Dept. of State, 20 
June 1997) 
 The purpose of public diplomacy is to influence opinion in target 
countries to make it easier for the British Government, British companies 
or other British organisations to achieve their aims. The overall image of 
Britain in the country concerned is of great importance – but this is not to 
say that it is the only factor. The most important factor will usually be the 
actual policies of the British Government and the terms in which they are 
announced and explained by Ministers. In most countries a broadly 
internationalist posture will be positive. A narrow and open pursuit of 
national interests at the expense of others will be negative. For example, 
the Government’s handling of the beef crisis in the summer of 1996 had a 
negative effect not only on Britain’s ability to get its way on other EU 
issues, but also on the view taken of Britain in many non-EU countries. 
(Sir Michael Butler, former British representative to the EU, 2002) 
Furthermore, in a U.S. context, Carnes Lord describes public diplomacy as a key 
strategic instrument for shaping and communicating fundamental political and 
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ideological ideas in order to affect a foreign audience. It may consist of elements such as 
international information programs, for example voice of America; educational and 
cultural programs, such as educational exchange; political action and public affairs.102  
Clearly, the military has a role to play in public diplomacy as well, firstly, in a supporting 
role where the armed forces’ broad international engagement directly or indirectly could 
be exploited to promote the government’s official interests and images. Secondly, in a 
supported role for the government to explain the basis for having a certain military 
structure, the need for a military transformation into the information age, and also the 
need to use military power  under certain conditions. The latter will be of particular 
importance in the future in light of the recently disputed interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  
The Norwegian government has begun to recognize public diplomacy as an 
important tool to enhance Norway’s image in the world, but, so far, the military’s role is 
very moderate and perhaps even contradicting of the desired image that Norway wants to 
portray of itself. In a report on Norwegian Public Diplomacy, compiled by the British 
research body The Foreign Policy Centre in cooperation with the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry, it is acknowledged that Norway faces the problem of invisibility in the world 
society.103 A number of factors contribute to the invisibility:104 
− it is small in population, economy and presence;  
− it is isolated politically, geographically and culturally;  
− it lacks linguistic attraction, many Norwegians speak English but not vice 
versa;  
− it lacks brands or icons , there are no emissaries for the Norwegian identity;  
− it is similar to Scandinavia – its shared culture does not help to distinguish it 
from the rest. 
 
Arguably, that the rest of the world knows little about the Norwegians is a 
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strategy arises.  This thesis will not elaborate Leonard’s and Small’s distinguished 
strategy, but of particular interest is the suggestion to strengthen Norway’s image based 
on four desired perceptions: 105 
− Humanitarian superpower, emphasizing Norway’s contributions to aid, its role in 
peace-keeping and peace processes and its commitment to developing new kinds of 
global governance.  
− Living with nature, emphasizing Norwegians’ unique relationship with nature, 
exploiting its potential whilst pioneering ways of protecting the environment. 
− Equality, emphasizing the value of equality which is deeply embedded in Norwegian 
culture and Norway is living proof that equality and economic dynamism can be 
combined.  
− Internationalist / Spirit of adventure, emphasizing Norway’s history which is literally 
sprinkled with famous adventurers whose endeavors are only partially known – from 
the Vikings and Heyerdahl’s Kontiki to Amundsen’s polar quests and the modern 
BASE jumpers to sport performances. 
Although interagency efforts are stressed to develop and implement a public 
diplomacy strategy, the Norwegian Military role in such a strategy is only mentioned 
vaguely despite its contribution to all of these images. Obviously, the first one is relying 
extensively on military contributions. Actively using the Coast Guard and Navy to 
protect and ensure a healthy environment in Norwegian waters is an example of the 
military contribution to the second image. The third image is a cornerstone value in 
which the military’s basis for existence is found. Lastly, in the internationalist / spirit of 
adventure image, the military’s role has also been important. The military’s contribution 
to Norwegian polar history and its role in organizing the 1994 Winter Olympics are some 
examples. The point here is not to exaggerate the military’s role in public diplomacy, but 
                                                 
105 Mark Leonard and Andrew Small, 3. This is not official Norwegian policy. The state secretary 
Thorhil Widvey underlined in a speech in Ottawa 7 Nov 2003 that “these stories are in no way politically 
agreed upon as the stories to tell the world. For instance, the term "humanitarian superpower" has met some 
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http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/taler_politisk_ledelse/032171-090183/index-dok000-b-n-a.html  
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by not including the military efforts opportunities for public diplomacy are  missed. Thus, 
introducing NCW in the future should also imply to “net” and make visible the military 
role in a broader society. It should also bolster military operations and activities.  
In the infancy of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry’s attempt to create a public 
diplomacy strategy, the military’s role is very unclear. For instance is the issue of peace 
keeping operations, the following citation from the report shows how this image should 
be portrayed: 106 
The first aspect is about Norwegians as engaged global citizens: 
peacemakers and peacekeepers – the blue helmet rather than the white 
dove; thinkers and practitioners at the forefront of debates about soft 
power with a sophisticated understanding of global security. In order to 
avoid both undermining its role in peace negotiations and provoking other 
partners, emphasis needs to be placed on the right aspects of the message – 
Norway as a partner, facilitator and good multilateralist – and attention 
should only be drawn to peace processes once they are firmly established.  
Without a broader contextual description of the military’s role in society and the 
current military engagements abroad, this portrayed image of the Norwegian 
governments use of military power could be misleading and interpreted just as much as 
an annoyance to official foreign policy goals. The Norwegian government’s willingness 
to use military power for other purposes related to the country’s self interests should be 
portrayed as well. Although important, the use of military power should not be hidden by 
the humanitarian aspect only. As a consequence, it is important to coordinate Norwegian 
security and defense policies more closely in public diplomacy efforts. An NCW 
implementation process should coordinate these efforts as well and establish an adequate 
political – military network to ensure that military interests are attended to and do not 
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G. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has elaborated some of the important factors in the Norwegian 
strategic environment that should be factored into a NCW implementation process. There 
are several others that are not mentioned. Not because they are not important, but because 
they are less distinctive in a NCW concept compared to other warfighting concepts. 
Factors such as Norway’s topography and demography, the distinctiveness of the political 
system and the country’s economic and industrial strength will have to be taken into 
account in any warfighting concept. Hence, they will not be discussed separately and in 
detail here. Likewise, some other factors, such as the social structure, society’s and the 
military’s adaptability to new technology, past war experiences and the populations 
motivation or will to fight will be commented on later in relation to the changes in the 
nature of conflict, or to the transformation of war, as Martin Van Creveld named his 
ground-breaking reinterpretation of armed conflict in 1991. 
Conclusively, this chapter’s goal was to make a distinction on factors in the 
strategic environment that perhaps require a different approach to how the concept. of 
NCW should be implemented. Norway’s strategic freedom of maneuver within the power 
triangle between Russia, the EU and the U.S. is one such determining factor. Norway’s 
closeness to Russia, its non-membership in EU, and attempts to balance the transatlantic 
link combined with the general global security policy developments, suggest that Norway 
must develop a broader range of capabilities in order to conduct independent crisis 
management. An alternative approach, where Norway, for instance, became a full partner 
of the EU, could perhaps change the formula, but that is not the current assumption. 
Moreover, the independent NCW capabilities should be tailored specifically to meet 
Norway’s geopolitical situation, including the potential conflict portfolio that comes with 
Russia as a neighbor.   
The NCW capabilities should also be tailored to fit Norway’s specific interests 
that there is a political will to defend by military means. These interests need to be further 
defined. In the example used to illuminate this issue, many of these are maritime 
interests. This implies that an intra-agency and intra-service network at all levels within 
the maritime sector should be developed and maintained not only in times of crisis but 
also on a daily basis.  
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NATO continues to be the cornerstone in Norwegian security and the NATO 
transformation process and NCW development should be closely followed. In this regard, 
Norway is well ahead with several initiatives pursuant to the PCC requirements. 
However, when developing NCW capabilities, Norway should be critical of 
implementing blue prints from the larger partner nations. Norway’s distinctiveness, with 
a smaller power base and other natural conditions, may demand a different military 
doctrine and other technological solutions. In addition, Norway should be prepared to 
raise its own interests with more force as the NATO network becomes more politicized in 
a more globalized and interest based world.  
The economic and technological aspects of a NCW implementation invite new 
ways of strategic thinking. The assumptions of NCW as an expensive warfighting method 
in the information age can be proven wrong if other strategic, conceptual, and doctrinal 
sides of the implementation are prioritized, rather than focusing on expensive high 
quality materiel throughout the whole military organization. However, because of  
heritage and a considerable gap in the predicted NCW structure, it is unlikely that total 
defense spending can be reduced in the short future. On the contrary, it is likely to 
increase; but if a long-term view is taken, and NCW is implemented in an orderly fashion 
and in cooperation with Norwegian industry, the implementation may also give good 
returns to both civil and military society.       
The Norwegian culture and attitude to the significance and efficiency of soft 
power, and in particular IO and public diplomacy, may be a serious obstacle to the 
achievement of information superiority. Understanding and exploiting these tools could 
be a cost efficient means to enhance daily operations and combat efficiency, in addition 
to the other humanitarian costs that inevitably are connected to war. The expected 
dividend of NCW most likely can never be collected until a grasp of the prospects and 
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IV. CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF CONFLICT 
 The prospects for NCW as an information-enabled warfighting concept and  
certain aspects of Norway’s strategic environment that should influence a NCW 
implementation strategy have been discussed previously. Attention is now turned to the 
nature of conflict where questions such as, is the war high-tech or low-tech, short or long, 
limited or unlimited, conventional or unconventional, become important to determine the 
impact of the information age on future forms of warfare. An NCW concept must aim to 
embrace all these characteristics to a larger or lesser degree according to their relevance. 
Surely, each conflict is unique as Clauswitz proposed, but there are perhaps some general 
lessons learned from the characteristic features of the information age and a more 
thorough analysis of future adversaries that will help determine the mission challenges, 
opportunities and constraints in the future. Hence, the latter elements will be the focus of 
this chapter. As depicted in the model below,107 which further breaks down the elements 
in Figure 1, an analysis of these factors should contribute to identifying the specifics of a 
NCW concept as guidelines in an implementation strategy.  
 
 
Figure 8.   The Environment (From Alberts, 2002) 
 
                                                 
107 Model adapted from Alberts, Information Age Transformation: Getting to a 21st Century Military 
(CCRP Publication Series, June 2002), 34. 
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 With regard to the consequences for a Norwegian implementation strategy the 
findings in this chapter will be more general in nature and they will have a broader 
application. They should, nevertheless, have a prominent place when a NCW strategy is 
mapped out. 
 
A. NOTES ON THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS  
Since the end of the Cold War, it is apparent that the “nature of war” in general 
has changed. Total nuclear war and large conventional clashes between NATO and 
Warsaw Pact forces on the battlefields of Europe now seem distant and military doctrines 
based on attrition warfare have become antiquated. Or at least so it seems. Since the early 
nineties, sophisticated armed forces around the world have adopted a maneuver-oriented 
doctrine and are in a state of constant transformation towards even more flexible and joint 
force capabilities. The contemporary revolution in military affairs, primarily based on 
technological progresses is believed to further and fundamentally change future forms of 
war. In essence, changes will take place in three general classes of warfighting 
activities:108 
− In the perfection of traditional combat 
− In the evolution of nontraditional missions such as special operations, 
humanitarian assistance, counter-drug operations, peace operations and 
counter-proliferation 
− In a new form of war unique to the Information Age focusing mostly on 
Cyberspace and the information domain  
However, it is debatable if the current information revolution will have such an 
impact. According to Richard O. Hundley, who has investigated military technology and 
military revolutions in the 20th century, the following defining characteristics must occur 
in a true RMA:109 
“An RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military 
operations; 
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− which either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a 
dominant player, 
− or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension of 
warfare, 
− or both.” 
By his definition Hundley argues that, primarily because of lack of empirical or 
historical evidence, it is premature to characterize the current military technological, 
doctrinal and organizational development as an RMA. It is simply too soon to tell: but, a 
revolution is perhaps emerging or has the potential to become one.110 The point here is 
not to engage in a theoretical discussion about whether a RMA is occurring or not, even 
if the discussion is highly relevant since the belief that it is, in fact happening, is drawing 
a large amount of resources to its attention. More important, are perhaps Hundley’s 
findings of other characteristics showing that RMA is more than new technology. Some 
of his results based on the same historical examples are:111 
− RMAs are rarely brought about by dominant players. 
− RMAs frequently bestow an enormous and immediate military advantage on 
the first nation to exploit them in combat. 
− RMAs are often adopted and fully exploited first by someone other than the 
nation inventing the new technology. 
− RMAs are not always technology-driven. 
− Technology-driven RMAs are usually brought about by combinations of 
technologies, rather than individual technologies. 
− Not all technology-driven RMAs involve weapons. 
− All successful technology-driven RMAs appear to have three components: 
technology, doctrine, and organization. 
− There are probably as many “failed” RMAs as successful RMAs. 
− RMAs often take a long time to come to fruition. 
− The military utility of an RMA is frequently controversial and in doubt up 
until the moment it is proven in battle. 
  Acknowledging these points should lead to the investigation of other 
aspects of the contemporary RMA before implementing a NCW strategy. Perhaps focus 
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should be more on adversaries’ strategies or preferred tactics while simultaneously 
exploiting the advantages of new information technology. Losing focus on enemies might 
prove disastrous when the NCW concept is put to the ultimate test on the battlefield. The 
actual RMA may instead be determined by the adversaries in what tends to be called 
asymmetric warfare. Means such as guerrilla and terrorism tactics targeting vulnerable 
aspects of society such as, densely populated areas, transport and communications, power 
supplies and environmental high risk facilities can be highly effective in modern 
societies. These strategies and tactics may render net-centric forces, advanced 
information and weapons systems more or less useless if these capabilities are allowed to 
be developed within a conventional and military framework only. This discussion is part 
of what many scholars have labeled a counter-revolution, a second revolution that 
includes countermeasures that obviously seek to outmaneuver the comparative 
advantages coming from a technology driven RMA.112 Again, the key point is not  
semantics regarding RMAs, but to constantly use creativity and stamina in a thorough 
analysis of potential adversaries’ activities and responses in accordance with the lower 
left side of Figure 1. For sure, as the September 11 disaster and the most recent terror 
attacks in Madrid have shown, the enemy obviously never rests and new technologies 
will never make the “fog of war” so transparent in the future to fully prevent similar 
incidents.  
Contributing to further defining the characteristics of an RMA, Eliot A. Cohen 
has identified four key questions that need to be answered to understand the 
implications:113 
− Will the revolution change the appearance of combat? 
− Will it change the structures of armies? 
− Will it lead to the rise of new military elites? 
− Will it alter countries power position? 
                                                 
112 For elaboration on the second revolution see amongst others James Stavridis, “The Second 
Revolution”, JFQ, Spring 1997,   
113 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 75 No. 2, March/April 1996, 
43-44. 
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The answer to these questions may identify important mission challenges, 
opportunities and constraints that can provide guidelines on what to emphasize in 
information-age warfare.  
Cohen’s qualified answer to the first two questions is in many respects reflected 
in Chapter II in the discussion of the prospects of NCW, IS and in new ways of 
organizing or networking the force. In addition this chapter also highlights the 
opportunities an NCW concept represents for future warfare. Concepts such as 
knowledge-based warfare, information warfare, shock warfare, swarming and netwar are 
pertinent labeled concepts that give an idea of the development of information age 
warfare. In addition, Cohen addresses a few other points. One is that an increased 
incentive for preemption may grow due to the domination of long-range intelligent 
precision weapons.114 Combined with a belief in a counterrevolution, the first blow can 
indeed prove to be decisive in future conflicts. The recent intervention in Iraq may serve 
as an example of the U.S. and the Coalition institutionalizing this principle. Part of the 
preemption formula is also the fear that WMD may be used by non-state actors or rogue 
states. In this respect, with the convergence between new technologies and new terrorism, 
preemption and/or prevention by democracies to confront intolerable regimes, may be 
seen as both necessary and courageous.115 Cohen also highlights an increased use of 
covert means, for instance in cyberspace, as another side of the preemption strategy. 
“Such attacks – to which an information-dependent society like the United States is 
particular vulnerable – could have many purposes: blinding, intimidating, diverting, or 
simply confusing an opponent”, however, “How such wars initiated by information 
strikes would play themselves out is a matter of tremendous uncertainty.116 Some aspects 
of this uncertainty will be addressed later in a discussion of some of the constraints in the 
concept of information superiority. 
In his third question, addressing the structure of military organizations, Cohen 
tentatively describes militaries of the next century. Among other factors, it will rest on 
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long voluntary service, be increasingly joint, and have more “quasi services” operating, 
such as Special Forces and information warfare entities. Also, the use of supporting 
civilian contractors on the logistical and analytical side will increase. Cohen also points 
out that “The radical revision of these structures will be the last manifestation of a 
revolution in military affairs, and the most difficult to implement” 117.  
Lastly, Cohen addresses the changing power of states. The United States’ position 
as the sole superpower is probably uncontestable and it is perhaps the only country that 
can exploit the revolution to its fullest. However, other powers have great ambitions as 
well. China is emerging as perhaps the greatest challenger to U.S. global influence while 
Russia, as mentioned before, is reemerging as a power that seeks both regional and global 
power. Moreover, the contemporary revolution “offers tremendous opportunities to 
countries that can afford to acquire expensive modern weaponry and the skills to use it 
properly.”118 In this respect, size matters less and Cohen points to Israel, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Australia as examples of countries that can do more against larger 
opponents than was ever before imaginable.119 In the information age, a large population 
and industrial capacity means less than in the past and the ability to translate 
organizational, economic and technological power into military capabilities can 
significantly alter a regional or local military balance. This could be true also for a small 
country like Norway. As a modern, high-tech oriented and wealthy nation, Norway’s 
willingness to balance the risk of transforming its military into networked modern 
information age forces can yield great benefits in the sense of increased influence and 
security.  
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS  
According to some scholars, the key challenges for transforming Western 
militaries lies not in the technological challenges ahead, but more on the doctrinal and 
organizational changes that must come. These changes are emerging either as a result of 
the opportunities posed by developments in the information age or as constraints by the 
                                                 
117 Cohen, 48. 
118 Ibid. , 50. 
119 Ibid. 
64 
very same. It will go too far here to expand on all the types of organizations or 
organization principles that are envisioned for militaries in the information age, but in 
general two organizational doctrines, as proposed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, seem 
particularly fit for networked actors.120  One is to organize in a seemingly “leaderless” 
way. Multiple leadership with consultative and consensus-building mechanisms for 
decision making are some of the organizing principles. The edge organization described 
in Chapter II, with the empowerment of individuals at the edge of an organization is a 
major doctrinal step in a less hierarchical and leader-independent direction. Moreover, 
the power to the edge concept is considered to be a necessary condition for networked 
force to reach self-synchronizing capabilities.   
The second proposed organizational doctrine is “swarming.” According to 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, swarming can be viewed as the idea of “engaging an adversary 
from all directions simultaneously, either with fire or in force.”121 However, swarming is 
more than a tactical concept. Coupled with information age technologies, IO and the 
emergence of well informed and lethal small units such as Special Forces, it may be 
regarded as a mode of conflict having a fundamental impact on doctrine development. In 
addition, a study of swarming in nature, swarming-techniques during past military 
conflicts, and contemporary organizations’ use of swarming-techniques, in cyberspace 
for instance, have proven that swarming concepts can be highly effective.122  Thus, there 
is an opportunity for modern militaries to exploit this efficiency in NCW where the 
infrastructure to wire decision makers, sensors and shooters already is in place. 
Moreover, in a technology driven RMA, swarming is an opportunity to “give network-
centric concepts operational life through organizational and doctrinal innovation.”123  
Since the notion of swarming is relatively new in modern military terms, some further 
definitions of swarming are useful to understand different variations of the concept. 
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Below are some that were presented at the Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center 
conference on swarming in network enabled C4ISR 13-14 January 2003:124  
Swarming … is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to 
strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force 
and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions. It will work best – 
perhaps it will only work – if it is designed mainly around the deployment 
of myriad, small dispersed, networked maneuver units.125 
A swarming case is any historical example in which the scheme of 
maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more)  
emiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some 
particular place. “Convergent” implies an attack from most of the points 
on the compass.126 
A collection of autonomous (or semi-autonomous) entities which rely on 
local sensing and simple behaviors – interacting in a way that a more 
complex behavior emerges from entity interactions.127  
A smart mob128 
[In] smart mobs … leaders may determine an overall goal, but the actual 
execution is created on the fly by participants at the lowest possible level 
who are constantly innovating, [Howard] Rheingold notes. They respond 
to changing situations without requesting or needing permission. In some 
cases, even the goal is determined collaboratively and non-
hierarchically.129 
A doctrine that includes swarming concepts represents a number of challenges 
regarding command and control and organizational aspects. With regard to C2 some of 
the challenges are that the characteristics include:130 
− Diverse information functions, entities. 
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− Distributed computation to reduce communications bandwidth. 
− Decentralized control to avoid vulnerability and bottlenecks. 
− Dynamic adaptability to changing battlespace. 
These characteristics are to a certain extent incorporated in today’s operational 
principles based on a maneuver-oriented doctrine; but the swarming requirements for 
shared situation awareness, autonomy, self-organization and simplicity go much further. 
Adding up, are the organizational requirements of distributed or dispersed forces and a 
sufficient presence of a large number of forces. The latter clearly represents a challenge 
for smaller nations, but numbers can be reduced if the forces have the necessary 
information advantage, for instance, based on detailed local knowledge of the battle 
space, and if organized in an efficient size.  
Moreover, for Norway’s case, it can be argued that some types of forces already 
have some experience, or they can easily be transformed to swarm-type of forces if the 
right conditions are in place. As an example, is the Norwegian littoral concept utilizing 
fast patrol boats (FPBs). These FPBs, operating in numbers from 3-12 vessels, have 
extensively utilized tactics where they converge on high value targets trying to maximize 
their total weapon load. Focus has also been on achieving a pulsing effect where the 
different weapons available on these vessels, missiles, torpedoes and guns have been 
timely coordinated following relatively simple guidelines from certain weapons release 
criteria. The existing fleet of FPBs, combined with the newly developed Skjold class 
FPB, an air cushion catamaran with stealth capacity and a top speed of nearly 60kt, can 
provide a unique opportunity to develop this force further in a naval doctrine for 
swarming in the littorals. Unfortunately, the old Hauk class FPBs are to be phased out no 
later than the year 2010, leaving the remaining FPB fleet with only six new vessels. In 
light of O’Hanlon’s recommendation of retaining older but perfectly usable platforms for 
further service in the information age, this is regrettable. The Hauk class is newly 
upgraded and in a swarming type concept a minimum number of units is still required. 
Consequently, the drive for new technologies and modern sensor weapons can also be a 
hinder to exploit other doctrinal and organizational sides of the RMA that could give an 
even better comparative advantage.  
67 
 Another, and perhaps missed opportunity for developing swarm-type forces, is 
the newly developed coastal ranger concept. The coastal ranger force, consisting of 
lightly equipped marine type troops on small high-speed landing craft, is decidedly 
reduced and integrated in a joint ISTARbn with the army. The unit will function as the 
ISTARbn maritime element and contribute to security and reconnaissance in the 
littorals.131 The costal rangers’ limited, but still unique offensive capabilities that rely on 
speed, stealth, local information knowledge and autonomy in the littorals are apparently 
to be discontinued. In addition, both the above mentioned forces operate naturally 
together in the same environment making the degradation of this littoral capability 
complete when we see them in a combined context.  
Similar analogies can perhaps be made for capabilities in the Norwegian army, 
home guard and air force, but one consequence of this development seems clear; if 
consistent efforts are not made to adjust the current transformation policies into proper 
doctrines within a NCW concept Norway will, in few years have a sophisticated but 
extremely small force structure with severe constraints for doctrinal and organizational 
development. So far the transformation has been focused on reducing numbers after a 
“cheese cutter” approach on a broad scale, without properly recognizing that certain 
capabilities have a critical size limit before their efficiency or endurance drops 
drastically. In this respect, Alberts reminds us that transformation must be mission 
specific and concept-driven rather than trailing technology. New information related 
capabilities must be treated holistically, meaning that they have to be considered in a 
mission capability context.132 Breaking up Norway’s littoral capabilities in this maritime 
nation with one of the longest and roughest coastlines in the world, is not a good sign of a 
holistic approach. In addition, swarming effect operations are not easily conducted within 
an allied framework due to the particular characteristic of swarming that requires intimate 
knowledge and long relationships as obtained by training and exercises, before personel 
are able to operate together. Thus it is important to maintain certain national and 
comprehensive capabilities.  
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With swarm forces and networks in general come also vulnerabilities. Some of 
these vulnerabilities can be found by studying terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda 
that apparently share some of the characteristics of a swarm force. One of the key ideas in 
this respect is that “it takes networks to fight networks”133 and we can learn much about 
future warfighting concepts by studying our enemies who, for many reasons, have fewer 
constraints applying new technologies and organizational forms to their strategies of war 
or violence. The relationship between swarming characteristics and some principles on 
how these networks might be disrupted are depicted in the figure below.134 
 
Figure 9.   Characteristics of Swarming and Network Countermeasures  
(From Chartier, Joint C4ISR) 
 
The different concepts of swarming and the implications will not be elaborated 
further here, although Rheingold’s concept of smart mobs in a low-intensity conflict 
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context will be expanded upon in the next chapter. The reason is that the combination of 
these two trends in contemporary conflicts has important sociological consequences that 
deserve to be examined further in a NCW context. 
The upper “command area” of Figure 9 also calls attention to the often 
underestimated function of trust in modern societies in general, and in the military 
command and control systems in particular. In the information age, trust has become so 
integrated into our daily activities, such as transportation, electronic monetary 
transactions, e-commerce and so forth, thought is rarely given to the fact that we would 
not use these systems if we did not inherently trust them. The same can be said for 
command and control systems. Even more important is the function of trust in 
information dependent and networked types of organizations. These trust relationships 
can be interpersonal, sociological, organizational, technological or even system/nation 
related.135  A network or organization’s use of information to increase its efficiency or 
achieve its goals is highly affected by whether the information coming through this 
variety of relationships is trusted or not. Consequently, net-centric forces depending on 
information superiority should be consciously aware of the function of trust because it 
will play a significant part if the NCW concept is to function properly. It may be 
compared to cement in brick constructions. Without trust, NCW would fall apart as a 
modern way of waging war. Distrust could be compensated for by relying on hierarchical 
forms of organizations with slow and bureaucratic control mechanisms, or even worse, 
the technology would not be used effectively nor could information distributed through 
networks be relied upon. In short, NCW will not work unless people networked and 
collaborated with, the technology that supports the networks, and the information 
distributed through the networks are trusted.136 
Advancing research on the significance of trust in societies and organizations has 
led to the notion by McEvily, Vincenzo Perrone and Akbar Zaheer to develop trust as an 
organizing principle. The function of an organizing principle is to solve problems of 
interdependence and uncertainty and, “is the logic by which work is coordinated and 
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information is gathered, disseminated, and processed within and between 
organizations.”137 McEvily, et.al, see trust as an organizing principle accomplished by 
“specifying structuring and mobilizing as two sets of causal pathways through which trust 
influences several important properties of organizations” (italics added).138 Furthermore, 
structuring is explained as: 
…the development, maintenance, and modification of a system of relative 
positions and links among actors situated in a social space. The result is a 
network of stable and ongoing interaction patterns, both formal (e.g. 
routines and organizational units) and informal (e.g. cliques and 
coalitions). Structuring also creates social stratification that produces 
differential status, power and knowledge. We argue that trust as an 
organizing principle molds the social structure of an organizational system 
in both of these ways.139 
The other pathway, mobilizing, is explained as follows: 
By mobilizing we mean the process of converting resources into finalized 
activities performed by interdependent actors. Resources, both material 
and nonmaterial (such as time, effort attention, and knowledge) are 
decentralized and unevenly distributed among actors. Mobilizing involves 
motivating actors to contribute their resources, to combine, coordinate, 
and use them in joint activities, and to direct them toward the achievement 
of organizational goals. Mobilizing results in organizational action and, 
we argue, trust influences the pathway through which such actions arise. 
Specifically, trust influences the process of knowledge sharing, 
committing, and safeguarding through the mechanism of disclosing and 
screening, identifying, and suspending judgment, respectively” 140 
An abstract notion such as trust as an organizing principle may seem like an odd 
idea, but without trust uncertainty will prevail in information dependent organizations 
and networks. Also, it is recognized that integration can be achieved by other cognitive-
cultural mechanisms. According to Milward and Raab,141 “These are generally shared 
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beliefs within a society outside the organization (common values, common culture, 
common socialization) and shared beliefs within the organization (common visions, 
shared norms of cooperation, unity of purpose, corporate identity).” Moreover, and 
perhaps more important for integration in an allied context is that “a second mechanism 
which is more intentional and easier to create is the orientation towards common 
goals.”142 In view of the Iraqi intervention, this last mechanism highlights that reaching 
these common goals is perhaps not so easy after all. At least it underlines that diplomatic 
efforts and some level of consensus has to present before operations are conducted in a 
coalition context.  
 The key point here is not to introduce an entirely new organizational theory for 
militaries in the information age, but rather to emphasize that the trust principle at least in 
coordination with other organizational principles, has the potential to simplify the 
decision-making process and reduce the need for control. Time and valuable resources 
may be saved and trust could be part of the answer to reach a state of self-synchronizing 
forces since, “Trust operates like a ‘rule of thumb,’ using the information that is available 
to formulate an expectation, rather than acquiring all of the relevant information to make 
a comprehensive, rational decision.”143 This quality of trust can be decisive when large 
amounts of information must be processed in time-sensitive operations. A prerequisite is 
of course that the actors and technological systems in the different varieties of trust 
mentioned by Sztompka are trustworthy. That includes allies, other military forces and 
entities, individual commanders, sensors, weapons and information systems. Blind trust is 
damaging and will only allow adversaries’ countermeasures to work; for instance, 
attempts of IO, including PSYOPS and deception. Common values, doctrines, language, 
cultural understanding, interoperable equipment, education and training are some of the 
key requirements to establish a proper foundation of trust within military organizations 
and between allies.  
Perhaps trust as an organizing principle can support new ways of command and 
control in the information age. In his closing arguments in the book Information Age 
Transformation, Alberts sees the command and control aspect as a major organizational 
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challenge and calls for new ideas and research for NCW command and control 
arrangements. Clearly, they must be different from those developed during the industrial 
age.144 The latter were based on staff processes and the supportive technology for 
command and control. The answer, he argues, may be found by answering three 
questions. 145 Based on the discussion above, part of the answers may be found in trust: 
− Alberts’ Q1: Under what circumstances does self-synchronization work?  
Trust contribution: An efficient organization clearly thrives under good trust 
conditions. A network design must work autonomous within jointly set 
schedules.146 Managerial philosophies such as empowerment and structural 
trust functions will enhance the circumstances where self-synchronisation will 
work. 
− Alberts’ Q2: How can command intent be best articulated? 
Trust contribution: Through investments in human capabilities. The more 
competence in the commander’s own organization, “the more facile and 
effective the network linkages can be made.”147 
− Alberts’ Q3: What sorts of command interventions are needed to maintain 
control? 
Trust contribution: Trust building and maintenance will function as control 
mechanisms in networks. 148  
  Furthermore, Alberts suggests a reconsideration of the whole term “command and 
control” because it is out of date. Command implies that someone is in charge. 
Experiences have shown that consultation is the prevalent method and no single entity is 
actually in charge. Likewise, nobody is responsible for carrying out the intent. A series of 
collaborative efforts makes the progress. Lastly, control is not an accurate term for 
describing the level of expected control in today’s complex environments and operations. 
Consequently, Alberts argues that “convergence” is a more realistic goal. These views 
might seem radical, but they are in line with what Arquilla and Ronfeldt have described 
as doctrinal practices for netwar actors. Furthermore, these practices align with the early 
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Kosovo experience and the increasingly stronger hands-on approach as a work-around for 
organizational problems from the U.S. in the later Iraq-Afghanistan coalitions. Thus, 
Alberts is probably right when he argues that the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the 
whole command and control concept if it is to be useful in the information age. 
Lastly, actually implementing these organizational paradigm shifts will be an 
enormous challenge to the traditional Western military hierarchies. Bureaucratic and 
cultural resistance is an important obstacle to reaching the required goals of new 
organizational structures. These factors have a more or less universal application in most 
Western countries. Admiral Owens remarked that “…the promise of the information 
revolution has stalled as a result of the distraction of world events, poor planning, 
insufficient budget priority, and behind-the-scenes bureaucratic opposition to the 
dramatic organizational and cultural changes…”149 For the British there is a preference 
for close combat warfighting concepts and an innate reluctance to embrace the RMA 
based on the nation’s and the military’s culture.150 Similar resistance is experienced in 
Norway, and the Minister of Defense is particularly stressing this point since the whole 
defense structure, including the military must embody both the will and the ability to 
change and adapt in order to achieve the aims of the transformation process.151 
Consequently, this will and ability must be founded in a clear and understood vision of 
the NCW concept if transformation is to succeed. 
 
C. MISSION CHALLENGES IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS  
The lessons learned in the contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
predestined to influence the development of Western militaries. Thus, some experiences 
from these contemporary conflicts thought to be particularly relevant in the discussion of 
mission challenges based on changes in the nature of conflict have been highlighted in 
this section.  
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1. NCW as a Problem Fixer  
An important challenge in the transition to information age militaries is the 
exaggerated belief in new warfighting concepts and technologies as problem fixers 
without taking into consideration that the basics in the nature of war, in fact, are 
unchanging. Although Alberts et.al., reject the notion that NCW will change the nature of 
war profoundly,152 for many scholars it is a concern that a non-linear approach to warfare 
utilizing superior information technology and a system of systems approach to lift the 
“fog of war” in accordance to, for instance Admiral Owens visions,153 will lead to the 
perception that classical strategic thought is outdated. Concerns are raised that 
exaggerated belief in NCW will reduce the art of war to science, that the operational art 
will diminish with increased centralization of command and control until NCW is nothing 
more than a tactical concept, that the enemy’s countermeasures will not really matter and 
that the role of morale and psychological factors will no longer have an impact.154 The 
latter arguments, somewhat simplified, were stated by Dr. Vego in his article “Net-
Centric Is Not Decisive.” 
 Vego’s concerns might be right in view of how Western militaries actually are 
performing in contemporary conflicts. In the Iraqi case, criticism has been raised because 
the administration and campaign planners neglected to plan the post-combat phase 
properly. “The U.S. was woefully unprepared for the postwar administration of the 
country and was surprised by the extent of the guerilla war that it would have to fight.”155 
In light of NCW characteristics, one can argue that planners applied a nonlinear approach 
with a tactical focus on the whole Iraqi problem. Hence, proper phasing was deemed 
unnecessary and the campaign was seen as a continuous operation, which arguably 
promotes higher tempo and more flexibility in the conduct of operations. Although it is 
difficult to tell with certainty, at least with the advantage of hindsight, many of the 
encountered problems now facing the U.S. led coalition could have been approached 
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differently on the basis of a more thorough planning preparation for the post-combat 
phase.  
 
2. Shortcutting Strategies 
Another important lesson comes from the alleged exaggerated belief by the 
current U.S. administration and the media that as soon Saddam Hussein’s regime was 
toppled, and the dictator himself captured, the necessary grounds for the Iraqis to stop the 
resistance, begin nation-building, and embrace democracy would be created. Surprisingly 
to many it was not, or as expressed by the Secretary General of the UN., Kofi Annan 
“People are happy Saddam has gone, but they had not expected this disorder to 
follow”.156 This simplified cause and effect relationship of decapitation strategies, 
coupled with a convincing, but also true, belief in the information enabled U.S. 
supremacy on the conventional battlefield, highlights the danger of shortcutting strategies 
that promise fast solutions to difficult problems. In the Iraqi case it might also have 
suppressed the U.S. administration’s view of the need for diplomatic efforts for the 
purpose of having a larger portion of the international community onboard. Clearly this 
was a campaign U.S. forces could undertake alone if they had to. The consequences of 
not fighting harder along the lines of diplomacy seem clearer today when several 
countries have announced that they are pulling out from Iraq in the summer of 2004. The 
tactical consequences of these withdrawals are perhaps insignificant, but within an allied 
network they should be regarded as very serious. As a global actor, the U.S. needs these 
allies regardless of how small their contributions are, and conversely, smaller nations still 
need a strong, trustworthy and competent ally like the U.S. with sustained confidence in 
the world community. Indeed, the post-combat phase in Iraq, where democratization is 
the main objective, will be a test for modern democracies, gauging how future conflicts 
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3. Identifying Tipping Points 
A third lesson from Iraq is the highlighting of the moment of Saddam’s capture as 
the tipping point in the liberation of Iraq. Although several media recognized the 
significance of this event, particularly one article by Frank J. Gaffney Jr. in the 
Washington Times specifically used the term “tipping point” to describe the situation.157 
Four months after the capture, when this was written, severe fighting broke loose in the 
Sunni Muslim dominated city of Falluja, and there is substantial fear that the unrest will 
spread to other regions as well. In addition, insurgent bomb attacks and kidnappings of 
foreign military and civilian personnel are presently increasing. Creating a tipping point 
in a conflict or any other desired/undesired social behavior is of course wanted, but they 
rarely occur by wishful thinking, or simplified cause and effect analyses that particularly 
are found in decapitation strategies. True tipping points are hard to predict because the 
cause and effect relations in social behavior are immensely complex. The concept of 
tipping points originates in epidemiology and can be described as the idea “that small 
changes will have little or no effect until a critical mass is reached.”158 Figuratively, and 
with implication for social behavior, the term implies that when certain social or 
structural conditions are in place, just a small incident is enough for the situation to tip in 
a particular direction. A tipping point has three characteristics: “…one, contagiousness; 
two, the fact that little causes can have big effects; and three, that change happens not 
gradually but at one dramatic moment…”159  
Saddam’s capture was obviously an important victory for the coalition forces, but 
at that phase of the occupation, Saddam’s power of influence was definitively over. One 
could argue that it could be equally dangerous to underestimate the myth and inspiration 
of Saddam’s legacy, but the possibilities that the insurgents’ cause rests more on other 
factors such as Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism rather than support to 
Saddam himself should perhaps have been emphasized more. Added to the equation is 
also the influence and activities of other adversaries, for instance al-Qaeda, which were 
not traditionally affiliated with the Baath regime. Moreover, the event was not likely to 
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change the average Iraqi citizen’s everyday life. More essential was the occupation 
forces’ attitude and efforts to improve overall security, critical infrastructure and living 
conditions in general. In other words, to deliberately create a tipping point the occupation 
force should focus on networks in the population that will make the difference with 
regard to the critical mass. Hence, resources must be freed to attend the symptoms of 
dissatisfaction by improving the small and everyday changes rather than focus on the big 
issues. Simultaneously, obvious hostile groups in the population must be contained or 
eliminated. To create a contagious effect the local politicians, religious leaders, 
connectors, mavens, salesmen, and other gatekeepers must be influenced. In this respect 
the word of mouth is more important than advanced information technology, international 
headlines and governmental statements. Hence, any surpluses in information advantage 
or military resources should be used to create conditions for changes at the level of 
ordinary citizens, or in the influencing part of the population, in order to reach the critical 
mass in which a tipping point can occur.   
 
4. Integrated Civilian and Military strategies - Tipping Points 
Continued 
In military terms a tipping point resembles, but is not equal to, the culminating 
point that planners and commanders try to identify, avoid or establish the conditions for 
in different phase of a campaign. Certain criteria are identified to indicate when own or 
the enemy’s culmination point can be expected to occur. The culmination point is 
traditionally connected to the offense where the goal is to maintain the initiative and 
momentum in an operation. In light of the characteristics of low intensity conflicts and 
expected information superiority, perhaps the culmination point should be redefined to 
also include the characteristics of a tipping point. Due to its complexity it would be 
harder to identify and many aspects of the necessary conditions needed to reach such a 
point would be out of military control. Traditionally, external interference is regarded as 
disadvantageous by the militaries but such an approach will at least highlight the need for 
better interagency and NGO cooperation or even full integration. The British 
counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya serves as a classical example for successful 
military-civilian integration. This strategy was not primarily military, but as R. W. Komer 
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points out, “a mixed strategy encompassing civil, police, military, and psychological 
warfare programs, all within the context of a firm rule of law and steady progress toward 
self-government and independence, which robbed the insurgency of much political 
appeal.”160  A mixed or integrated strategy does not imply limitations on offensive and 
proactive means where commanders deem it necessary, but it would highlight the 
defense, phasing, planned operational pauses and preventive strategies to a larger degree. 
Moreover, the dangers of a nonlinear approach where the decision makers lose 
sight of the larger problems and objectives may be reduced, or as Vego puts it, 
“Campaigns and major operations normally are divided into several phases because the 
ultimate objective cannot be accomplished in a single fell swoop, even against a much 
weaker opponent. Without phasing, there is the risk of overshooting the point of 
culmination”161 Thus, understanding and identifying tipping points is a very good 
incentive to develop truly integrated civilian-military strategies in future conflicts, and 
particularly in low-intensity conflicts.  Such analyses can be a very powerful tool in a 
NCW concept where all the resources, military as well as civilian, to a larger or lesser 
degree must be integrated to reach common goals. 
 
5.  Evolving or Revolutionary Nontraditional Missions? 
Another important mission challenge is the neglected military view on low 
intensity conflicts as “worthy” military missions. Obviously there is reluctance in the 
military to embrace these new and changing missions such as peace support and 
humanitarian operations even if they have political, economic and social significance. 
The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are both in a low-intensity phase with an 
apparent asymmetry between conventional coalition forces and local insurgencies or 
terrorists. As recently discussed, there are problems applying military power effectively 
against these adversaries. The expected dividends of information superiority have been 
markedly absent against these types of adversaries. The exception is perhaps found in the 
“Afghan model,” at least in the first phases of the Afghanistan war where an 
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unconventional approach utilizing coalition Special Forces, combined with precision 
munitions and an indigenous ally, proved to be highly efficient against the Taliban 
regime and al-Qaeda fighters.162 Later, when conventional forces dominated the Afghan 
battle space, and when the enemy had turned unconventional, progress was halted. This 
does not imply that Special Forces and/or the Afghan model are the only possible 
solution to low-intensity conflicts or insurgency problems, but it does suggest that 
different types of conflicts need different solutions and sets of forces. It also suggests that 
counter guerrilla warfare in particular needs unconventional approaches to succeed. 
Although low intensity conflicts and new asymmetric threats are addressed in, for 
instance, NATO’s strategic concept,163 and in many Western countries’ military 
doctrines, the preferred solution still seems to be a conventional approach. In the Afghan 
case, one could argue that the initial extensive use of Special Forces was a choice of 
necessity more than a preferred course of action. At the time, nobody else was capable of 
doing the job within the critical time limits and logistical challenges that the Afghan 
battle space represented. The key to success, however, “is to team heavy, well-directed 
fires with skilled ground maneuver to exploit their effects and overwhelm the surviving 
enemy,”164 in addition to a sound strategy to recruit skilled and local allies and gain 
popular support. The latter is perhaps a greater challenge than the former in future low-
intensity conflicts. 
The reluctance to adapt militaries based on changes in the nature of war is nothing 
new. In 1991, due to new threats and the emergence of low-intensity conflicts with vastly 
different actors such as terrorists, guerillas, bandits, robbers and other non state actors, 
Van Creveld stated the need to reevaluate the nature of war in our time.165 To the 
extreme he argued that “If, as seems to be the case, the state cannot defend itself 
effectively against internal or external low-intensity conflict, then clearly it does not have 
a future in front of it.”166 Liddell Hart made the same observations almost 30 years 
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earlier in his second revised edition of “Strategy” where he included a chapter on guerilla 
warfare in which he added a clause to his old maxim; “If you wish for peace, understand 
war - particularly the guerilla and subversive forms of war”167 (italics added). 
Furthermore, he argued that conventional responses to these conflicts, utilizing 
overwhelming forces and strategic bombing are counterproductive and in fact enhance 
guerilla type strategies.168 Like Van Creveld, he saw the need for a reorientation of 
military policy to develop counter strategies of corresponding kind to face this new 
threat.   
Noticeably, there is a need to transform both the understanding of low-intensity 
conflicts as Van Creveld claims and war fighting capabilities to meet the information 
revolution, as RMA proponents suggest. Applying RMA only to the conventional, mid- 
and high intensity level of war will not help solve the difficult problems connected to 
low-intensity conflicts. Moreover, the scale of conflict is not a continuous line with just a 
higher intensity of the same problem. High-and low-intensity conflicts are in fact inverse 
problems with vastly different origins and threat assessments. They require different 
strategies, tactics and organizations in order to be solved.169 Recognizing this diversity 
should imply that both capabilities are needed and that the types of forces employed in 
each case are not necessarily easily compatible, at least not without an extensive period 
of combat enhancement training prior to insertion.    
Likewise, it would be a waste not to exploit the anticipated information 
superiority based on new information technology to also enhance the counterterrorism or 
counterinsurgency strategy and tactics. For sure, when found convenient and secure 
enough, adversaries such as insurgents and terrorists will utilize all means in their power 
to achieve their objectives. As will be discussed later, cyberspace is not an unfamiliar 
sphere for extremists, terrorists and insurgents. The potential impact of the latest trends in 
the information revolution on adversaries in low-intensity conflicts should be equally, if 
not more, emphasized when developing and implementing a NCW concept. The impact 
of the information age will be in force in all types of low-intensity conflicts but most 
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urgent is the al-Qaeda type terrorist threat and insurgencies as they are seen in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Currently, they represent the most serious threat against Western 
values and democracy, and at least some types of terrorist organizations clearly know 
how to operate in a high tech environment. 
This reemphasizes the dangers in exaggerating our faith in new warfighting 
concepts and also Liddell Hart’s warning that certain (conventional) preferred strategies 
and tactics can be counterproductive against terrorists and insurgents. Militaries in the 
information age should ensure that the newly developed forms of warfare, such as rapid 
decisive operations, knowledge-based warfare, information warfare and shock warfare 
aiming to strengthen the offense, do not become equally counterproductive. As will be 
discussed later, there are several areas in which an adversary may exploit new 
information technologies. Consequently, the defense should be as equally emphasized as 
the offense in order to ensure that proper capabilities exist to maintain equilibrium 
between the two.   
 
D. THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
Several mission challenges and constraints arise with the concept of information 
superiority. As dangerous as exaggerated beliefs in superior strategies and military 
strength is an overestimation of the effects of information superiority. For instance, in the 
Kosovo war, NATO’s information supremacy did not achieve a political or diplomatic 
victory. Neither did it give NATO major operational or tactical advantages. Instead, the 
assumed knowledge led to an overestimation of NATO’s capabilities, and information 
also become subject to Serbian manipulation.170 Consequently, despite of information-
sharing progress within the coalition forces, the Kosovo experience showed that NATO 
had a long way ahead before it could fully exploit advances in information technology, 
and the campaign highlighted the urgency for improvements.171 The approach is, 
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however, “a matter of political will rather than a technology solution. Technology will 
only be an enabler.” 172 
Also, the concept of IS, as explained in Chapter Two, involves the gathering, 
processing and distribution of enormous amounts of data. In addition, networking the 
forces is expected to increase the value of information significantly. Metcalf’s law states 
that “as the number of nodes in a network increases linearly, the potential ‘value or 
effectiveness’ of the network increases exponentially as the square number of nodes in 
the network.”173 However, there are pitfalls connected to the increased information 
richness that ought to be considered in a NCW implementation.  
The following will elaborate a few of the constraints and pitfalls of information 
superiority since they undoubtedly will have an impact on the NCW concept.  
 
1. Impact on the Decision Making Process 
Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and 
conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is 
FOREKNOWLEDGE. 
         Sun Tzu 
 In general, processed military information should be presented in a Common 
Operational Picture (COP) enabling different friendly actors shared and increased 
situation awareness. In turn this common awareness enhances collaboration and 
synchronization within the force. Moreover, the amounts of information that are possible 
to integrate in the COP are almost infinite, but along with the information richness 
emerge several problems.  
The first lies in the danger of information overload. Until machines are able to 
reasonably simulate complex systems in a digital and virtual conflict environment, it still 
takes a human brain to analyze the essence of the information and transform the 
information into relevant decisions on the battlefield. Although future technology enables 
more and more information processes, as well as decision-making processes to be 
ve limited functions in the cognitive domain. This is automated, machines still ha
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especially true for decision-making processes that are connected to the adversary’s intent 
and future courses of action. Often, factors like psychology, intuition and educated 
guesses are more important to a commander trying to figure out several sequential moves 
in an adversary’s unpredictable strategy. In these cases it may be more productive to 
simplify and reduce information to get to the core of the problem.  
Secondly, when all levels have access to the same planning assumptions and real 
time information/intelligence, it can result in a common problem focus and blur the 
distinction between the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Although technical 
solutions provide the capability to filter and adjust the COP to each commander’s needs 
at various levels, it is within human nature to gather and present as much information as 
possible. This tendency may actually be counterproductive compared to the desired speed 
and self-synchronization in NCW. Hence, organizational as well as technological 
mechanisms must be found to prevent commanders relying on the same COP that cannot 
be shared nor real at all three operational levels simultaneously, according to the intended 
functions of these levels. 
The third problem lies with the anticipated advantage of speed in the decision 
making process. Ultimately IS means to improve our own OODA loop174 compared to an 
adversary’s.  Arguably, the dividend of IS is highly focused on responding more quickly, 
for instance by shooting faster and more accurately at the enemy. However, it can be 
argued that the improvements should be more focused on the observe and orient portion 
of the loop. Self-synchronization and speed in the decision making process may lead to 
hastened and unintentional responses. The technical advanced AEGIS cruiser, USS 
Vincennes, shoot-down of Iran Air Flight 655, 3 July 1988, killing 290 people, may serve 
as an example of the consequences when critical decision making processes, based on  
advanced information technology are short-circuited in the drive for speed. The shoot-
down happened after the airliner had crossed the 20-mile point where the commander of 
USS Vincennes had announced that he would shoot if it did not change course.175 
Apparently, the pilot of Flight 655 never received the warnings.  Although this case 
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involves many aspects, including an alleged offensive mentality of Vincennes’ 
commander, the shoot-down clearly highlights the complexity of time sensitive decision 
making, including automated decision making processes and the human mind’s role in 
modern C2. The incident also highlights self-synchronization issues including delegation 
of authority and proper rules of engagements. Lastly, the Vincennes’ case highlights 
force protection issues and the appropriateness of using the right set of forces and 
technology for a particular mission. The question is if the cruiser, a highly specialized air 
defense platform, was the right choice to operate within Iranian littorals in the first place, 
considering the threat that consisted of low-tech Iranian gun boats with very limited 
weapon capabilities.  
Fourth, IS may imply that we outthought ourselves in the decision making 
process. Adversaries that do not rely heavily on IT, have been denied information or have 
been denied access to his own information systems, may not even have perceived our 
first moves when we start a second OODA loop. When we initiate our second move he 
might respond on our previous moves leaving us with the wrong impressions of cause 
and effects. Hence, asymmetry of perception can be counterproductive to our objectives, 
particularly in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Understanding the 
limitations of Information Superiority is therefore just as important as understanding its 
possibilities. IS will never be a 100% condition because then we must understand our 
adversary’s cognitive domain to the full, which is practically unachievable.  
Similarly, the expediency of a strategy that aims to degrade an opponent’s 
information and information system indiscriminately is questionable, and even if efforts 
are made to discriminate, the impact of information is difficult to control and measure 
since it ultimately is processed in the cognitive domain. Denying a foe information will 
consequently allow other perceptions, also false ones, the freedom to operate. 
Information gaps will be replaced by more or less qualified assumptions. Thus, IS, within 
the concepts of IO, should incorporate plans for information sharing; not only to friends 
and allies, but to opponents as well. Again, this is particularly important in MOOTW 
where “the military should use its mighty information technology to generate the “00” 
portion of the decision-making loop for others who ultimately will take the lead in 
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deciding and acting.”176 In addition, civilian and military information structures are 
tightly shared structures,177which also brings about the problems of collateral damage 
and the usefulness of the very same structures for our own purposes, for instance in 
nation building efforts. 
Conclusively, one lesson for developing information age decision making 
processes is that, “…the point is not to engage in some never-ending speed race with our 
own worts-case fears, but rather to concentrate NCW on how to best exploit the delta 
between our loop time and his.”178 
 
2. Information Superiority and Asymmetric Responses 
Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 
         Sun Tzu 
It is also a concern that IS and improved technology will encourage asymmetric 
responses. It will not only be U.S. allies that will find it problematic to follow such a 
costly path. Third world countries, rogue states, sub state organizations and terrorists will 
obviously lack the resources to match U.S. forces on the battlefield with equally 
symmetric responses. Instead, they will seek to use asymmetric responses, such as 
guerrilla warfare, cyberattack, information warfare, terrorism tactics, and WMD if their 
position is threatened. Nothing is more dangerous than a cornered opponent. Feeling total 
inferiority and denied influence through, for instance, IO, may force an opponent to his 
limit where tactics and weapons such as terrorism and WMD seem the only solution to 
deter U.S. or coalition forces from further intervention.  
Asymmetric responses also move the costs of warfare away from advanced 
technology and military forces to other dimensions.179 In guerrilla warfare, the costs are 
transferred to human and social dimensions. The civil population will come in harm’s 
way and infrastructure will be destroyed. In addition, because these types of operations 
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often are risky and long-lasting, it may be difficult within a coalition to recruit and 
sustain operations. Other types of asymmetric warfare may have other cost attributes 
depending on the nation or actor involved.  
In addition, if one’s force consists of few and costly units it might create a higher 
threshold to use them. Consequently, a commander will closely consider the risk of using 
high value units before they are put into action. Added to the equation is also the 
emerging trend in the U.S. and other Western countries that a military’s own casualties 
must be kept at a minimum to sustain political and public support to a military campaign.  
In particular, this would be applicable in low-intensity conflicts. Recent conflicts such as 
the first Gulf War, Kosovo and Somalia have proven this as a considerable factor that 
limited the coalition’s efficiency and end-state objectives. It should be noted that in other 
cases, the Western and particularly U.S. risk-adverse mentality have been overestimated 
by adversaries. The willingness to take risks is, ultimately, closely linked to how vital the 
interests are perceived. This lesson will surely be remembered by Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein. The key point is, however, that IS has little value if the information 
cannot be properly exploited, for instance, as in Kosovo, by not flying low enough or 
putting troops on the ground to counter an identified target.  
Lastly, assuming knowledge as IS implies might be dangerous when countering 
an asymmetric opponent. It is not a given that IS will increase because the opponent is 
less dependent on IT. Asymmetric responses will always seek to exploit  vulnerabilities. 
Less IT might just as well imply “greater social capacity for low-tech work-arounds that 
either negate or complicate information warfare immeasurably.”180 Such work-arounds 
were frequently experienced and exploited by the Serbs during the Kosovo conflict, 
which by many was said to be a conflict where NATO had near IS. Wesley Clarke 
pointed out one such vulnerability on the public-relations front, “…we knew that 
NATO’s greatest vulnerability was unintentional injuries to innocent civilians. We knew 
the political impact on our governments could be devastating if it were thought that 
innocent civilians were inadvertently bearing the brunt of NATO’s air attacks.”181 
Furthermore, the Serbian forces managed to manipulate NATO’s battle space awareness 
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far more often than expected.182 Due to human and software failure to interpret 
intelligence information, bad assessments of the actual situation were made, resulting in 
wasted ammunition on fake or inaccurate targets. Other work-arounds might exploit 
another great weaknesses; targeting civilian personnel or objects in the homeland, in 
coalition territory or even in a third country. Such strategies and tactics will increase the 
battlespace significantly. In the U.S. it already has with the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Defense. This is a true paradigm shift for a country that had 
never experienced any external threat since its origin.   
 
3. Increased Political Interference in Military Operations 
 “Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, 
the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or peril.” 
         Sun Tzu 
Information Superiority also implies that detailed information is available to all 
decision makers in the chain of command as well as to the politicians. Political control of 
the military is a cornerstone value in most Western democracies. However, detailed 
political control at the operational and tactical level may severely hamper military 
operations. Therefore, IS, which includes the ability to transfer live audio and video, or 
by other means visualize the actions on the battlefield, may tempt politicians to introduce 
an extra decision making loop before resources are assigned to operations. Negative 
effects of such interference could be that the commander’s own decision making loop 
will increase instead of shorten. Another implication is that interference may disrupt 
military campaigns and the targeting process, which are logic and often sequential 
processes with the intent to decrease the adversary’s military capabilities systematically. 
Furthermore, it is always a prerequisite that these campaigns have been through a 
political process where the intent, objectives and end-states of an operation have been 
made clear and politically approved. Consequently, and even if a tighter interagency 
cooperation and integration are deemed more important in the future, detailed political 
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interference should be unnecessary. If it occurs, it may diminish both the short- and long 
term effect of military operations.  
Also, interference may actually hamper IS and put forces at considerable risk. In 
Kosovo, the effectiveness of information systems was actually degraded because the 
politicians demanded that pilots fly above a certain height to minimize casualties.183 
Moreover, inconsistent and changing political objectives reduce the advantages of a 
commander’s campaign planning, which exploits available information systematically 
and comprehensively. In the Kosovo campaign these objectives changed  progressively 
from the air campaigns’ initial aim of bringing Milosevic back to the negotiating table, to 
stopping the ethnic cleansing, to ceasing fire, to Serbian withdrawal and return of 
refugees, and finally, to the presence of a NATO led international force in Kosovo.184 It 
is therefore important that new and adequate ways to integrate the political process are 
found when developing the concept of IS. If ways around this problem in limited wars or 
low-intensity conflicts are not found, IS might actually be counterproductive to the goal. 
 
4. Increased Vulnerability in Cyberspace 
 
 “We repeat then that the defense is the stronger form of war, the one that makes 
the enemy’s defeat more certain.” 
Clausewitz 
Increased dependency on sophisticated information systems to achieve IS will 
inevitably entail greater vulnerability to the same systems. Information systems can be 
influenced in the physical, information, and cognitive domain. The two latter include the 
use of Cyberspace for influence; and, it is not unreasonable to claim that the battles in 
these domains increasingly will be fought in Cyberspace. In this respect, the Institute for 
Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College points out three lessons learned after 
studying the India – Pakistan conflict, the Israel – Palestine conflict, the Kosovo conflict, 
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and also the tension that occurred between the U.S and China over the U.S. surveillance 
aircraft incident. The lessons are:185 
− Cyber attacks immediately accompany physical attacks 
− Cyber attacks are increasing in volume, sophistication and coordination 
− Cyber attackers are attracted to high value targets 
 
These general trends apply to all kinds of cyber attacks, with or without political 
motivation. Other hostile actors in cyberspace, with different motives, can be criminals 
and thrill seekers or “script kiddies”. 
It is appropriate to anticipate similar types of cyberattack in future conflicts. 
However, as the lessons learned point out, the attacks may be expected to be more severe, 
aimed not only to spread a political message, but also to influence, or destroy  
information systems and other vital IT based infrastructure. Even if military systems may 
be better protected and easier to isolate military operations will be, directly or indirectly, 
influenced by cyberattacks on the civilian society. For instance, over 95% of military 
communications are routed over civilian links,186 which obviously could hamper military 
operations if these links were attacked either physically or through cyberspace.   
It may be very difficult to control information and gain IS in a cyberwar scenario. 
Conflicts draw attention from a variety of groups with more or less peripheral interests 
and connection to the conflict itself. Thus, the participation in a cyberwar against a 
Western coalition during conflict may be high. Pro-opponent hacker groups and activists 
may align their efforts and launch coordinated cyber attacks. Likewise, peace, or 
otherwise motivated activists, may also coordinate similar types of cyberattacks 
simultaneously. In a worst-case scenario, the attacks will come from several directions 
causing a swarming effect. This may be intentional or unintentional, but the effect can be 
dangerous as the magnitude of attacks may hide and take away information managers’ 
focus from more severe cyberattacks.  
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Consequently, some of the threats IS should encompass defense against are:187 
− Frequent and massive cyber attacks with activists and hackers using swarming 
techniques 
− Attempts to deface governmental, military and other institutional web sites. 
These attacks will be politically motivated aimed to disseminate false 
information and propaganda 
− Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks can be very 
severe if aimed at vital societal infrastructure  
− Worms and virus attacks. New and more devastating worms are being 
developed. Some may spread in a very short time before countermeasures can 
be developed. Others may have a sleep phase, which enables them to 
coordinate an attack. Combined with a physical terrorist attack, these worms 
can have a devastating effect.  
− Exploitation of routing vulnerabilities. 
− Infrastructure attacks. Unauthorized intrusion of vital infrastructure resulting 
in infrastructure outage and corruption of information. Combined with 
terrorist attacks, this might be the most devastating type of cyber attack.  
− Compound attack. A mix of the above points and/or combined with physical 
terrorist attacks.   
 
Vulnerabilities to other and more direct military threats, such as physical attacks, 
jamming, use of EMP and/or directed energy weapons, insiders and spies, are also a 
concern. For instance, it is believed that Milosevic had an insider within NATO during 
the bombing campaign. The insider notified Belgrade, reducing the effect of bombing, 
because targets where either moved or replaced by dummy targets188. These 
vulnerabilities are not new and spies have existed just as long as military conflicts have. 
The problem now is that excessive belief in, and reliance on IS as the enabling factor for 
strategic and operational concepts, may have more fatal consequences than before.  
To summarize, in future conflicts the potential number of hactivists, hackers and 
other cyber warriors against sophisticated but also vulnerable Western militaries have a 
mobilization potential never experienced before. In addition, and partly because of the 
link to the disputed U.S. led strategies against GWOT and WMD, a cyberwar can be 
                                                 
187 Trustees of Dartmouth College,. “Cyber Attacks During the War on Terrorism: A predictive 
Analysis”, 14 - 18.   
188 Thomas. 
91 
expected to be more sophisticated and devastating than previously experienced. Hence, 
information assurance as part of IO to prevent the above mentioned threats is essential to 
enhance confidence in proprietary information and to achieve and maintain IS. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on changes in the nature of conflict based on 
characteristic developments in the information age. Some of these changes will have an 
important impact on the mission challenges, opportunities and constraints in future forms 
of war. The characteristics of these changes should be carefully considered in an NCW 
implantation. One important conclusion is the need to emphasize nontraditional missions 
that occur in low-intensity conflicts, humanitarian crises, terrorist and criminal activities. 
The perfection of traditional combat never will be good enough in order to sufficiently 
reduce the costs of war, but it is not in this arena that Western countries are facing the 
most important challenges in the future.  
Furthermore, organizational and doctrinal challenges that are foreseen in new and 
unique forms of war in the information age should be paid more attention to than 
blending new technologies. In this regard, holistically net-centric and information 
capabilities that are mission specific should be developed. Mission capability packages, 
such as Norway’s vital need to maintain a warfighting capability in the littorals, must 
consist of an appropriate operational concept, including new information age doctrines 
for command, control and organization. The force structure should be adequately 
equipped to operate in an information and time sensitive environment; be efficiently 
organized and sized to have the adaptability to develop and incorporate new concepts 
such as swarming; and lastly, human capability development should be emphasized 
through adequate education and training. In addition, networks are highly trust dependent 
and the development and maintenance of trust is seen as increasingly more important for 
net-centric forces to operate. Trust functions, in military organizations, should be studied 
as a contribution to finding more suitable command and control arrangements within 
NCW concepts.  
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Other mission challenges, opportunities and constraints also arise as a 
consequence of changes in the nature of conflict. Arguably, examples from contemporary 
conflicts show a tendency to view new warfighting concepts as problem fixers and 
exaggerate conventional and technological supremacy on the battlefield. In doing so there 
is a danger to overlook causal relationships, especially in low-intensity conflicts. This 
tendency may shortcut strategies and lead to unintended consequences. Likewise, there 
are also pitfalls related to the concept of information superiority. This enabling concept 
will eventually reach its potential when military forces mature in a fully networked and 
joint environment. That may still take years. Ironically, it will not be the missing gaps in 
new information technology that will be the greatest hindrance, but rather our own ability 
to reorganize, cooperate and comprehend the true nature of information as power on the 
same level as other warfare areas.  
Lastly, NCW does not represent a new theory of war by the standards of historical 
or empirical evidence although the first part of the Afghanistan war was a good test of 
network-style operations. Hence, an overestimation of the concept can be equally 
dangerous as not taking it into account. Nevertheless, changes in the nature of conflict, 
only a few aspects of which were discussed in this chapter, have189 and should lead to a 
further redefinition of the principles of war for information age forces. The principles 
networked actors rely on to achieve precise and decisive results are based on superior 
knowledge and must be different from the principles currently defined in contemporary 
doctrines based on attrition- or maneuver-warfare. By emphasizing the conceptual, 
doctrinal and organizational aspects in a NCW implementation we should be able to 
develop these principles further. 
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V. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS AND EMERGING TRENDS IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 
Previously, the needs of transformation of both the understanding of low-intensity 
conflicts and war fighting capabilities to meet the information revolution have been 
pointed out. The last Chapter Four highlighted some of the factors that may contribute to 
such an understanding. Still, a more in-depth analysis is needed to understand the impact 
of the information revolution on potential adversaries. So far, the practical experiences of 
the RMA has been relatively internal for Western military organizations trying to exploit 
the advantages posed by new information technology within existing doctrines. 
Nevertheless, the same technologies and organizational progresses apply to other actors 
in low-intensity conflicts as well. In addition, the developments in new information 
technology are continuing in quantitative leaps rather than in a continuous and 
predictable manner. The strategic and sociological consequences of these developments 
are hard to predict. Networked type of organizations, wireless technologies and peer-to-
peer (P2P) communications have been, and will probably continue to be, employed by 
extremists, terrorists and insurgents in the future. This chapter will analyze some of the 
newest trends in the information age coupled with old and new theories on how terrorists 
and insurgents operate. The result of such an analysis may contribute to developing NCW 
capabilities that will be more useful than the ones being applied today in these evolving 
nontraditional missions. A key question is whether actors such as terrorists and guerrillas 
operating as “smart mobs” will be seen in netwars where the main battles will be fought 
in the information and cognitive domain rather than in the traditional physical space.     
 
A. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS - THE DOMINANT FORM OF WAR 
According to Martin Van Creveld, three-fourths of all armed conflicts since 1945 
have been low intensity conflicts (LIC) and have also tended to be more violent in nature 
with vast humanitarian sufferings.190 Van Creveld identifies low intensity conflicts by 
three principal characteristics: 
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− LIC’s unfold in the lesser developed parts of the world except for smaller-
scale armed conflicts within developed countries that fall under the label of 
terrorism. 
− LIC’s rarely involve regular armies on both sides, but rather regulars on one 
side and guerillas, terrorists and parts of the population on the other side 
− LIC’s do not rely primarily on high technology collective weapons usually 
found in modern forces 
Failure to properly recognize these characteristics is perhaps the reason why so 
many LIC have turned out negatively for modern militaries. The American retreat in the 
Vietnam War, and similarly, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan stand out as examples in 
this regard. The dependency on large maneuver formations and an over reliance on 
superior technology and weapon systems are part of the explanations for these failures. 
There is also a tendency to underestimate the political and logistical costs of fighting such 
wars at a distance even if superior technology and strategic lift capability enable regional 
or global reach.  
Another reasons why Western militaries resist changing their doctrines to include 
what Van Creveld sees as “the dominant form of war in our age”191 is the long standing 
culture of fighting wars according to a “Clausewitzian universe.” Arguably, 
contemporary low-intensity conflicts do not follow a trinitarian paradigm192 where war is 
predominantly waged by governments for political ends, but rather a non-trinitarian 
paradigm where the people, or factions within the people, employ warlike violence to 
achieve a variety of objectives.193 In this paradigm, the methods of violence, rules of 
conduct  and the perception of the legitimacy of targets differs vastly from Western ideas 
about war as they have developed during the last two centuries. Van Creveld’s 
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interpretation of Clausewitz’ trinitarian analysis may seem somewhat narrow, 194 but it is 
incontestable that Western militaries have not been very successful in adjusting their 
doctrine, organization, training and technological innovation efforts to meet the 
challenges at the lower end of the conflict scale. As a result, we have difficulties in 
changing our mindset in the post Cold War environment and continue to resist change; 
As described in a pertinent remark by General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.), on the 
military culture for changing missions in the nineties, “Traditional military leaders 
insisted on holding the line to fighting the Nation’s wars and hoped to go back to “real 
soldering” as they were mending a transitioning force suffering from all the pressure on 
it.”195 Now, in the twenty-firts century it is time to adhere to these missions properly. In a 
globalized world, former archenemies have joined forces in the GWOT, and it is widely 
recognized that efforts must be made to solve the problems with the non-integrating part 
of the world. Principally, this may be done either by exporting security to the most urgent 
trouble spots, or by establishing sufficient protection against these states’ export of 
terrorism, drugs, criminal activity, or in the worst case WMD. In either case, these 
strategies must also consider the impact of new technological and sociological trends 
imposed by the information age.  
 
B. SMART MOBS - THE NEW TECHNOLOGY ENABLED SOCIAL 
REVOLUTION 
Arguably, the information revolution has turned cyberspace and the infosphere 
into an arena not only for the military, but for terrorists and insurgents as well. Netwar by 
networked non-state actors has long been emerging as a new threat. The term netwar was 
first coined by Arquilla and Ronfeldt in 1996, and further developed; “Netwar is the 
lower-intensity, societal level counterpart to our earlier, most military concept of 
cyberwar”…”it is composed of conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, 
and ethnonationalist extremists; and by civil-society activists on the other. What 
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distinguishes netwar as a form of conflict is the networked organizational structure of its 
practitioners - with many groups actually being leaderless - and the suppleness in their 
ability to come together quickly in swarming attacks.”196 To be fully effective, a netwar 
actor has to be effective at five levels of theory and practice, “the technological, social, 
narrative, organizational and doctrinal level.”197  
One of the most recent terms in the netwar arena is Howard Rheingold’s concept 
of smart mobs. Rheingold emphasizes the increased development of wireless and mobile 
devices and their ubiquitous nature. When these devices get extensively embedded in the 
population, there is a potential of a new social revolution due to the ways of using them. 
The affordability and availability of this technology is in fact increasing in most 
countries. In Norway, for instance, 800 000 new MMS mobile phones are expected to be 
sold during 2004.198 Considering Norway’s population of only 4.5 million, this new 
technology will be quickly embedded in the population. MMS stands for Multimedia 
Messaging Service and these phones have the ability to transmit pictures, animations and 
sound in addition to text messages. The sociological consequences of this new MMS 
technology are difficult to predict. One emerging trend is that ordinary people now are 
acting as “phone journalists,”199 seeking out events as they occur or have just happened 
to be at the right place at the right moment. Consequently, ordinary people are currently 
influencing journalism in a new and exiting manner.  
These often unpredictable sociological effects are at the core of Rheingold’s smart 
mob concept. “The people who make up smart mobs cooperate in ways never before 
possible because they carry devices that possess both communication and computing 
capabilities.”200 Hence, it is the enhanced potential for cooperation for beneficial or 
destructive purposes that is revolutionary. The smart mob concept fits within Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt’s notion of netwar but focuses mainly on the social dimension.  
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The term smart mobs is difficult to grasp as Rheingold himself admits: “Smart 
mobs are an unpredictable emergent property that I see surfacing as more people use 
mobile telephones, more chips communicate with each other, more computers know 
where they are located, more technology becomes wearable, more people start using 
these new media to invent new forms of sex, commerce, entertainment communion, and, 
as always, conflict.”201 With greatest impact to the latter, Rheingold’s main points on the 
potential power of smart mobs can be summarized as follows: 
− Ability to form dynamic ad hoc alliances based on many-to-many, real time 
communication networks (161) 
− Ability to swarm and network in a decentralized organized structure (162)  
− The massing crowd is not only an effect of technological devices, but the 
crowd can be seen as a kind of technology itself (160), meaning that the 
presence or assembly of people/crowds creates the necessary infrastructure, 
C2 arrangements and means of communication.  
− Recognizes and connects like-minded people or people with the same in-
plugged interests.  
− Forms and distributes both real time and analytical information and creates 
intelligence networks by websites, peer-to-peer journalism, and text 
messaging (164-168). 
− Ability to form mobile ad hoc social networks where everyone in a smart mob 
is a “node” with social links (170). 
− Ability to form ad hoc mobile information systems that are self-organizing, 
fully decentralized, and highly dynamic (171). 
− Triggers a diversity of cooperation thresholds among individuals that can tip a 
crowd into a sudden epidemic of cooperation - bandwagon effect (174) 
− Inherent capability of collective intelligence where the online social network 
knows more than the sum of its parts, meaning, for instance, that the network 
can make collective decisions that are more accurate than the performance of 
the best individual predictors in the group (179-181) 
 
In short, Rheingold argues that mobile telecommunications enable people to act 
together in new ways and in situations where collective action was not possible before. 
Networks, peer-to-peer communication, swarm intelligence, collective knowledge and 
ad-hoc crowd action are some of the trends that Rheingold foresees might bring about a 
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social reorganization on a larger scale. His prediction of social change is not only based 
on the inherent capability of new technology but more importantly on emerging trends in 
how people and crowds are, often unintentionally from the manufactures’ side, using new 
technology to organize and interact. Admittedly, it will take a decade, if not more to see 
profound changes in society and social relations as a whole, but we can already now 
observe changes in how people meet, mate, work, fight, buy, sell govern and create.202   
 
C. REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 
If one accepts the idea that wireless mobile devices will be more common and that 
the ubiquity of communicating chips will increase, it is natural that social behavior will 
change, as it has done before with pioneering innovations such as the telegraph, 
telephone, railroads, automobiles and aircraft. Logically, if social behavior changes, the 
nature of low-intensity conflicts such as guerilla warfare will change also since basically 
it is rooted in the population. Guerilla warfare is often referred to as people’s war. In 
broad terms, people’s war is any form of popular insurrection or guerilla conflict that has 
its origin in the internal population, regardless of ideological roots. 203 Whether social 
behavior in general will change in a revolutionary manner is another question. At least 
that was not the case with the innovations mentioned above, no matter how important 
they were for mankind. In this context, the term revolutionary will be reserved for social 
changes “that involves the intrusion of violence into civil social relations.”204 A sudden 
or profound change in other aspects of social behavior due to technology or other 
intervening factors might deserve to be called revolutionary, but in order not to confuse 
the two, a distinction is needed.  
Social change by revolution occurs when other means have failed and the social 
system is in disequilibrium. Different theories of revolution attempt to explain how this 
disequilibrium occurs. Commonly, they can be divided in four basics groups:205 (1) Actor 
personal dimension. The types of individuals or groups that oriented theories focus on the                                                  
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engage in revolutions, their motivation, and how they channel and trigger a situation are 
common questions in actor oriented theories. (2) Structural theories focus on structural 
components and the social situation including class structure. They see revolutions as 
normal people’s reactions to abnormal situations, independent of cultural influence.  
They have a long-term historical perspective and the outcome of revolution is important 
to evaluate and classify the theories. Some of the conditions for revolution are a state’s 
disadvantaged position internationally and internal peasants’ revolt, in addition to a 
distracted elite. (3) Conjunction theories combine actor and structural theories in an 
inclusive context. They emphasize lifecycles, the different stages, social order and 
distribution of political power. Causes of social movements are explained by the dis-
synchronization of  social relationships among particular groups. Actor oriented variables 
are used to explain the attraction to the movement and the influence of leaders’ 
personalities and capabilities. Structural variables assess the likelihood of a movement 
becoming revolutionary. Political structures and regime toleration towards a movement 
becomes important. (4) Last are the process theories that emphasize contingency; one 
change will lead to the next and so forth. They realize the complexity of the real world 
and that pathways are not possible to predict from the outset. They also try to explain, not 
only the changing strategic vision of the parties during conflict, but also the unintended 
consequences of the different actions. Both Lenin and Mao realized the need of flexibility 
and adaptability to changing situations. Consequently they avoided actions and restrictive 
dogmas until the revolution was secured. 
Even if we admit smart mob theory has the potential of profound social 
reorganization, it cannot explain social revolutionary change within the chosen definition. 
A social disequilibrium is not likely to be created because of new information technology 
or collective intelligence in online social networks. Also, with reference to the many 
ongoing low-intensity conflicts today, it is naïve to believe that smart mobs will end 
violent rebellion because of a higher state of human cooperation based on democratic 
values. However, within all the four described revolutionary theories, smart mob theory 
may enlighten some of the processes that occur in revolutions. Smart mobs have the 
potential to reinforce some of the processes, increase people’s awareness and make things 
happen more quickly. Understanding smart mob behavior can be particularly useful in 
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process and actor oriented theories. If recent larger demonstrations are examined, they 
have a chaotic and anarchistic nature, which makes the outcome of any mass gathering 
unpredictable. Nobody knows what is coming next or how violent a crowd is going to be. 
Mass gatherings also have the potential to be manipulated by strong individuals or groups 
with a more determined purpose. In the longer run, if the profound changes in social 
behavior that Rheingold predicts turn out to be correct, smart-mob behavior may 
contribute to structural theories, first and foremost still as enablers for individuals, groups 
or different classes to express their opinions, and to organize and communicate. 
Secondly, if we believe in the development of a higher collective intelligence for mainly 
good purposes, we may see an equalization of knowledge, power and even goods based 
on smart-mob behavior. However, the former is a more realistic path and it will be 
characterized by evolutionary and not revolutionary change. The latter will remain as a 
revolutionary but utopian ideal. In the following this view will be elaborated by looking 
more specifically at the emergence of insurgencies. 
The development of an insurgency, if it is internally and not in response to an 
occupation, is usually a long and complicated process which can be divided into several 
phases. The number of phases depends on the levels of analysis. Krepinevich suggests 
three phases in his account for the South Vietnamese and American defeat in the Vietnam 
War.206 Contention is the first phase including the insurgent agitation and 
proselyteization among the masses. Second comes the equilibrium phase where the 
guerillas seek overt violence, guerilla operations, and the establishment of bases. Third is 
the counteroffensive that includes open warfare and overthrow of the existing regime. 
Certainly, a subsequent phase of consolidation always follows a successful insurgency.  
This phase has been problematic in several revolutions. Different factions within an 
insurgency may maintain cohesion during the struggle against the incumbents but 
antagonism often surfaces when the new rulers distribute or retain power and benefits. 
Often this “revolution within the revolution” has a dividing line between party 
leadership/intellectuals and peasants/proletariat.207 However, even if the story doesn’t 
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end in phase three; the story of the new incumbents starts. The following figure208 
illustrates an insurgency lifecycle throughout its phases:  
 
 
Figure 10.    Insurgency Lifecycle  (Adapted from McCormick, 2003) 
 
The efficiency of smart mobs depends on how well they support the insurgent 
strategy. In a pure insurgency, strategies and tactics are centered against three axes, the 
insurgent - population, the state - population and the insurgent - state axis. To make a 
difference, smart-mob strategy must support the insurgent’s ability to control the 
population and, over time, muster popular support for its cause. By many scholars this is 
the far most important axis and from where an insurgency derives its strength. The 
relationship between the axis and the prioritized insurgent, or counter state strategies are 
depicted in the upper triangle of the following figure.209 The lower triangle of the 
diamond shows the prioritized strategies (not numbered) for a partisan movement. A pure 
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Figure 11.   Guerilla Strategies (Adapted from McCormick, 2003) 
 
To achieve victory, whether the guerillas are an insurgency or partisan movement, 
they eventually have to exercise control over the internal population, either voluntarily or 
by repression (strategy 1). They are also dependent on support (logistically and 
politically) from the population. This supply side at work, from either the internal 
(endogeny) or external (exogeny) environment, is represented by the feedback loop in the 
Figure. At the same time the insurgency will try to impair the incumbent’s relationship 
with the same population (strategy 2). Of particular interest is how the smart-mob 
concept may or may not enhance these strategies during the different phases of an 





1. The Contention Phase 
The contention phase is perhaps the phase were smart-mob strategies may have 
the greatest impact. Early in this phase, in an environment not yet characterized by 
violence, it will be easier to demonstrate, spread propaganda, connect with the like-
minded, and form alliances. It is also the phase where people are most likely to “jump on 
the bandwagon” because the incumbent’s tolerances to the movement are expected to be 
more forgiving and the punishment for opposition less severe. Altogether, smart mobs 
might even contribute to a “bloodless revolution.”  This is one of the most optimistic 
hypotheses on the consequences of smart mobs. Although Rheingold shows both sides of 
the anticipated social revolution, he emphasizes the positive side, ”Technologies and 
methodologies of cooperation are embryonic today, and the emergence of democratic, 
convivial, intelligent new social forms depends on how people appropriate, adopt, 
transform, and reshape the new media once they are out of the hands of engineers - as 
people always do”.210 Implicit, if humankind is able to reach such a level of higher 
cooperation, the need of terrorism and armed rebellion will diminish because large 
portions of the population will have the opportunity to support, oppose or demonstrate 
their political preferences in a manner and scale never experienced before.  
If a revolutionary movement manages to direct the energy of smart mobs 
efficiently to support its cause, it might demonstrate such an overwhelming opposition 
that the incumbents see the futility of denying people the desired social change. 
Moreover, revolutionaries do not actually need to have the majority of the people behind 
their cause as long as the popular demand is a regime change in general. Power may be 
conquered anyway in the wake of a regime change if the movement is mature, ruthless or 
powerful enough, or if its political opponents are sufficiently weak. In a sense, this is 
what happened in 1917 during the October revolution in Russia. The Kerensky 
government failed to implement reforms after the Tsar fell in February the same year, and 
the bourgeoisie and opportunistic labor parties failed to unite their efforts against the 
advancing Bolsheviks.     
The Russian Revolution might be an extreme case of a society in disequilibrium 
ovement exploited a chaotic situation. Arguably, also in but it shows how a certain m                                                 
210 Rheingold, 214. 
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modern times, smart mobs can create these windows of opportunity, which 
revolutionaries can exploit. As an example of a bloodless revolution in less extreme 
circumstances, Rheingold points to the Philippine people’s spontaneous overthrow of 
President Estrada in January 2001. Estrada resigned after massive demonstrations. Over a 
four-day period more than a million people found their way to the streets to demand his 
resignation. Allegedly, this massing of the crowd was a self-organized ad hoc event as a 
result of the Philippine population’s adaptation to a new mobile and wireless technology; 
mobile phone texting. According to Rheingold, the Estrada takedown is but one of many 
early warning signs that we should “…expect the second order effects of mobile 
telecommunications to bring a social tsunami.”211 Other cases where smart-mob behavior 
has influenced politics are:212 
− The “Battle of Seattle” 30 Nov 1999; demonstrators protesting the meeting of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) used “swarming tactics”, mobile 
phones, Web sites, laptops and handheld computers to organize and 
coordinate their efforts. 
− British citizens blocking fuel delivery (Sep 2000) in protest against gasoline 
prices using SMS, e-mail and radios in a wildcat political protest. 
− Toronto (spring 2000); violent political demonstrations covered by roving 
journalists with online webcast digital video. 
− San Francisco; since 1992, thousands of bicyclists assemble monthly for 
“critical mass” moving demonstrations. The critical mass operates through 
loosely linked networks, alerted by mobile phone and email trees.  
 
Undoubtedly, new information technology and telecommunications are changing 
the way democratic rights are exercised. However, social change by revolution occurs 
when other means have failed. The Philippine case stands as an example where mass 
demonstrations succeeded in overthrowing a regime. History shows other results; in  
Tiananmen Square, in Beijing in 1989; the Spring demonstrations in Prague 1968; and in 
several Latin American countries during the last century, peaceful or low violent 
demonstrations have been quelled by brutal force. What is telling in the Philippine case 
and in other recent demonstrations is the ease with wich the protesters have mobilized 
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and organized their efforts. The outcome, however, is decided by other factors, as 
explained in the theories of revolutionary change. For instance, in variables such as the 
country’s democratic tradition and the incumbent regime’s tolerance or de facto ability to 
control their own military and police forces. Also, in Manila, the protesters agreed on the 
overthrow, but there was no particular political movement or ideology that inspired them. 
Even if Estrada, due to the ignorance of his corruptive behavior, still had large support in 
the rural areas, the common identifier was to get rid of him, almost regardless of his 
successor.  
That is not the case with a revolutionary movement, for instance, based on a 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, as many revolutionary movements have been during the last 
century. Many of these movements, initiated and led by intellectuals, see the use of 
violence for social change as a necessity. Hence, a violent strategy is part of their 
operational profile from the outset. Other groups, such as the peasantry or the working 
class are useful and needed to create and grow an insurgency; but, as indicated earlier, 
“…while elites and peasants may come to share a common religious or political 
identification, their nominal unity disguise sharp contradictions in the meaning, content, 
and practice of their respective faiths”.213  
Today, a revolutionary movement could ease the process of mobilizing the 
population using smart-mob strategy and technology. By mobilizing their supporters and 
manipulating other networks to participate they can muster the masses. The objective is, 
of course, to put pressure on the incumbents, either to initiate reforms, or to provoke the 
regime to initiate repressive countermeasures that will attract more supporters. Looking at 
the violent demonstrations that occur almost everywhere when the world’s top leaders 
gather, be it in the WTO, G7, EU or other types of conferences/summits, one may 
wonder who is used by whom. A variety of groups or networks appear, from left to right 
wing extremist, anarchists, environmentalists, students and - just ordinary people. Truly 
peaceful demonstrators get drawn into violent crowds and increase the impression of a 
large, angry and determined crowd. Sometimes the effects are devastating. Even in 
peaceful Sweden, people get shot and killed by the police. In June 2001, over 20, 000 
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people gathered in Gothenburg to demonstrate against president Bush and the EU 
summit. An aftermath report half a year later summarized it as a weekend of total chaos 
and fear.214 The material damage was substantial, hundreds were injured, and the police 
randomly chased people. Nearly 500 people were temporary imprisoned and a large 
number were also prosecuted.  Later also came the political consequences in forms of 
harsh criticism against the Swedish government and the police forces. The incident serves 
as an example of the great potential of manipulation and exploitation of demonstrators 
where most of them actually had peaceful intentions. Even the successful protest 
organization, Action pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens (Attac), 
founded 1998 in France and largely involved in organizing the demonstrations in both 
Seattle (1999) and Gothenburg, claims a non-violent line of action. Despite good 
intentions, the potential for manipulation is great for those with a more serious intent and, 
so far, it is the hooligans that get the blame.215 Hence, smart mobs can be very useful for 
any revolutionary movement in the early phase of an insurgency.  
Besides the noise these demonstrations create in Western democracies, the 
important lessons learned are about the chaotic and anarchistic nature of modern 
demonstrations, which make the outcome of any mass gathering uncertain. Equally 
important is the potential manipulation of these mass gatherings by strong individuals or 
groups with a determined purpose. Also demonstrated by these cases, and in recent 
terrorist attacks by organizations like al-Qaeda, is that Rheingold’s optimistic view of a 
higher level of cooperation and collective intelligence for only good purposes seems very 
naïve and distant at the moment.  
The largest obstacle towards such a “convivial and democratic” development, to 
use Rheingold’s own words, is perhaps the nature of smart mobs themselves. The easier 
to mass crowds, the easier it will be to mass counter forces. The focus of smart mobs will 
tend to shift in such an environment. Today we see these counter forces at work between 
the right and left wing movements in Europe. The leftists monitor skinheads, Nazi 
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supporters, and other right winged extremists, and vice versa. Counterdemonstrations are 
arranged and political meetings are disturbed. Individuals are surveyed, put on public 
“death lists,” harassed and sometimes attacked. Consequently, smart mobs are inherently 
unpredictable and unstable over time. In a social system that seeks equilibrium they will 
tend to balance each other more like different ad hoc interest groups. In this perspective 
smart mobs will be just another way of organizing people, and to coordinate and 
distribute political views. Hence, it can be difficult for a revolutionary movement to take 
advantage of smart-mob strategies unless the timing and social conditions are 
advantageous. 
 
2. The Equilibrium Phase 
An insurgency cannot remain in the contention phase as an anonymous diverging 
subgroup in society. Not achieving their goals by “peaceful” means, violence now 
becomes a significant trademark. The insurgency can either move into a more or less 
temporary phase of terrorism or it may resort to guerrilla operations directly (see Figure 
10). Once the movement has come “out of the closet” it has to maintain momentum, grow 
and mobilize support for its cause. The Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in 
Mexico did so very successfully against the Mexican government in 1994-1998. When 
open hostilities broke out the guerrillas changed their strategy after only a few days of 
costly and futile traditional guerrilla tactics and adopted a new form of “social netwar,” 
which by many can be said to represent the world’s first “post-modern” insurgency.216 
The most important features of this new strategy217 were an organizational shift from 
centralized and battalion-sized formations to decentralized and much smaller 
maneuverable formations. The second was the insurgents’ campaign to mobilize and 
utilize transnational NGOs and activists to support their cause. A variety of ad hoc 
networked actors engaged in campaigns, demonstrations, marches and peace caravans 
against the Mexican regime demanding democracy through nonviolent means; respect for 
human rights; a cease-fire and withdrawal by the army; peace negotiations; freedom of 
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information; and respect for the NGO’s role in the conflict.218 The mobilization for the 
insurgents’ cause strongly constrained the Mexican government’s responses and 
admissions but equally important is the influence it had on the insurgents’ goals, which 
changed from a regime change to democratic reforms. In this sense the Zapatista 
movement, including the engagement by networked actors, transformed the conflict from 
a traditional guerrilla insurgency into an information-age social netwar.219  
Depending on factors such as the ability to mobilize international support, 
centralized or decentralized leadership, intellectual or peasant dominance of ideas, or the 
urban or rural origin of the conflict, other revolutionary movements in the information 
age may not transform and continue to seek an equilibrium based on violent means. In 
these cases a few interdependent conditions become important if smart-mob strategies are 
to enhance the insurgent cause. The first condition is the widespread use of smart-mob 
technology in society in general. To be useful in an internal conflict the technological 
infrastructure must be comprehensive and smart-mob behavior must be internalized in the 
population. Otherwise, in spite of smart mob efficiency, the insurgency will stand out as a 
vulnerable target. They have to have the ability to hide within, or exploit, the normal 
population’s signatures in cyberspace and the infosphere. Hence, smart-mob behavior 
will be more efficient in technologically sophisticated societies or where wireless 
technologies such as mobile phone texting is extensively used by the population To use 
Mao Zedong’s terms; guerillas must be like fish in the water - indistinguishable from the 
indigenous population and its environment. Only then can smart-mob behavior and 
technology be effective in a true insurgency. The picture is slightly different in a partisan 
movement. These groups will depend more on the global Internet and long distance 
communication than wearable communication devices in order to secure support. That is 
an entirely different circumstance since the hook up nodes can be fewer, the 
technological infrastructure, including critical nodes and servers, are placed abroad - 
outside of the incumbent’s reach. Also out of reach is the receiver of information or 
propaganda. Only later, even late in phase 3, do they really need to control the indigenous 
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population and, by that time, the partisan movement may have transformed to a classical 
political and military hierarchic organization.  
The second condition is that the technological means that enables smart mobs to 
function must have a certain level of security. The security of future wireless networks 
and devices will depend on several factors. An important but very uncertain one, is how 
the wireless Internet will be regulated in the future. Both merchants, such as hardware, 
software and Internet providers, and governmental agencies can instigate privacy 
intrusion but for different purposes. Merchants would like to collect personal information 
about their users to tailor their products and gain market shares.220 This may include 
inbuilt “silent” communication, unnoticeable by the user, between wireless devices when 
they are online. The result may be a collective self-surveilling population that leaves 
behind traceable signals. Governments may also want to regulate the use of bandwidth 
and number of providers by license policy, which will make it easier for them to retrieve 
information. In addition there are unsolved legal issues on the protection of privacy in 
cyberspace. Another issue is that every electronic signal that travels in the air may be 
picked up by electronic countermeasures. Although, new and almost unbreakable 
encryption codes are available to the public, just the bearing of these signals may be 
enough to prevent their use.  
Another possible development is a free and public innovated mobile Internet with 
a variety of networks and standards that will be far more difficult to survey. In addition, 
“experience shows that the information-recording and transmitting equipment used to 
bolster a regime can be equally handy in subverting it. Devices declared tamper-proof by 
their manufacturers will nevertheless be tampered with.”221 Such a development 
combined with the first condition in place, may offer enough freedom of maneuver in the 
information domain for the insurgents to operate. This freedom of maneuver is a 
necessity for smart mobs to operate. The greatest difference between smart mobs and 
other networked actors lies in the fact that the former are mainly technology enabled. In 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s terms a networked actor does not necessarily need to be 
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technology dependent. They emphasize that “Old technologies, like human couriers, and 
mixes of old and new systems may do the job in some situations.”222  
Still remaining is the third condition, trust in networks. Not only must security be 
sufficiently taken care of, but also the social relationships and the information exchanged 
between networks and individuals must be trusted. Naturally, this is of outmost 
importance when an individual’s life is at stake or when a whole group might be 
jeopardized. Most likely, the use of cyberspace for malignant purposes will trigger the 
apparatus of surveillance, enforcement and enactments even in democracies. Intrusion 
and deception into the insurgencies own network is another source of distrust.  
More significantly, the social relevance of trust in modern contemporary societies 
has also changed throughout the last decades. Pjotr Sztompka has identified some of 
these changes, which reveal to some degree that the strength of smart mobs is also their 
weakness in an insurgent environment.223 Firstly, a smart-mob insurgency is 
interdependent on other networks in which they cannot exercise absolute control. In 
addition to the lack of control, these networks consist of a variety of individuals and 
groups from different social layers that may or may not share the insurgencies’ beliefs, 
values and objectives. The anticipated higher level of cooperation also becomes a source 
of uncertainty. In Sztompka’s words: “Cooperation - of intra-societal as well as inter-
societal scope becomes a pressing need, a crucial challenge, but also the domain of 
uncertainties.”224  
Secondly, technology itself creates uncertainty and unintended consequences that 
are not compatible with an insurgency of limited resources. An insurgency cannot allow 
its existence to depend on technology that, as all PC users have experienced, inherently 
will fail from time to time.  
Third, is the complexity of institutions, organizations and technology. In addition 
to a leadership that may have the intellectual and technological capability to equip and 
conceptualize wireless mobile devices into smart-mob strategy, the mainstream users are 
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ordinary people. Peasants or working class guerillas may be familiar with mobile phone 
texting, but if they don’t understand the technology behind it, for instance the 
technological possibility to trace a signal, mistakes will be made that their opponent can 
exploit.  
Fourth is the anonymity and impersonality of the wireless net. In an environment 
where your very existence depends on your supporting peers and connected networks; 
personal knowledge or long established relationships of trust seem like a prerequisite. 
These requirements will largely limit the extension of the insurgency network and 
consequently also the power of the mobile many.  
Last is the inevitable presence of strangers in smart mobs. “To cope with 
strangers, trust becomes a necessary resource”225 Due to the perilous nature of an 
insurgency, the problem is that the guerillas usually have no second chance to recover 
once the trust has been misused. 
If the above conditions are not present to a certain degree, smart-mob 
insurgencies will certainly experience what J. Bowyer Bell claims to be the inherent 
inefficiency of the underground. Moreover, Bell highlights the deadly realism of a 
movement that is forced to operate underground. Revolutionary movements are 
“inherently inefficient, a price paid for the capacity to persist.”226 If Bell is correct, 
persistence must be characterized as the minimum level of cooperation, far below the 
expected dividend of a smart-mob concept. Bell argues that some of the obstacles of 
operating in the underground are a constant strain - making everyday activity difficult; an 
inefficient and dysfunctional secrecy policy; difficult command, control and 
communication arrangements - causing amongst others, a lack of debate and collective 
decision making and organizational problems.227 Lastly, but of outmost importance for 
smart mobs, is that a revolutionary movement needs a liberated zone in which to operate. 
A zone “where proper authority can be displayed, where the dreams can be seen above 
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ground and at work.”228  The whole idea of smart mobs is the development of a higher 
level of cooperation and collective intelligence. If the constraints of being in an 
underground become so heavy, as Bell suggests, the whole foundation of smart mobs will 
fall apart. A smart mob needs to be extroverted and sociable to influence the population. 
If this is not achievable, only the hard-core insurgents in their own networked fashion 
will remain. In this sense smart mobs will be no different from any other netwar actor. 
 
3. The Counteroffensive 
The third phase of an insurgency is the counteroffensive that includes open 
warfare and overthrow of the existing regime. Again, the efficiency of smart-mob 
behavior will differ whether the guerillas are insurgents or partisans. With part of the 
organization working abroad, shielded from the local battlefields, the partisans can 
maintain their activities in the information domain and continue to communicate and 
influence public opinion, their supporting nations, NGOs or other non-state actors. Smart 
mobs will usually have more freedom of maneuver to operate internationally depending 
on their affiliations to terrorist, crime or other shady activity. In contrast, for the 
insurgency, most of the constraints that were discussed for phase 2 still apply. However 
there are two differences. Assumable, when operating more conventionally, the 
insurgents also have established more permanent bases and extended their control over 
the population in certain areas. If desired, they may more safely resume smart-mob 
strategies in these or adjacent areas, to further establish trust and influence. On the other 
hand, the insurgency may not want to see a reemergence of smart mobs. As discussed 
earlier, smart mobs are unpredictable and inherently allow other networks with other 
ideas and values to enter. Revolutionary movements are based on some kind of religious, 
ideological or political ideas. It is questionable that they will allow smart mob 
interferenced in their own system. Particularly not after a prolonged battle that most 
certainly has involved human suffering. Hence, the very strategy that helped in an earlier 
phase now becomes a threat. Besides, being armed and in control, the insurgents now 
have more suppressive means to gain control if other types of persuasion should fail. 
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 The other difference is the typical reorganization of the guerillas during 
phase 3. If the current regime does not give in voluntarily, its power base eventually has 
to be destroyed by defeating the incumbent’s military and police forces. In order to be 
efficient on the battlefield, the guerillas must reorganize, and they often do so in a 
hierarchical and conventional manner. In these systems anarchy-like smart-mob behavior 
has fewer conditions for development. What remains are the strategic or tactical elements 
of cyberwar or netwar activities. Information technology will still be useful, even crucial 
to gain victory, but most likely not in a smart mob context.  
 Lastly, late in phase 3 when the insurgent victory seems likely, it is 
conceivable that people will jump on the bandwagon to be associated with the winning 
side. However, this is not true smart-mob behavior, just a natural way of avoiding 
unpleasant consequences. Still, mass uprisings among the people in the last stages have 
the potential to shorten the war and lessen casualties significantly. 
 
D. IMPLICATIONS OF SMART MOB STRATEGIES FOR NCW  
The implications of smart mob behavior for further developing a NCW concept 
are many, but two stand out. First and foremost are the requirements of network centric 
forces to understand and predict the consequences of this type of behavior by opponents 
or actors in low-intensity conflicts. For instance, mass gatherings are extremely 
challenging for military forces not trained nor experienced in police-type work. 
Nevertheless, they will occur wherever military forces are engaged in nontraditional 
missions. The frequent and violent demonstrations in Kosovo and Iraq have proved to be 
very difficult for militaries to handle and there is always a danger that they might 
escalate, turning into very unfavorable events for the forces whose objectives originally 
were to stabilize and protect. In this sense, the insurgent strategies depicted in Figure 11 
apply to the incumbents, but with opposite signs. Hence, understanding the sociological 
impact of the latest trends in the information age will be important both to counter 
insurgent, terrorists and extremist strategies and tactics and to avoid or lessen negative 
reactions in the population of the same. Preemption and prevention based on extensive 
HUMINT and SIGINT intelligence efforts, can choke a mass uprising before it bursts 
into flames; but, time is of essence here since these situations may rapidly escalate. 
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Containment of key individual’s or groups’ influence on larger crowds, following current 
police-principles as seen in Europe before and during large sports events, is one efficient 
method, but it has to be swift and forthright. However, it demands extensive interagency 
cooperation and legal justification. Another method is to expose ill-intended actors’ 
motives publicly and beforehand. This requires detailed knowledge about the key actors 
and their modus operandi. The proposed and inherent capabilities of information enabled 
network centric forces have a better prospect of defeating malicious smart-mob behavior 
if their design includes nontraditional missions as well. For Norway’s case, the armed 
forces should be well suited to include these capabilities in the doctrinal development of 
NCW with their long tradition and experiences in military peace keeping and peace 
enforcing missions. 
 Another important aspect in the development of new wireless information 
technologies and smart-mob types of strategies are the possibilities of developing new 
doctrinal concepts for homeland defense. In Norway’s case, an example could be to 
introduce NCW capabilities in the home guard. The home guard in Norway is a 
considerably large resource,229 and one could imagine the impact of such a force if it 
were truly able to operate autonomously with the advantages of new information 
technology combined with the force’s detailed local knowledge of the cities and rural 
territories. Moreover, the force is already embedded and integrated in society with 
multiple civilian and military nodes and network connections. With the proper doctrinal 
development it could be the key actor in homeland defense alone or in conjunction with 
domestic and allied reinforcements. Neither should one disqualify the Afghan model 
from being used in Norway as well in future worst-case scenarios. In such a model the 
home guard would function as the qualified and required indigenous force.  
The reason a proper doctrinal development is mentioned is that, although a 
modernization of the home guard is recognized, the basic features of the force are not 
likely to change according to the MoD’s and Chief of Defense’s latest proposal. They 
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suggest an upgrading and modernization of the equipment in order to solve “important 
tasks relating to protect infra structure, force protection for national and allied forces and 
storage facilities.”230 Except for a differentiation in the reaction time for different types 
of home guard forces, the tasks remain static and nearly the same as they have been 
throughout the last decades.  
Another path could be the NCW approach, taking advantage of the common home 
guard’s every day use of mobility and wireless technologies, which is likely to be carried 
anyway, and use it for service purposes. The idea of systematically using assets for 
mobilization purposes in the population is nothing new in Norway. Everything, from 
cars, buses, motorcycles and even bicycles have been requisitioned. In the information 
age, laptops, wireless networks, and cell phones could be added to the list. More 
important, however, is the need to make these units autonomous, but with the ability to 
interact and operate with other forces entering their area. Or, home guard units could 
deploy outside their traditional local boundaries, depending on the situation. This requires 
a higher degree of situation awareness and ability for self-synchronization, which should 
be possible if the home guard concept is rethought in terms of smart mobs and the 
characteristics of networked low-intensity actors. Even developments of swarming tactics 
could be possible, if the different home guard territories and entities are seen in 
conjunction with each other. However, a NCW approach for the home guard requires a 
release from a limiting set of static tasks and probably also a deliverance from the 
conventional army’s command and control dominance and doctrinal influence.  
 
E. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the phenomena associated with smart-mob behavior in low-
intensity conflicts within a social context has been discussed. Although, smart-mob 
behavior is based on developments in information technology, particularly in wireless 
networks and wearable mobile devices, it is the anticipated changes in social behavior 
that are significant. Other aspects of smart-mob strategies adequately find their place 
within, for instance, Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s netwar and networks concepts. 
e benefits an insurgency may have of the emergence of Consequently, all the possibl                                                 
230 MoD, Proposition to Parliament No.42 (2003-2004) – Short Version, 13. 
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mobile wireless devices for strategic and tactical purposes have not been discussed. 
These benefits can be substantial, but at the same time severe constraints apply. Emphasis 
has been on the newest trends of smart-mob behavior centered against the insurgent 
problem of getting control over the population while depriving the incumbents the same 
opportunity. 
The greatest benefits of smart-mob behavior seem to occur during the first phase 
of an insurgency. Tolerance within certain regimes may allow smart mobs and 
transnational networked actors to operate and evolve. This allows the insurgency to 
display its message, mobilize support for its cause and establish local and global 
networks and connections. Because of smart mobs anarchistic or uncontrollable nature, 
large crowds may be manipulated and encouraged to demonstrate. Recent mass 
gatherings linked to the world’s top leaders’ summits have more than often turned into 
violent riots. In societies characterized by social disequilibrium, there is a potential for 
revolutionary movements to seize power in the wake of a regime change sparked by the 
mobilization of the masses; but, the timing and social conditions must be advantageous. 
There are also prospects for smart-mob behavior to increase people’s democratic rights 
by effectively massing the crowds. However, whether the outcome, as in the Philippine 
case, can be characterized as a “bloodless revolution” depends more on social structures, 
culture and democratic traditions within society than the convincing power of the mobile 
many.  
As the insurgency moves further up the spiral of violence and eventually crosses 
the thresholds of terrorism and the military horizon, smart-mob behavior will be risky and 
less beneficial. Severe constraints, such as the lack of comprehensive wireless networks 
and mobile devices in the population, security issues and distrust in online social 
relationships and information, reduce the effects of smart-mob strategies. Furthermore, 
the realism of an insurgency being in the underground is not easily compatible with the 
overt activity and needed space of smart-mob behavior. This applies to the information 
and cognitive domains as well as mass gatherings in the physical space. Eventually, when 
the insurgency transforms into more hierarchical and conventional style of political and 
military organizations, smart-mob strategies are no longer required nor wanted. On the 
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contrary, depending on revolutionary movements’ political, ideological or religious 
standpoints, smart-mob behavior may represent a threat to the new regime. 
To conclude, smart mobs and networked actors are likely to change the way 
democratic rights are expressed and fought for in the future. They may influence social 
reforms, as seen in the Zapatista movement or even cause regime changes, as in the 
Philippine case, when certain societal circumstances are in place. However, severe 
constraints apply to smart-mob strategies in revolutionary movements that have no other 
choice or seek to reach their goals by violent means. In this conflict category, the 
information and cognitive domain will also become more important with computerized 
C2 aid, electronic sensors for more efficient intelligence, and wireless mobile devices that 
enhance both parties’ strategies and tactics. But in the end, it will still be the battles in the 
physical world that matter. These battles are, as they always have been in internal low-
intensity conflicts, characterized by many restraints, brute and cruel violence, and fierce 
hand-to-hand combat on the ground that will make smart-mob behavior difficult. 
The strategic and societal consequences of the information revolution in low-
intensity conflicts should also influence how NCW-type forces develop their doctrines 
and organizations in the future. First and foremost is the ability to understand and predict 
the consequences of smart-mob type behavior by opponents or other networked actors in 
order to counter these strategies properly. The vulnerabilities inherently found in smart-
mob strategies should be taken advantage of. Detailed knowledge about key actors and 
their modus operandi is required in this regard. In addition, there are also doctrinal and 
organizational opportunities in smart-mob strategies that could be exploited to enhance, 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
120 
VI. CONCLUSION - TRANSFORMATION IN A NETWORK 
CENTRIC DIRECTION 
A. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE AND TRANSFORMATION 
STRATEGIES 
Early in this thesis military transformation was defined as an optimizing strategy 
that weighs changes in doctrine, organization, capabilities, training, education and 
logistics in order to fit the defense structure to current and future security challenges. The 
Norwegian transformation process is explained as a wheel where concept development, 
doctrine development, operational lessons learned and technological development 
interact in the transformation process. Interacting links between these elements contribute 
to an adaptive defense structure.231 The focus of this thesis has been the strategic factors 
that are influencing the NCW concept and subsequent doctrinal development.  
 
 
Figure 12.   Transformation Wheel (MoD, 2003) 
 
However, the term transformation does not fully describe the underlying vision or 
the different warfighting concepts that transformation efforts are supposed to support. 
Clearly, a proactive process that aims to “create a defense organization which is better 
able to manage unpredictability and the broad spectrum of defense tasks”232 is an optimal 
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232 Ibid. 
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goal, but when the transformation process itself gets as much attention as it arguably has 
at the moment, combined with a wilderness of new terms, fragmented ideas and 
experimental concepts, it is not easy to identify or understand what the underlying visions 
or key concepts of the transformation really are. There is a danger that the term will 
become as unsettling as the term RMA became in the U.S. military in the late nineties as 
a framework for explaining the emergence of new warfighting concepts. Hence, RMA 
was replaced by transformation by the National Defense Panel to revitalize the 
innovative processes initiated by, amongst other studies, Joint Vision 2010.233 It is argued 
that similar concerns still exist and, concerning the Norwegian transformation process, 
defense policy and military planning for the next long-term period are not yet pointing 
out any coherent new warfighting concept. The old and official Norwegian defense 
concept, which also determines the current doctrine developments, 234 remains. This 
concept is certainly not visionary, but it does state some important values and political 
guidelines. Four mutually reinforcing principles constitute the defense concept: 
− A balanced and flexible national defense.  
− Military co-operation with allies and participation in international defense-
related co-operation. 
− Total defense concept and other civil and military defense-related co-
operation. 
− The principle of conscription. 
Clearly, this concept is not aiming to move the military into the information age 
and there are no other comprehensive, visionary and authoritatively Joint Future 2020-
type documents based on Norwegian conditions that may transform the Norwegian armed 
forces into netcentric type units for the information age. The significance of not having 
such a common point of departure is unfortunate because it allows all types of ideas, both 
antiquated, bureaucratic consolidated, and innovative, to mix in an uncoordinated 
fashion. A better vision of the future seems to have become the transformation process 
itself, aiming at an adaptive defense structure where the “Norwegian Armed Forces shall 
ading organization - that deliver what is needed, when be a learning, vibrant and le
                                                 
233 William Owens, “The Once and Future Revolution in Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 
Summer 2002, 58. 
234 Norwegian Chief of Defense, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine Del A - Grunnlag, Oslo, 
February 2000, 14. 
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needed, where needed.”235 Coming, as it does from the MoD, this vision is also 
authoritative, and certainly, operational concepts and doctrines for the information age 
will be developed accordingly within the transformation wheel. The question is whether 
such a vision is specific enough to provide necessary guidelines in a 10 - 30 year 
perspective, as the function of a vision or defense concept in reality should do to ensure 
proper doctrinal developments.    
The emerging Norwegian approach to NCW has the prospect of becoming a new 
and authoritative concept with the potential to provide the necessary guidelines, but it 
needs to be expanded. So far, concept development is operationally and tactically 
focused, based on networking the different components within the military structure 
using new information technology. This thesis has offered an analysis of some of the 
strategic factors that need to be studied if NCW shall become the key defense concept for 
the information age. Moreover, NCW is part of the transformation process, but not yet at 
the core as it should be, in order to transform the military from the industrial age into 
information age forces.236 The defense minister’s New Year speech at the Oslo Military 
Society exemplifies this. Her speech highlighted eight important challenges:237 
− Compulsory military service – the cornerstone 
− Modernized Officer Candidate Schools 
− More junior officers with experience 
− Predictable availability of personnel for operations 
− From support structure to activity and the “sharp end” 
− Quality upgrade for the Home Guard 
− A network-based defense 
− Strategic management of investments 
Although these challenges were not specified in a prioritized order, “a networked 
-based defense” stands out as an isolated effort. In conjunction with the other issues it 
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236 Admiral Arthur Cebrowski in Testimony delivered on “Military Transformation” before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee Hearing. Washington, D.C, 9 April 2002 
237 Kristin Krohn Devold,: From course change to military transformation  New year address at Oslo 
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123 
signals that NCW is not yet seen as an imperative and integrated part in the 
transformation process. If it were, the list could in fact be turned upside down, where the 
other issues were addressed in the context of NCW. In its present form, NCW might not 
be the proper concept or even right term to use for how Norway should contribute with  
military means to future conflicts, but we have enough theory, experiences and related 
experimental doctrines to outline a more tangible and comprehensive concept. In this 
regard, the Norwegian adapted term Network-Based Defense or perhaps Net-centric 
Defense may be more appropriate than the term Network Centric Warfare, because it is 
not specifically war related and includes entities outside the military force structure. It 
encompasses all levels of conflicts and could also meet the requirements of net-centric 
activities, cooperation or integration across services, joint units, inter-agencies and 
multinational entities. Thus, NCW is just one aspect and becomes the warfighting 
concept, as IW is to IO, used during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote 
specific objectives over specific adversaries. This distinction is more than semantics 
considering the emotional effect of the term “warfare” to non-military actors, whom net-
centric operations very much depend upon.  
Furthermore, focus on transformation is good for changing the organizational 
culture, making units and individuals receptive for change. But too much focus on the 
process can also be counterproductive. Transformation involves such a broad spectrum of 
technology, organizations, culture and processes238 that without direction, it produces 
opportunities for excuses to do “business as usual,” or to display the impressions of 
urgent activities, within the disguise of clever “buzzwords” that in fact are non-
productive. An intense transformation process, aiming to change every aspect of the 
organization could also be too much to ask for, since the organization itself must create 
the incentives to transform.239 In a vaguely defined transformation process this may be 
extremely difficult because such a process will depend heavily on bottom up engagement 
in addition to good leadership. Arguably, the emerging NCW concept has much better 
potential to substantiate and unite the many challenges and objectives currently “floating” 
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in existing transformation strategies. Thus, the continuous process of a transformation 
strategy may continue as a corporate strategy for MoD and defense management, but the 
process needs tangible direction in addition to just being proactive and flexible. The key 
point is that without a relatively clear vision of the future, or at least a reasonable 
achievable concept of why, against whom and how military affairs are going to be 
conducted, it will be difficult to realize expedient military transformation in the 
information age and beyond. Consequently, if NCW offers the prospect of delivering 
what its proponents suggests, it should be at the core of every main objective in the 
Norwegian transformation efforts.   
 
B. TOWARDS A NETWORKCENTRIC CONCEPT 
Highlighting networking as the key strategic and operational concept for the 
future implies some changes for the transformation strategies that lie ahead. Mentioned 
earlier was the method of rapid spiral transformation to achieve the desired agility in the 
transformation process. As a point of departure, some of the issues discussed in this thesis 
can be viewed within this strategy.  The rapid spiral transformation process consists of 
three parts that must be seen in conjunction with each other.240 Part one consists of 
continuous small steps of evolutionary changes; part two features many medium jumps 
exploring new opportunities; and part three involves taking a few big jumps that could be 
revolutionary. The key is to fit these three different approaches to a terrain of future 
strategic, operational and tactical challenges accordingly. The different approaches imply 
different risks and gains considerations, and each change needs to be studied closely 
before implementation. However, full knowledge of anticipated consequences will never 
be achievable, and without taking risks, the dividends can be expected to be equally 
small. It must also be remembered that even small steps may entail large risks insofar as a 
military’s own competitive advantage is dependent on its opponent’s innovative 
strategies and force capabilities as well. 
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Some of Norway’s capabilities connected to homeland defense and the protection 
of vital interests are areas that ought to be explored in continuous small steps. Without 
predictable consequences, these capabilities should be sustained and developed in an 
evolutionary manner, with the objective to keep them on a local maximum. The 
conscription system and the systems for preserving and defending Norwegian maritime 
interests are some of the capabilities which should be carefully analyzed with regard to 
the consequences before major changes are implemented. For instance, the current Coast 
Guard concept has been developed over decades and has managed to build a well-
founded trust among the coastal population, the domestic fleet and international actors in 
Norwegian waters. The usability of this force may be increased in a military sense by 
exploiting the force even more with regard to better network centric capabilities and 
operational concepts, but its primary mission must never be forgotten. On the other hand, 
many of the network centric capabilities needed for command and control will also 
enhance the usability of the Coast Guard in its primary role as well. In addition, the 
likelihood that a crisis could evolve from a minor incident in the North Atlantic is quite 
possible. An important aspect of the NCW concept is also the ability to understand any 
situation earlier and in a broader context. Preemption of conflicts is a major goal. This 
will involve entities used for everyday operations as well as combatant elements. 
Therefore, units such as the coast guard, maritime patrol aircraft, border patrols, and 
security forces should be equally netted to the larger and “sharper end” of the network. 
Similarly, if the compulsory military service system is not adjusted to offer conscripts a 
meaningful service within a new information age defense structure, it will slowly decline, 
drawing valuable resources away from a professional force in need of large investments 
in new materiel and doctrinal development. Consequently, a continuous evaluation of 
these capabilities must take place and when the time is appropriate larger changes may be 
introduced. A conscription system that focuses on older and better educated conscripts, 
instead of today’s eighteen to twenty-year olds, can be more useful for NCW forces 
engaged in, for instance, information intensive low-intensity conflicts. Also, gender may 
mean less in a net-centric compulsory service, which opens for new discussion on the 
possibility of drafting women as well as men. Ultimately, before changes are made, these 
issues must be grounded in dynamic and farsighted NCW doctrines.    
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In most other areas of the Norwegian defense structure there is a need for many 
medium jumps that will continuously explore and expand the current capabilities within 
new doctrines, organizations and technological systems. The benefits of upgrading some 
of the legacy forces in a “hi-low” mix of entities that will promote doctrinal NCW 
development have been pointed out. The slogan that “quality counts more than quantity” 
might be particularly true for information age forces, but old capabilities should not 
discarded without measuring them thoroughly against a net-centric concept. 
Technological sophistication does not automatically translate to NCW capabilities and 
much can be done by simpler means. For instance, local knowledge is better achieved by 
those who still inhabit the area than by satellite or air surveillance, and runners can still 
transport vital information as well as the electromagnetic spectrum. Not all information 
will be time-critical in a NCW concept. Thus, in a Norwegian context, it is extremely 
valuable that a capability such as the Home Guard, which also involves preserving one of 
the most important qualities in a country’s homeland defense - the will to fight - is 
continued and seriously integrated in a NCW implementation. In fact, with a proper 
doctrinal development for the Home Guard, in conjunction with professional forces and 
allied reinforcement, an overall credible homeland defense could be maintained. That 
would contribute to resolving one of the main lines of disagreement in the Norwegian 
transformation process, namely the usability of entities in both an allied and homeland 
context.    
Development of a NCW Home Guard capability may be an example of the larger 
jumps that also are part of a rapid spiral transformation strategy. Other factors that may 
change the Norwegian MoD and the defense structure profoundly have also been 
discussed. An increased use of the elements of soft power is one area where the benefits 
could be large. Truly exploiting the elements of IO and public diplomacy require a 
fundamental cultural change in how we collect, process, and distribute/display 
information, but the end-result could significantly change how we conduct future 
operations. Together with the different types of knowledge needed to understand friends 
and enemies in the information age, and in what many believe will be the dominant form 
of future wars - low-intensity conflicts - the information requirements will fundamentally 
change the intelligence business, influence concepts of command and control, and 
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redefine military organizations at most levels. The functions of intelligence: collection, 
counterintelligence, analysis and covert action,241 must change and focus more on 
information that is likely to influence friends’, allies’ and adversaries’ information and 
cognitive domains more than their physical capabilities.  This is nothing new in military 
affairs, since influencing decision makers has been a crucial aspect since the days of Sun 
Tzu. However, the information revolution enables processing and analyzing more 
complex information structures than a single commander’s brain ever could, which can 
be difficult enough, considering the unpredictability of recent adversaries such as 
Milosevic and Hussein. Moreover, the information revolution coupled with a 
reorganization of intelligence efforts may enable the understanding and prediction of 
complex concepts such as smart-mob behavior and tipping points. Taking into 
consideration these latest sociological trends in the information age can prove to be 
decisive if information age forces are to fight “smarter” in the future. Few have doubts 
about the RMA hypothesis on the conventional battlefield and for high-intensity armored 
warfare, but this is not the form of war where Western countries will meet their greatest 
challenges in the future. 242 Even if Norway is geographically located at a “safe” distance 
from most of the world’s trouble spots, this type of exported security is expressively 
stated as a mission for the Norwegian military. Consequently, doctrine development and 
the incorporation of relevant NCW capabilities that enable the armed forces to operate in 
an LIC environment will be increasingly more important in the future.  
In conclusion, and as depicted in the model for strategic planning which was the 
starting point for this thesis, the impact of NCW development has been set in a strategic 
perspective. The aim was to identify some of the factors that are important to 
understanding subsequent mission challenges, opportunities and constraints. In most 
areas, NCW concepts entail so many profound changes that only a few issues that will 
have an important impact on future forms of war have been discussed. The underlying 
premises found in Norway’s strategic environment will always be important and should 
function as a driver in the concept development. Hence, a comprehensive national 
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strategy based on Norway’s geopolitical situation and vital interest, which also includes a 
military doctrine, becomes important. Currently, the situation demands a need for 
comprehensive and independent NCW capabilities in addition to a strong allied 
affiliation. Likewise, a continuous adaptation of the NCW concept to the features of 
future potential adversaries and the changing characteristics of the nature of conflict must 
be emphasized. Many other challenges are barely mentioned. For instance, there are the 
challenges connected with the NCW implementation process itself. Allied and inter-
governmental interoperability, joint force training requirements, the linkage of strategic, 
operational and tactical levels, and further research and developments, are all issues that 
will be crucial if the NCW concept is to be realized. Last but not least, the direction of the 
transformation process itself will be crucial. Vice Admiral Cebrowski stated that, “When 
we think about transformation we divide it into three distinct areas. Transformation of the 
role of defense in society; transformation of the management of defense; and force 
transformation.”243 This distinction is useful to concentrate efforts in a transformation 
strategy, but one of the main conclusions that emerges from analyzing NCW through 
strategic lenses, is the fact that the elements of NCW will intervene in all these areas 
simultaneously - as a truly embedded network should. Consequently, if net-centric 
operations are seen as the cornerstone in future warfighting concepts, it should indeed be 
pursued on a broader level in a comprehensive Norwegian transformation strategy. 
Despite its size, Norway possesses both the resources and competence to do so. It is first 
and foremost a question of networking national resources. In so doing Network Centric 
Defense has the potential to become a feasible and holistically defense alternative.  
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